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ABSTRACT

"Universities," the monthly newsletter of University Professors for Academic Order, began publication in August 1970. This anthology is for the most part a compilation of representative articles printed in it from the beginning to May 1973. Taken as a whole, they delineate a theory of the traditional university much in need of articulation during a period of rapid change in our conception of the university. The contents are divided into the following sections: freedom and order; the disease defined (intellectual decay, radicalized academy, bias and discrimination, declining standards), the politicized academy, and a strategy of freedom in order (suggestions for confronting the radicalized campus, teacher evaluation, limits of academic freedom, tenure safeguards). The final section includes reviews of books by Nisbet, Buchanan and Devletoglou, Hook, Dietz, Glazer, Frankel, Ulam, and Barzun. Throughout the brief span of its existence, the University Professors for Academic Order has sought to uphold by word and example the ideals of the traditional university. This book is a further contribution to that end. (Author/PG)

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Continuity in Crisis: The University at Bay

Edited by
Charles A. Moser

With a foreword by
Cong. Philip M. Crane

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Editor's Note

Universitas, the monthly newsletter of University Professors for Academic Order, began publication in August 1970. This anthology is for the most part a compilation of representative articles printed in it from the beginning to May 1973. Taken as a whole, they delineate a theory of the traditional university much in need of articulation during a period of rapid change in our conception of the university.

All the contributors are members of University Professors for Academic Order, and most articles originally appeared in *Universitas* for the month indicated at the end of each. Two articles—those by Roche and van der Kroef on Affirmative Action—are reprinted directly from other publications, and one piece—that by Henry Myers on the case of Dr. Filimon Kowtoniuk—is here published for the first time.

Throughout the brief span of its existence, UPAO has sought to uphold by word and example the ideals of the traditional university. This book is a further contribution to that end.

Charles A. Moser
January 1974

Foreword

by
Congressman
Philip M. Crane

In recent years the American university has been under serious attack from those who disparage its traditional role and function.

The criticism which has come from the New Left is not essentially the same as that of the academician, who sees increasing bureaucratization and "training" rather than "education" and who fears that we may, in fact, be presiding over the end of liberal education in America.

In his important volume about the American university, former Columbia University Dean and Provost Jacques Barzun says this:

> The American University has upheaved itself to 'catch up' and 'modernize,' words that mean: has ceased to be a sheltered spot for study only; has come into the market place and answered the cries for help uttered by government, industry, and the general public; has busily pursued the enthusiasm of our utopian leaders of thought, both patrons and big foundations; has served the country by carrying on research for national goals; has finally recognized social needs by undertaking to teach the quite young, the middle-aged, the disabled, the deprived, the misdirected, and the maladjusted.

Dr. Barzun notes that every new field cultivated within the academy creates a new claim by the community. Thus the school of social work aids the poor, the school of architecture aids the slums, the school of business advises the small tradesman, the school of dentistry runs a free clinic, the school of law gives legal aid, and the undergraduate college supplies volunteers to hospitals, recreation centers, and remedial schools.

Thus occupied with social service, the university has often slighted its primary functions of teaching, research, and thinking. Woodrow Wilson's concept of the university—now seventy-six years in the past—seems to have disappeared:

> A little world; but not perplexed, living with a singleness of purpose not found without; the home of sagacious men, debaters of the world's questions every day . . . and yet a place removed—calm science seated there, recluse, ascetic like a nun; not knowing that the world passes, not caring, if the truth come in answer to her prayer.

Truth, however, has now often been replaced by an active involvement in the affairs of the day. Many young people believe that the university is responsible for everything, and capable of all things. They expect the university to end war, eliminate racism, and decontaminate the cities. As Professor Henry Steele Commager has said, they want "the university to be contemporary—to deal with every issue as it arises, plunge into every controversy, offer courses in every problem, be involved in everything."

Dr. Commager contrasts the activists' attitude with the more traditional idea of the academic community: "They are unable to understand—and many presidents and professors are unable to understand—that the university is the one institution whose conspicuous duty is not to be involved in everything, and above all not to be so involved in contemporary problems that it cannot deal with problems that are not merely contemporary. The solution of contemporary problems is the business of politics and government. The business of the university is to preserve the heritage of the past, to anticipate the problems of the future, and to train students able to solve the problems of the present."

During the past decade, as we have witnessed student strikes, university closings, the bombing of buildings, and the virtual elimination of free speech on many campuses, we have been forced to confront the challenge of those who have, in effect, called for a university diametrically opposed to our traditional ideas of what higher education is meant to accomplish.

The United States and the entire English speaking world have seen the campus as a sanctuary where ideas are studied, debated, analyzed and readied for future action. The activists want a political university. According to Fred Hechinger of *The New York Times:* "The American scheme views faculty and administration as the permanent arbiters of goals and ground rules, with the students cast in the role of transient participants. The other scheme involves students in alliance with compatible faculty members, in command of political and ideological goals."

At the present time, freedom of speech is under serious attack at our leading colleges and universities. Those engaged in this attack do so on the basis of a philosophical hostility to free speech. In his volume *A Critique Of Pure Tolerance*, Professor Herbert Marcuse, one of the major influences upon both student and faculty activists, states that people who are confused about politics really do not know how to use freedom of speech correctly. They turn it into "an instrument for absolving servitude," so that "that which is radically evil now appears as good." Having established this premise, Marcuse recommends "the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, racial and religious discrimination or which oppose the extension of public services." For him, the correct political attitude is one of "intolerance against movements from the right and toleration of movements from the left."

The result of this, as we observed through the nineteen sixties, was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara entering a police wagon to avoid crowds at Harvard General Lewis Hershey being forced from the stage at Howard University, students charging the podium at Brown University as General Earle Wheeler spoke, a professor pinioned and clubbed across the face at Cornell.

In discussing these events Professor Charles Susskind of the University of California remarked: "I don't know why they think of themselves as the New Left. Their methods look to me much more like those of the Nazi students I saw in the 1930's harassing deans, hounding professors, and their families, making public disturbances and interfering with lectures, until only professors sympathetic with the Nazi cause remained."

Professors not sympathetic with the New Left have been forced to leave many universities. Dr. Lewis S. Feuer, who after nine years of teaching philosophy and social science at Berkeley left for the University of Toronto, stated that "freedom of discussion presupposes that the chief sides in any national debate will be presented. In Berkeley, the supporters of President Johnson's foreign policy are, in effect, denied a forum on the Berkeley campus. The New Left has made it nearly impossible for the national administration's standpoint to be presented to Berkeley students."

In recent days we have heard it said that the campuses are now quiet, that student activism has given way to a return to serious studies, and that the politicization of the university is no longer a serious threat. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. An event at Harvard University in October of 1973 indicates that free speech is in as much danger today as at the height of student protests several years ago.

At that time, pressure from the Harvard Black Law Students Association resulted in the cancellation of a scheduled debate between Roy Innis, national director of the Congress on Racial Equality, and Dr. William Shockley, the Nobel Laureate who has espoused the controversial genetic theory that intelligence is linked with race.

Howard Brownstein, president of the Harvard Law School Forum, cited "expressions of displeasure within segments of the Harvard community" and a fear of disruptions as reasons for the cancellation. He added that the Forum "regrets that conditions are such at Harvard that a free and open debate cannot be held on any subject, no matter how irrational and pernicious that subject appears to some members of the community."

It was not only student militants who opposed the Harvard debate. Discussing the circumstances under which the debate was cancelled, Professor Martin Kilson, a leading black academician at Harvard, noted that "a disturbing feature of the cancellation . . . was that besides the emotional opposition of militant Negro law students—a form of intellectual infantilism not uncommon in the past six years among both black and white militants—faculty members and the Law School Administration also discouraged the debate."

Professor Kilson reported that Derrick Bell, a black professor of law, argued that the "Harvard Law School shouldn't be open to any view," because "it isn't open to every view anyway." Dean Albert Sacks informed the officers of the Forum that the Shockley-Innis debate "would in all likelihood be a circus" and counseled the Forum's officers to "give careful consideration to the question whether it wished to proceed with the planned program." He even provided an incentive for cancellation, offering to reimburse the Forum for any financial deficit incurred from the cancellation.

These actions by faculty members, states Dr. Kilson, "suggest the unfortunate spread of insensitivity toward unfettered discussion at a great institution of higher learning like Harvard. We can now expect more actions of this sort around a number of emotionally charged issues . . . The most distressing feature of this whole dreadful affair are the few signs within the Harvard community of the kind of outrage that is necessary to reverse the spread of insensitivity toward free speech and public life."

The *New York Times* editorially lamented the decline of free speech at Harvard. It referred to this incident as "a sad commentary on the state of intellectual tolerance in the academic community." Professor Kilson concluded that "something very awful is happening to American intellectual life."

What has happened to American intellectual life, in large measure, is its politicization. This thesis was set forth at a conference held in Vienna in October 1973 on "The Crisis Of The University." At that time Professor Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School warned educators against active political commitments.

Pluralism disappeared from universities, Professor Bickel said, when they put their resources to work to attack practical problems of society rather than engaging in the objective pursuit of knowledge. A consequence of this, he contended, was the death not only of diversity but even of free inquiry altogether.

Throughout this period—when the attacks upon academic freedom were mounting—University Professors For Academic Order has been a beacon light, continuing to fight for a free and open university, and continuing to believe that the function of the university was something other than political partisanship and sloganeering.

It has been my great privilege to participate in this organization and to witness the impact it has had upon the academic scene. It has resisted the attacks not only of the New Left, but also of government agencies which, in the name of "nondiscrimination," have sought to impose upon universities a racial and sexual quota system of faculty hiring. Each assault upon academic freedom and the integrity of the university has been met with a vigorous response by University Professors for Academic Order.

This anthology of articles which has been gathered together from *Universitas*, the journal of UPAO, represents the best thinking of some of the nation's leading academicians on the current questions being faced in the whole field of higher education.

With men and women such as these joining together in defense of the traditional university, there is every reason to believe that the current assaults upon it will be defeated. At a later time the entire academic community will acknowledge the debt which it owes to the members of UPAO. Men may never be prophets in their own time and place, but those who have fought the lonely fight for the integrity of intellectual pursuits know that they fight not only for themselves and for today, but for the generations which follow. It is because of those who have had the courage to make this fight that there is a real hope for the future.

Freedom and Order

Why UPAO?

by

Charles A. Moser
The George Washington University

IN THE FINAL ACCOUNTING, faculties are responsible for the current crisis in American universities, and it is they who must discover a way out of the difficulties with which the universities are confronted. While the current turmoil on our campuses is fundamentally disruptive, it does have the virtue of compelling those who have dedicated their lives to the academy to pose some fundamental questions about the role of the university in society, the scope of higher education, the place of research in it, the relationship between instructor and instructed, and the composition of faculties. If these questions are answered satisfactorily–unhappily we have no guarantee of this–the universities may emerge from this transitional period stronger than before they entered it. But these problems can only be resolved by those who have the deepest and most continuing interest in our institutions of higher learning–the professoriate.

As citizens, the members of University Professors for Academic Order are dedicated to the proposition that, for all its imperfections, the principles upon which American society is based are superior to the principles upon which other societies have been built. As academics, the members of University Professors for Academic Order are dedicated to the proposition that the university should be a place for instruction, learning and the seeking of the truth through research and reflection, and *not* an instrument of social change or an organization for the furthering of political objectives within society at large. One of the most disturbing developments of recent years in this country has been the incipient totalitarianization of our entire society effected by insistent and intolerant demands that no social, religious, educational or other organization remain apolitical. The universities, the schools, scholarly associations, churches, and all sorts of other organizations have been called upon to politicize themselves by taking stands on questions which should legitimately be handled through the political process and political organizations existing or created for this purpose. The causes on which it has been demanded that stands be taken have, of course, been presented as unexceptionable ones—elimination of poverty and racism, cleansing of the environment, and particularly opposition to the Vietnam war. Now these problems are not at all so one-sided as they are usually made out to be, but even if they were, the demand that such institutions as the churches and universities take official stands upon them must be bitterly resisted. For the absence of social institutions free of political control and uninterested in political questions is the hallmark of the totalitarian society; and it is of the essence of a free society that there be large areas within it from which politics is *on principle* excluded. In our society the universities have long been institutions in which, theoretically at least, politics played no genuine role. But now they have gone far down the road toward transforming themselves into completely political organs.

The present situation did not develop overnight. Even in the 1950's political criteria were in fact often applied when decisions had to be made on the hiring and firing of instructors. To be sure, the situation was concealed behind a decent hypocrisy; those in authority usually felt that a man whose political convictions were not liberal had somehow not been properly educated, despite his years of internship in institutions of higher learning, and that therefore he could not be a qualified scholar and teacher. A person of this type had to present almost overwhelming evidence of scholarly ability before he would be hired in a major university. The utilization of political criteria in deciding on faculty appointments seems to have been most extensive at certain of the most prestigious universities, and now has given rise to the, at first glance, paradoxical situation in which the best universities have been least faithful to their calling and collapsed most abjectly in the face of the radical assault upon their autonomy, while institutions not of the first rank have remained relatively truer to the traditional idea of the university.

When the radical assault upon the universities began in good earnest a few years ago, the professoriate was still by and large committed to the idea of the university as an apolitical arena of learning. However, it made the catastrophic mistake of assuming that these principles were so deeply embedded in the university milieu that they really did not need to be stated, restated, refined and upheld. This was a vast error. Preached constantly as it was against little overt opposition, the radical view of the university as a political entity has nearly supplanted the traditional view of the university, to the extent that students are now shocked when they occasionally hear the traditional view stated! The current attempts to close down universities in response to various national political issues is an advanced stage of the campaign to politicize them entirely. There is still a great deal of instinctive, passive resistance to this campaign, but in all probability, it will not endure without theoretical justification and underpinning. Thus the task facing the members of UPAO is, first, to admit the bitter fact that, largely because of our own negligence, the traditional view of the university, including the notion of academic freedom, has been replaced in the minds of a majority of the university community by the view of the university as a political organization; and, second, to regard ourselves now as a minority but to take advantage of the residual strength of our position among students and especially faculty, advance the theoretical justifications for our positions, and mount a counteroffensive to recapture as much as possible of that which has been taken from us. Most of us are temperamentally uninclined to preach our views or work organizationally to promote them. We have, however, arrived at a point where we in fact have no option if the universities are to emerge from their present chaos in anything like the form we would wish them to adopt.

September 1970

University Professors for *Legitimate* Academic Order

by

Franklin Debrot

ONE THING THAT INVARIABLY fails to come up in debates among students (with the exception of Y.A.F. circles) on the subject of force or violence is the notion of legitimacy. Whether the debate takes place at Columbia University in the midst of violence perpetrated by students against fellow students and established authority, whether it be a debate among students at a peaceful midwestern private college, wherever it takes place, the failure of the participants to grasp the crucial importance of legitimacy as related to order, and by extension force as an instrumentality of legitimate power exercised in maintaining the general good, is striking but usually not noted. Having found that some representatives of authority are remiss in their duties, adolescent wisdom has now, in the colorful words of William James, thrown out the baby with the bath water. But this is not confined to the adolescents among us, or even to the academy. Mr. Tom Wicker, the *New York Times* columnist, consistently confuses the force of the military in Vietnam and the force employed by the police with the violence of the revolutionary and the criminal. Lumping them together, he condemned them both as immoral. And therein lies the rationale of the New Left. *National Review* properly chided Mr. Wicker for his blunder, but in academic circles his error has more the aura of an established truth than a blunder. Who has not heard a pacifist colleague, righteously indignant, fulminating on the topic of the evil of violence *especially* when it is exercised by those Who Should Know Better?

What is usually overlooked is that the moralists' conception of legitimacy is akin to that of the rulers of the Soviet Union, Red China and Hitler's Germany. That is, since they refuse to recognize legitimate authority based on constitutional law, ultimately grounded in values derived from a transcendent reality, and known through a living tradition the totalitarians base authority on power alone. And power alone, without the legitimacy that gives power its moral prerogative, is pure force and potential violence to be exercised at the whim of any individual or group who wields it. The individuals on our campuses who proclaim their inability to distinguish between force exercised legitimately and force exercised illegitimately, notwithstanding their sloganeering and posturing to the contrary, usually end by justifying certain forms of violence through their own innovative basis for legitimacy: direct personal insight. This is what we are faced with then, a manifest hypocrisy of such gall that one is left gawking in disbelief before it.

Insofar as order has been associated in the minds of many with mere constraint, we must make an effort to assert the positive aspect of maintaining order. *University Professors for Academic Order* is for *legitimate* academic order, and this, it should be emphasized, is an order inseparable from freedom and the dignity and worth of the individual.

It is true that in recent years, with the tremendous influx of students on our campuses and the burgeoning of new departments in areas of study not previously dealt with, the personal factor in college life has been largely lost. Students live in huge, multi-storied dormitories and must contend with an implacable bureaucracy and excessive academic rigmarole. The net effect is to leave the student lost in a sea of faces. In such an atmosphere the temptation to emphasize the quantitative at the expense of the qualitative is too great to be resisted.

The maintenance of legitimate order should encompass a positive effort to rediscover in our colleges and universities the personal values of traditional liberal education. The steps we take to achieve this—and they should be both personal as well as collective—ought to be high on the agenda of our organization. In this sense, then, we stand not merely for the *status quo* nor is our purpose that of a totalitarian state: the dissemination of useful knowledge to effectuate the maximum material good of the state, and propaganda to guarantee the uncritical loyalty of its citizens. We believe in the transcendentally bestowed dignity of the human person, wherein lies the ultimate basis for all true legitimacy. And this is the vital distinction between being for order in a free system and under a totalitarian state.

March 1972

Professing Academic Order

by

Jerzy Hauptmann
Park College

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE scene is remarkably quiet nowadays. Gone are the days of great unrest, protest movements, and violence. Gone too are the days of faculty search for solutions to the problems creating the unrest. Even the political scene has quieted down. There are no more reasons to protest our involvement in Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi. It seems as if an era of normalcy has returned to the American campus.

UPAO was born in crisis. It was the response of a segment of the American academy to campus politicization. Since this politicization is seemingly receding today, one could ask whether UPAO has not outlived its usefulness. Has order, so central to the name of our association, really been preserved? Does the return to normalcy perhaps suggest that there is no justification for the continued existence of UPAO?

The very posing of such questions indicates that the American academic scene has been examined in only a superficial way. In reality, behind the calm of normalcy one can find major problems which call for solutions, although these problems do not lend themselves always and too easily to militant statement. All American universities and colleges, both public and private, are facing severe economic pressures. The passing of peak enrollments forces them to search out and compete for students. The national concern for a re-examination of priorities compels them to find ways to justify their continued existence. The students' continuing quest for relevance impels them to examine their curricula for ways to respond to it.

These pressures on the academy are the source of the new dangers facing it. When financial problems arise, it is so easy to revert to the convenient yardsticks of economy and efficiency, and in their name to reorganize structures and reassign responsibilities. The two "E's" are extremely attractive to state legislatures, Boards of Trustees, state commissions on higher education and college business managers. They merrily begin to insist on quantitative measurements of teaching loads, professorial performance, and costs per credit hour, hoping in this way to cut expenses and to create an impression of improved efficiency. They forget that the academy was built not on quantifiable factors, but on quality. They revamp organizational structures and create new ones simply to cover up their lack of new ideas while pretending to a serious concern for more efficient operation.

The search for students forces admissions officials to lower admission requirements and to propose that classroom standards take into account factors beside academic performance. To persuade society, the community, legislatures, and others that the college still has reason to exist, glorified pictures of the closeness between college and community or society are painted. The academy is pictured as responsive to all needs of the environment, and able to adjust quickly to these changing needs. Structures, programs, and curricula can easily be devised to show, *e.g.*, how we can meet today's demand for social workers in the inner city, while tomorrow—should it become necessary—we shall be able equally to respond to a demand for social workers in the declining rural areas. To keep students the academy transforms itself into a response to the students' expressed interests without any regard for their meaning, value, or character.

In the face of such a situation faculties have reacted ambivalently. Some simply submit to any kind of pressure, arguing that with the present market situation it is better to have some job than none at all. Occasionally a fight is started to block some small undigestible item, and then a victory on this one minor front is disproportionately exaggerated, in view of other retreats. Other faculties, especially in the larger institutions, think organization—even unionization—the only way to resist some of the pressures and to increase their own bargaining power. In both cases the responses to pressures are essentially economic, whereas the problems are by no means of economic nature, even if some appear to be.

The problem of the American academy is that it is losing its identity while fighting for survival. The order of the American academy is being eroded and those who are supposed to defend it—both administrations and faculties—have been distracted from its defense. More than that, the enemies of order are no longer only outside the campus. They are in our midst, on the college campus, even among college faculties. This makes the defense of order the more difficult.

In such a battle the notion of academic order tends to vanish in problems of economy, of finance, of student numbers, of curricular changes, and of relevance. And here is exactly where UPAO enters the scene. The reason for UPAO's existence is not economic in nature, although UPAO members are certainly interested in their own economic welfare. Neither is the reason for UPAO's existence curricular in nature, since its members have a variety of educational views. UPAO exists because its members believe in the values of academic order. This is not a defense of the *status quo*, however, since UPAO members may be found frequently in the first ranks of innovators and idea-bearers on the campus. It is rather the concern for the clarification of the nature of academic order, for the values inherent in this order, for the cultural insights this order embodies, for the national ideas this order expresses. And this order is endangered by the current responses to the pressures on the academy.

And so UPAO is not engaged simply in a defense, trying to man the walls of the academic citadel even though the barbarians already have scaled some of them. Ours is not a defense, not even an unmasking of the threatening barbarians, but rather an affirmation of a position. This position implies that the academy has to be different from other institutions, with its own standards and its own goals. This does not imply constant tension with the environment, but rather confronting the environment with standards which do not change, with values which do not pass away, with truths which do not shift with every changing fad and fashion.

How can this be achieved? The clarification of the nature of the order to be preserved is of primary importance. UPAO must be *responsive* to what its members say, the way they view the situation. It cannot become a bureaucratic organization in which the officers make statements on behalf of members who are never consulted. UPAO has to become more *visible* on the American academic scene. More members on more campuses, programs sponsored by UPAO chapters, involvement in local campus affairs: these are the ways to achieve such visibility. And then comes *impact*. UPAO must take a stand on the major academic issues of the day and speak up for the order which is to be preserved.

Issuing pronouncements and being visible are, however, not enough. The name of our organization declares that we are "for academic order," but also that we are "university professors." And this means that we, even as individuals, must profess the academic order we stand for. This points to a course of action for every one of us: on our local campuses we must become professors for academic order to serve as rallying points for colleagues who think as we do. Such collegial groups are the real dams against the tides unleashed by the barbarians of our day.

February 1973

The Disease Defined

Intellectual Decay on the American Campus

by

John P. East
East Carolina University

MANY INVOLVED IN COLLEGE and university teaching have become increasingly distressed by the continued intellectual deterioration on our campuses. As Thomas Molnar has analyzed it in *The Future of Education*, institutions of "higher learning" seem to be little more than service stations of technical training for economic survival, or (even worse) in some cases they appear to have become the revolutionary base for the realization of the instant utopia. As a result of this deterioration, higher education seems at best shallow and frivolous, and too often it appears fanatical, mean, and degrading.

Over the past several years we have seen this deterioration reflected in such matters as student personal appearance, permissiveness concerning class attendance, and the increasing pressure for "pass-fail" systems. In isolation these items might be of minor significance, but when viewed against the backdrop of the general deterioration they take on meaning.

The personal dress of some students has gone beyond casualness and informality, which in themselves are normal and understandable, to a calculated "slovenliness," to borrow a term from Ortega y Gasset's classic *Mission of a University*. This slovenliness often exceeds a disregard for elementary personal cleanliness and appearance to an intentional design to reject ordinary social amenities, and to a malicious disregard for the basic personal and property rights of others. The pattern of slovenliness is symptomatic of an inner disorder which reflects a profound disdain for intellectual life by denying the formalities and civilities essential to its survival. In his famous *Ideas Have Consequences*, Richard M. Weaver laid bare this question of civility with the observation that "the modern temper feels imprisoned by all form." "The soul of modern man craves orgiastic disorder," he further reflected.

Similarly, momentum has been generated in recent years among college faculties for allowing complete permissiveness regarding class attendance by students. The concept of *in loco parentis* on our campuses has been dead for some time; however, the matter of permissiveness in class attendance goes beyond that to the very integrity of the academic process. As with personal slovenliness, indifference to class attendance is evidence of the anti-intellectualism on our campuses, for it shows a repudiation of the personal discipline and perseverance which are essential to excellence in any pursuit, including learning and scholarship. The next step for college faculties may be to excuse themselves from the need for class attendance, at which point the American university may expire by simply adjourning *sine die*.

The most "in" thing at present on our campuses is the pressure for "pass-fail" systems. This is the system that allows no distinction to be made between the "A" and "D" student—the student either Passes or Fails. It is a crude system in that it minimizes the possibilities of drawing distinctions among students on the basis of demonstrated talent and effort. To many it is educational egalitarianism, a fetish for leveling at its worst. The proponents of "pass-fail" contend that it will allow students to "experiment" with courses without the "fear" and "pressure" of "grades."

Many reflective and serious observers of the campus scene see it otherwise. As Professor George Douglas of the University of Illinois has succinctly put it in *The Intercollegiate Review*, "a pass-fail course is simply one that the student need put in only the smallest amount of effort to get by, however nobly the matter may be looked at in theory. The truth is that students look on the pass-fail course (quite practically) not as a way of broadening intellectual horizons, but as a way of lightening the work load." "Pass-fail" denies an indispensable ingredient of quality education, namely, the pursuit of academic excellence. As with slovenliness and classroom permissiveness, the pressure for "pass-fail" is evidence of the continuing intellectual deterioration on the American campus.

II

Exasperation over this deterioration has been expressed by educators as dissimilar as Robert M. Hutchins and Russell Kirk, who have both declared that we might as well grant everyone a bachelor's degree and be done with it. Before we attempt reform or restoration on the campus it must be understood that the task is formidable. The process of decay has been going on for some time. The illustrations discussed above are merely current manifestations of it. Though it may seem alarmist to say so, we must recognize that this long-term decay is extensive, pervasive, and has produced a severe, though not yet fatal, crisis. Further compounding the problem of reform, the fact is that those best situated to implement the restoration of academic excellence are to a considerable extent the ones who have presided over the present decay. In sum, the base for reform in the American university is limited and fragile.

Moreover, it will not be enough merely to prune here and restructure there. For example, on the current scene it is not enough to press for a civilized dress code and responsible class attendance policies, or to resist the mania for "pass-fail." As essential as these short-term tactical measures are, they do not go to the heart of the matter. They are merely reactions to surface symptoms of a deeper malaise. The fundamental need is for a revitalized educational consciousness. (Although disturbing in many respects, Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* is instructive on the importance of "consciousness" in bringing about significant change of any kind.) To state the need is to underscore the extent of decay and to suggest the extreme difficulty of the task of reform.

The implanting of a "new" educational consciousness basically entails the restoration of some "old" educational first principles. There has been a spate of writings in recent years suggesting ways in which the intellectual integrity of the academy may be revitalized. Some are serious and insightful, but many are thin and banal, reflecting a hurriedness to cash in on the "relevance" of the educational debate. In any case, there are no contemporary works on the subject equal to those of that brilliant and lucid Englishman of the nineteenth century, John Henry Newman. Newman's writings on the role of the university bear eloquent testimony that "there is nothing new under the sun." All contemporary pieces on the current crisis in higher education are footnotes to Newman's monumental contributions. His neglect by contemporary educators is mystifying and unfortunate.

III

Newman spells out the essential ingredients of an intellectual consciousness directed to the achievement of excellence in higher education. This consciousness is composed of civility, opened and reasoned discourse, disciplined scholarship, inspired teaching, and that abiding quest for "the permanent things."

Concerning the civility of an educated person, in his classic *Idea of a University* Newman wrote: "He knows when to speak and when to be silent; he is able to converse, he is able to listen; he can ask a question pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably." On another occasion he described civility in this fashion: "It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a university." Yet Newman knew that civility in itself was inadequate to sustain excellence at a university, for by itself it can degenerate into the blandly genteel and sterile world of dilettantism, the ornamental, or (to use a phrase Newman borrowed) "elegant imbecility."

In constructing the notion of intellectual consciousness Newman adds to civility the idea of opened and reasoned discourse, and thereby unequivocally rejects the concept of the politicized university. In this connection he wrote, "A university is a place of concourse . . . in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge."

To civility and discourse, Newman adds discipline as essential to the pursuit of scholarship. He warned against those who believe "learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil . . . This forsooth is the wonder of the age." He elaborated: "Discipline is imperative, if the mind is . . . to discriminate substances from shadows." As he summed it up, "the bodily eye, the organ for apprehending material objects, is provided by nature; the eye of the mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of discipline and habit."

Nor does Newman neglect excellence in teaching. "An academical system without the personal influence of teachers upon pupils is an arctic winter; it will create an ice-bound, petrified, cast-iron university, and nothing else," he admonished. On another occasion, he remarked that "a university is . . . an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill." These warnings are appropriate in the present age of the impersonal mass university with its burning problems of student anomie and alienation.

Finally, Newman appreciated the indispensability of "the permanent things" to the integrity of the intellectual life. Unlike John Dewey and his contemporary disciples, Newman held that "knowledge" alone would not suffice: religious content was needed to give completeness, perspective, meaning, and direction to the development and accumulation of knowledge. In our pervasively secular age we have come to attribute magical qualities to "education" and "knowledge." In our time there is an underlying assumption that with increased knowledge and perfected education the great Earthly Utopia can be realized, and through the Works of Man Secular Grace can be achieved. The social and political traumas and convulsions of the twentieth century have badly shaken the euphoria of secular utopianism, but to many the secular utopian world-view is still valid and vital. This is particularly true on our campuses. In brief, the Biblical view is given short shrift on the great majority of our campuses today, and the more "prestigious" the campus, as defined by contemporary American educational values, the more likely this is to be so. No age has demonstrated more convincingly than our own that "knowledge puffs up."

In the nineteenth century Newman warned of the perils of a wholly secular educational perspective, and argued for the relevance of the Biblical view to excellence in education. The Biblical view engenders a sense of awe and mystery concerning the human condition. Man is frail and finite, there are the inescapable matters of "evil," "sin," and "tragedy" which inhere in the nature of being. As it gives rise to a deep sense of intellectual humility concerning the wisdom of man, this view strikes severely at the great pride in human potential of secular utopianism. Confidence in the grandiose schemes of the utopian planners withers and dies. This humility does not lead to obscurantism or resignation, which are forms of anti-intellectualism; rather, it is the key to intellectual excellence, for it nurtures a profound sense of skepticism about human designs and machinations, and it instills a deep appreciation of the infinite complexity of life, thought, and matter.

To those who might fear the subservience of intellectual freedom to religious dogma, Newman responded: "Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the growth of the intellectual by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought . . . I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that diversity of centres which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influence. . . . I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual." Newman issues a serious challenge to the overbearing secular education of our time.

V

What kind of college or university would emerge from Newman's educational consciousness? In his inimitable style, he answered that "a habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit. This then I would assign as the special fruit of the education furnished at a university . . . This is the main purpose of a university in its treatment of its students." In addition he wrote that "it is a place which wins the admiration of the young by its celebrity, kindles the affections of the middle-aged by its beauty, and rivets the fidelity of the old by its associations. It is a seat of wisdom, a light of the world, a minister of the faith, an alma mater of the rising generation." Has any other educator, past or present, stated this ideal more movingly and eloquently?

Newman has no peers in underscoring that the crisis today in higher education is a matter of spirit, philosophy, or consciousness, to use the word I have employed above; it is not a matter of mechanics, form or structure. To think in terms of gimmickry and tinkering is to be wide of the mark. It is a problem of grand strategy, not finite day-to-day tactics. If the educational philosophy of a Newman were the dominant one today in American higher education, such current surface disorders as slovenliness, permissiveness in class attendance, and the pressure for "pass-fail" would never have arisen as issues worthy of serious discussion.

No one could gainsay today that the confidence of the American public in university and college education has been severely shaken. It is not only the occasional lunacies and impieties emanating from our campuses that have produced this crisis in confidence; it is also an unspoken feeling that these surface maladies are symptoms of a deep crisis in educational philosophy. In recent years there has emerged among many parents of college-aged young people a serious belief that, on balance, college education may be detrimental to the spiritual, mental, and even physical well-being of their children. Sending the children off to college used to be a time of felicity and high expectations; now it is too often a time of trepidation and uneasiness. At a point when the demand of society for talent, education, and expertise has never been greater, how tragic it is that higher education should have placed itself in such an unenviable and shameful position. What a wanton squandering of power, resources, and opportunity.

It is essential for those involved in administrative and academic positions on our campuses, who wish to restore the integrity of the academy and the public's confidence in it, to return to educational first principles bearing a reasonable resemblance to those skillfully and indelibly etched by John Henry Newman. Anything short of that will be stop-gap and rear-guard, and will prove inadequate to the formidable task at hand.

November 1971

The Radicalized Academy

by

William A. Hunter

NATIONAL COMMENTATORS FREQUENTLY REFER to the "campus disorders of a few years ago" as a yardstick by which to measure the relative calm which allegedly prevails throughout the country at the moment. Even President Nixon's last State of the Union message contained a reference to this improvement in the academic environment. Obviously if this optimism is based upon valid data its implications can hardly be overestimated.

However, do the facts justify such sanguine conclusions? Is the mere absence of overt violence adequate proof of the restoration of sanity? Clearly, a categorical "yes" or "no" answer would be difficult to supply.

Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the student body of 1972 differs markedly from that of even five years ago. If we set aside external manifestations, a startling uniformity in the intellectual tone of our campuses—regardless of size or location—can readily be detected. This is the tone of the Counterculture, or the Movement, or whatever the fashionable designation may be at the moment, although it does not dominate the scene to the same degree from coast to coast. Still, a survey of student newspapers would reveal a monotonous similarity in their treatment of virtually all topics, examined nearly always from a leftist point of view. An examination of the annual lists of guest lecturers would reveal a comparable trend. Student elections, likewise, would seldom be found to favor candidates clearly identifiable as conservative or moderate.

Until recently the explanation for this state of affairs might have been simply that apathy on the part of most students had enabled the leftists, characteristically more aggressive, to assume control by default. I can no longer accept this reasoning, and it is reassuring to find my skepticism shared by others, including individuals much better qualified than most of us to draw further analogies. One of these is Dr. Morris B. Abram, former President of Brandeis University, who displayed commendable firmness during a period of unrest on his own campus. Readers of *Universitas* will recall that his article, "The Debasement of Liberal Education," appearing first in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* for October 18, 1971, was a feature of the January, 1972 issue of *Universitas*. Dr. Abram's scorn for the social scientist who allows his students to pursue premature and meaningless surveys (he aptly terms this sort of activity "do-goodism in the streets") before familiarizing themselves with the basic literature of the field is evident. However, he remarks, this professional irresponsibility is not yet, fortunately for all of us, characteristic of the physical sciences.

Equally forthright is an article in the Winter, 1970 issue of the *Bulletin* of the American Association of University Professors, "The Problem of the *Lumpenprofessoriat*," by Professor Richard F. Schier of Franklin and Marshall College. He uses the term *Lumpenprofessoriat* to denote the younger faculty, particularly those who still lack the traditional symbol of academic preparation, the doctorate. Proportionately, their numbers seem to be increasing, and he comments:

> They are concentrated heavily, moreover, in the social sciences and humanities because, at least until recently, government support of the natural sciences was sufficiently generous to see graduate students in science all the way through the doctorate.

In theory the elimination of marginally-qualified or untenured teachers should not be an insurmountable problem, but in practice it is often almost impossible. It is precisely these persons, for example, who hasten to embrace such faddish innovations as ungraded or "pass-fail" courses, or, indeed, any move in the direction of relaxed standards or diluted course requirements. Consequently a routine move to dismiss a teacher not considered adequately prepared or productive can arouse vehement opposition from students who approve of his unorthodox methods or are grateful for his support of their own radicalism.

Professor Schier reminds us that an abnormal proportion of opportunistic and intellectually indifferent young men have entered the profession simply to avoid military service. These constitute an "instant proletariat," readily mobilized for the advancement of whatever radical cause may be fashionable at the moment. As Professor Schier remarks: "Politics is fun when fun is defined in advance as politics, and playing hooky is fun."

The role of these young malcontents on the fringes of the profession becomes especially evident during the annual meetings of the national organizations. In *Human Events* for February 6, 1971, I described the crisis within the Modern Language Association of America following a sudden seizure of power by the New Left during a business meeting in New York in December of 1968. At the 86th annual meeting in Chicago on December 27-30, 1971, their characteristic fervor was somewhat subdued: after all, the occasion for disruptive measures had passed. As an editorial comment in *National Review* (January 21, 1972) put it:

> Of course, it would have been a little silly for radicals to have disrupted, say, the Modern Language Association meeting in Chicago, since the president of the MLA, a former director of a radical anti-war group called Resist, was urging his flock to start "a cultural revolution" and seize control of universities to make literature relevant to everyday life.

The very fact that the meeting was even held in Chicago deserves a passing comment, as the radicals' campaign more than three years previously had been launched with a sudden move to block the selection of Chicago as the site for the 1969 meeting. Capitalizing upon the hysteria following the confrontations during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, the dissidents forced the substitution of Denver for Chicago. The unprotested return to Chicago only three years later suggests that the New Left's policies are based upon expediency.

An examination of the textbooks displayed in the publishers' exhibits at the MLA meeting of 1971 confirmed this steady leftward drift. It could be said that some firms have capitulated to this pressure and are now gambling that the present vogue for the sensational will continue for some time. As a result, the impressionable freshman is subjected to a daily ration of radicalism, augmented by the comments of his instructor, who is likely to be only a few years older than his students. The most popular type of English textbook for freshmen is the anthology of essays or excerpts from longer books. These are prevailingly hostile to the "Establishment" and scornful of such concepts as the "Puritan ethic," "middle-class morality," or any other values associated with the detested "WASP culture." The radical viewpoint is rarely offset even by token selections from conservative authors, nor is there any indication that responsible persons might hold contrary opinions.

Occasionally an acknowledgment is made in the introduction that no attempt has been made to present the views of "the other side," the assumption being that the college student should at last be allowed some exposure to "unpopular" or "dissenting" views that have been all too often suppressed. To anyone familiar with the prevailing ideological atmosphere within the intellectual world since World War II, the notion that leftist dissent has been systematically stifled is too preposterous to deserve comment.

A listing of representative textbooks of the sort referred to here would serve no useful purpose, as copies may easily be obtained in any campus bookstore in the country. Not all are basic texts intended for daily use: some are designed as supplementary readings. One of these latter, published by Basic Books, is *The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin*. The catalog explains:

> It is the objective of this invaluable book to recover this authentic Marxist tradition, and thus to restore the centrality of critical Marxist theory to revolutionary thought and practice . . . the editors and contributors to this volume seek to show the relevance of a revitalized Marxism for the problems and crises that confront post-industrial society.

The same firm publishes Theodore J. Lowi's *The Politics of Disorder*:

> Does today's disorder—the passionate rhetoric, the angry confrontation—perform any useful *political* function? In arguing that it does, the author of *The End of Liberalism* sees in political disorder new opportunities for effecting a radical alternative to Establishment politics.

Another type of supplementary reading is the novel *Thanksgiving*, written by Robert Jordan and published by E. P. Dutton, which describes the activities of five young radical men and women. Searching for a suitable expression for their discontent, they decide to destroy an exclusive country club in Long Island. Originally they intend to carry out their plan while the building is empty. However:

> Living together, passionately exploring their own motives, their frustrations, the morality of their actions, they decide that a symbolic act is not enough, that they must bomb the country club at the height of the Thanksgiving Day celebration.

The Dutton catalog confidently predicts: "A deeply felt, painstakingly honest book, *Thanksgiving* will command wide national attention for its exploration into the heart of its country and its people."

A variety of conclusions could be reached as to the degree of urgency that one should assign to this problem, but I suspect that most members of UPAO would agree that this deliberate subversion of the classroom should receive more than perfunctory attention. One single organization is not likely to be able to effect a reversal of the present trend, but I am convinced that a realistic plan of attack should rank rather high in our scale of priorities.

November 1972

Bias and Discrimination in Higher Education*

by

Anthony T. Bouscaren
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THE ACTION BY STANFORD UNIVERSITY in firing leftist activist instructor H. Bruce Franklin has led to a flurry of publicity. Even though the action was thoughtfully considered over a long period of time, with due consideration to Mr. Franklin's side of the case, and even though the provocation by Mr. Franklin seems to be clear-cut by any objective standards, the event is almost unprecedented because, up to this time, only conservative academicians could be fired.

Some years ago Professor Thomas N. Carver of Harvard was forced to retire prematurely because of his traditionalist views on economics. The time-honored methods were used: hire other professors to teach his courses, shunt students into other courses, and omit salary increases.

Then there was the case of Professor Robert St. Ivanyi at M.I.T., whose crime was opposition to the leftist views of Dirk J. Struik. He was fired as a result of pressures brought about by Professor Kirtley Mather, long-time supporter of leftist causes. The great army of academicians who defended Struik had nothing to say about St. Ivanyi's academic freedom.

In 1950 Professor William T. Couch was fired from the University of Chicago because Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins, that great champion of the rights of the minority, considered him "contentious and disputatious." There was no hearing, nor did Professor Couch have any opportunity to defend himself. The Board of University Publications, composed of seven

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top-ranking professors at Chicago, unanimously supported Couch, who served as director of the University of Chicago Press.

Professor Ludwig Lewisohn of Brandeis once said: "The only scholar, the only type of student who is still forced into a defensive position on American campuses today is the conservative teacher or student . . ." The cases of professors Frank Richardson, Felix Wittmer and A. H. Hobbs, among others, bear out the truth of Lewisohn's statement.

The Richardson case prompted Russell Kirk to declare that this case history is "as shocking an instance of academic tyranny as can be found in the history of American universities." Professor Richardson was a tenured professor at the University of Nevada, had taught there eleven years, and was department chairman. But his views of education clashed with those of President Minard W. Stout. On March 31, 1953, Stout wrote to Richardson as follows: ". . . you are requested to appear for a hearing before the Board of Regents in the President's office . . . to show cause why you should be continued as a member of the faculty of the University of Nevada . . ." Richardson was fired May 25th, although subsequently the Nevada Supreme Court ordered him reinstated.

Two years before Professor Felix Wittmer of New Jersey State Teacher's College was forced to resign, after years of attacks on him by fellow professors and administrators who objected to his criticism of Soviet foreign policy.

Professor A. H. Hobbs of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania had been a successful teacher and author for ten years, but his conservatism angered his department chairman. When Hobbs asked for a promotion, the chairman answered as follows: "You will never be promoted, and you will never receive an increase in salary sufficient to support you and your family." Hobbs appealed to the dean. After a review of the case lasting a year and a half, Hobbs got a slight salary increase but no promotion. According to Hobbs: "in all these proceedings, never once was I given an opportunity to refute charges which were levelled secretly against me."

A colleague of Hobbs' had a similar experience at the same institution. This colleague had more publications and stature than the department chairman. But when he asked for promotion he was told he was too old. Within a year, another man of equal rank, with fewer publications and two years older, was promoted.

Fifteen years ago a department chairman at Marquette who had angered the dean with his conservative politics finally got tenure after ten years of teaching and many publications. But this was only by an appeal of last resort to the president of the university. The dean had the last word, however, by appointing a new department chairman, taking away the former chairman's courses, and freezing his salary.

A few years ago there was a bright young man at Yale, a China specialist. After a brilliant graduate record, he became an instructor. He began to publish, and was an excellent teacher. But he made the mistake of writing an article for the *New Leader* critical of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a leftist pressure group which influenced U.S. Far Eastern policy. Richard L. Walker did not get tenure, although he subsequently has carved out a brilliant record at the University of South Carolina.

In another case at Yale, the administration couldn't fire tenured Professor Willmoore Kendall, but it made life miserable for him. He hung on, and refused to quit until Yale bought out his contract for three years.

Several years ago Robert Pfaltzgraff, an outstanding political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, with a strong record in publications and an effective teacher, came up for tenure. Incredibly he was turned down, because of his critical view of the Communist world, and his support for strong U.S. national security policies. Today he teaches at the Fletcher School.

Then there is the case of Gerald C. Hickey, an anthropologist from the University of Chicago who lived for several years in the Montagnard country of Vietnam, studying these mountain people for the Rand Corporation. In the spring of 1971 Hickey tried to return to Chicago to do additional research. He wanted to spend a year at the university using the research library and writing a book about the Montagnards. But the Anthropology Department refused to have him, almost certainly because Hickey, although a Vietnam dove, once worked for the Rand Corporation. Dr. Hickey has returned to Vietnam to write his book, another victim of "McCarthyism of the Left." There are many other cases of scholars who have worked directly or indirectly in behalf of their government's defense programs who have suffered at the hands of the Academy.

When Walt W. Rostow sought to return to M.I.T. after service in the Johnson administration, he was turned down, even though he is one of the most brilliant social scientists in the country, whose books are widely quoted and relied upon by other scholars.

The above is by no means a complete list of professors who have been victimized because of their traditionalist or loyalist views. University Professors for Academic Order has under study other current cases, including that of Professor Filimon D. Kowtoniuk, recently fired by Virginia State College even though he had tenure. Another conservative known as a good teacher and with ample publications, his crime was opposition to the so-called anti-war movement.

The politicization of many leading educational institutions in this country, among them Berkeley and Cornell, forced established scholars to move elsewhere. If you are not demonstrating, there must be something wrong with you.

Late in 1969 the Carnegie Commission for Higher Education released a survey which confirms the bias in the Academy which makes life so challenging for conservatives. The survey was based on a poll of 60,447 faculty members in American universities. In response to the question: "How would you characterize yourself politically at the present time?" 41.5% said "liberal," 5.5% "left," 24.9% "middle of the road" (whatever that is), 22.2% "moderately conservative" and 2.2% "strongly conservative."

But the bias becomes more clear in the social sciences, where almost all the cases cited above come from. 58% of the political scientists described themselves as "liberal" and 13.8% "left." Only 16.2% were middle of the road, 8.4% conservative and 0.7% strongly conservative. Sociologists are even worse: 61.4% liberal, 19.4% left, 11.7% middle of the road, 4.9% moderately conservative and 0.1% strongly conservative. That is probably A. H. Hobbs!

77% of the philosophers were liberal or left and only 7.9% were conservative. Of the historians, 68.7% were liberal or leftist, while 68.4% of religion professors made the grade. 61.7%

of the economists were liberal or left, while only 14.5% leaned conservative. English professors were 65.8% liberal or left with but 14% conservative.

The writings of Ludwig von Mises (*The Anti-Capitalist Mentality*), Raymond Aron (*The Opium of the Intellectuals*), Sidney Hook, and Seymour Lipset, among others, have richly documented the lack of balance in American higher education. It is a problem to which we are just beginning to address ourselves.

February 1972

A Decalogue of Misconceptions About the Campus

by

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LIKE A CHILD'S TANTRUM, campus disruptions stand out and attract attention. As with a tantrum, their root causes are easily misconstrued and may not be searched for unless one happens to be especially interested in fundamentally difficult and dull explanations of behavior. Of this we may be sure: there is no one, single campus problem.

When problems on the campus are misperceived, this misperception may afflict almost anyone. Administrators, members of Boards of Regents, students, the general public, all are capable of misconception. The following ten root misconceptions about university and college problems may be found among all in some cases, or among special groups of persons in other cases.

1. "If you pay the piper, you can call the tune." But it is a misconception to believe that if you are a taxpayer supporting the institution of higher learning, then you may determine how the institution should be run. Another form of this misconception is to believe that since you as a member of the Board of Regents, legislature, or some other legal agency are responsible for making fiscal or legal decisions for the institution, you may determine all internal decisions of those institutions.

If you pay Heifetz, Heifetz will call the tune, not you. If you pay the physician, the physician will diagnose according to the facts, not according to what you pay or what you say. Professional educators in universities are paid to do their professional work: they do not work in order to get paid. Respecting academic decisions on curriculum design, course content, textbooks, grading, admission and retention of students, conditions of research, inquiry and other forms of scholarship, teaching and publication—all these are decisions exclusively within the competence of the faculty of the institutions of higher learning. Decisions on tenure, appointment and promotion are also fundamental faculty decisions, though acknowledged and confirmed by legal agencies, such as Boards of Regents. Though a state is dependent upon faculty professionalism, the professional faculty member is independent of the state.

2. Students are faculty peers. This misconception leads to a string of misunderstandings. Administrators or faculty who misconceive students as peers seem eager to involve students in all kinds of decisions formerly reserved for faculty only. Some faculty are so eager for student participation that they have been known to respect student decisions in instances where they have not even allowed younger *faculty* to vote.

Many are those faculty and administrators who smile happily as they vault into the academic playpen with their charges to play with the students' toys according to the students' rules. Instead of elevating the student to the level of peer, these men and women only reduce themselves to the level of late adolescents.

3. It is a misconception to think that improved communication between faculty and students, or administration and students, will produce amity and agreement. Though many believe in generation gaposis, it is uncommon to have it pointed out that where there exist fundamental value differences, improved communication will result solely in a clarification of these differences. Better communication will thus largely result in a clarification of disagreements. The remedy for the generation gap is to accept it, and return to an emphasis on the necessity for tolerance and mutual respect. Dialogue, when profoundly pursued, may greatly expand the spectrum of participants respecting one another's beliefs, but true dialogue is extremely rare and extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Martin Buber was one philosopher who believed that it was the rarest of achievements.

4. It is a mistake to think that the faculty derive their authority from administration, Board of Regents, or the state

legislature. Faculty, in departments of knowledge, are commissioned by their profession to serve in institutions of higher learning supported by the state. Provision for salaries, sick benefits, proper facilities, are all necessary, but never sufficient, conditions for the pursuit of the academic life. The substance of professionalism—the commitment to a field of scholarship, to its history and traditions, to professional standards—is not derived from legal sanctions or state support. Biological truth, like logical truth, is in no sense dependent upon legal authorities and state power.

5. That academic freedom means unrestrained license is a misconception that has been analyzed frequently. By now it would seem inconceivable that anyone could seriously continue to harbor this misconception. Still, one hears of the attitude, reflected in a variety of ways, that the faculty member "is king in the classroom," that he is subject to loyalties external to the university and state, that he can do largely what he wants to in his teaching, etc. As a group, faculty are inclined to constant and thorough self-flagellation, eternal critical reflection and self-assessment, and are fairly paralyzed by a constancy of self-correction. Professionals are intensely jealous of standards of performance, and have devised elaborate, usually private, methods of evaluation and criticism. And the process of *criticism* and *judgment* is lifelong. There is no such thing as "permanent tenure" for truth.

6. It is a misconception to believe that *academic responsibility* is lodged in administration, the Board of Regents, or government. As academicians, the faculty is responsible to its professional standards, the history of its subjects, and similar professional loyalties. The academic faculty, far from being dependent upon the legal sanctions of a particular state for its authority, brings to a state institution its expertise and vast learning as a commission. The state, through its legal restrictions and agencies, makes *provision* for instruction in higher learning. It does not determine either what that learning will mean, or how it is to be conveyed.

The legally inviolable and omnipotent state *can*, of course, withdraw fiscal support, thwart progress, pursue arbitrary personnel policies, and in other ways effectively dominate universities. It ought not to do these things, but it can. And when the state does, universities sicken and die.

7. Since no other community agency can serve as a political focus for young people, *therefore* the campus may justifiably serve in this capacity. This *non sequitur* would seem so obvious as to require no comment were it not for the fact that so many hundreds of young people, and quite a few faculty and administration, accept it. Though it cannot be doubted that there are no other community agencies so responsive to student pressures and excitements as the university, it does not follow from that fact that the campus itself should abandon its primary purposes to cater to these topical excitements and desires. The substantial question of how the campus should provide political platforms should certainly be raised, but directly and forthrightly. We must avoid letting the question be settled by default and poor logic.

8. It is wrong to believe that the concept of *in loco parentis* is dead. Though it is true that some universities have greatly liberalized their regulations and policies for dormitories and the like, there continue to be strong efforts to institute policies, rules, and regulations to govern student behavior, to dictate student actions, in ways that would be unthinkable for other groups of adult human beings. Boards of Regents are actively engaged in studying the causes of campus disruption, are eagerly soliciting assistance from legal counselors with a view to publishing rules and regulations to control student behavior. It is commonly thought that a publication of the rules of expected behavior, and quick and firm coercive action when these rules are violated, will result in the kind of universal internal discipline that will produce peace and harmony in the campus world. Students themselves clearly recognize this as a pious and unrealistic hope. The old-fashioned *in loco parentis* rules of universities failed because, for one reason, such rules did not take into account the fact that the university could do *no better* than the parents for whom it substituted. And just as it is a mistake to believe that the *in loco parentis* principle is defunct, it is equally a mistake to believe that so-called adult regulations will settle the problem of student disruption.

9. It is a misconception to believe that the non-intellectuals among the citizenry are a less formidable adversary than the

anti-intellectuals. Possibly a majority of citizens who pay taxes to support institutions of higher learning are themselves ignorant of the realities of campus life. They may know nothing of the professional requirements for university operation. It would be inaccurate to suppose that their complaints about the running of institutions, and their impatience with the handling of massive problems of disruption, to say nothing of their eager desire to reduce tax support for these institutions, would any of them be based on an explicit understanding of the bases for their own complaints. Anti-intellectuals very commonly are at least intellectuals, and their bases of complaint can be articulated. Since their views are inchoate, however, the numerous non-intellectuals cannot be combated, and thus their opposition is a much more formidable adversary than even anti-intellectualism. Academic institutions with state support have grown despite the understanding of non-intellectuals (who form the majority of citizens paying taxes to support such institutions), not because of it.

The silent majority has nothing to say. But that does not prevent it from voting against tax increases, or against policies for supporting universities. The more non-intellectuals develop negative attitudes toward institutions of higher learning, the more likelihood there is that they will gropingly come to understand how their votes can hurt the universities. They may ruin them.

10. A more difficult but widespread misconception is that legal power is tantamount to moral, intellectual, professional and cognitive authority. Boards of Regents especially, but also state legislatures and governors, possess strong legal powers to establish policies and to determine budget support levels. They are empowered to approve all decisions of any kind affecting state-supported institutions. But though they are empowered to conduct themselves in almost any way they see fit (short of unconstitutional acts), traditions have been established whereby Boards have become enlightened about the nature of institutions of higher learning and so have usually greatly restrained themselves in exercising these legally granted powers. Thus, though they are empowered to remove students summarily, to "fire" faculty, to remove presidents, they very seldom do act arbitrarily and summarily. Boards have come to respect the

academic rights of the students and faculty alike. Legislatures have deferred to the tradition of political non-interference in the affairs of academic institutions. Governors have respected the desires of university administrations to retain jurisdictional control over their internal student and faculty affairs.

Once more we see a misconception in which operates the basic distinction between the academic, subject matter, curricular, and professional bases on the one hand, as against the legal, fiscal, and "provisional factors" on the other.

State control agencies, such as Boards of Regents, though they have practically unlimited legal power, have begun to perceive the necessity to ask always what they *ought* to do, rather than what they *can* do, where policies for institutions of higher learning are concerned.

Unfortunately, an awareness of the misconceptions outlined above does not automatically lead us to the proper conceptions of those same problems. The best we can say is that an awareness of these misconceptions will at least alert us to precautions which may be taken against their continuation in our own minds, and will strongly suggest that some other positive conceptions need to be substituted for them.

April 1973

The Dilution of the College Curriculum – And How To Avoid It

by

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ONE OF THE MOST OBVIOUS TRENDS on the American college scene in the last few years has been what might be called a watering down of the curriculum. This has been accomplished in a number of ways—by reducing the number of hours required for graduation, by eliminating certain course requirements, by instituting pass-fail options and many similar devices of student sponsored "enlightenment."

Of course there is nothing wrong with examining the curriculum every so often, nothing intrinsically wrong with pruning, or even revision, but one gets the idea that much of the recent overhauling has been done by educators who simply give way to student demands rather than argue about them. This is to say, when one hears that still another university has dropped the "foreign language requirement," one always suspects it has done so because students don't like the requirement (learning languages is hard work, after all) and have agitated against it, and not because the faculty has found sound educational reasons for giving it up.

A common phenomenon of the past few years has been the tendency on the part of college professors to give up total educational responsibility, to retreat into their academic specialties and leave the *whole* curriculum to "others." But obviously the whole college curriculum should be the responsibility of every college teacher, so that when standards are eroded unthinkingly the professor is obviously giving up an important part of his role and his authority.

I am not suggesting that the erosion of the curriculum of the last few years is due to any bad will on the part of the professors. If anything, they have suffered from an excess of good will, a desire to make education relevant to a new generation of young people. But the desire to accommodate the younger generation, to give them a "relevant" college experience, is only justifiable when it is backed up by sound educational thinking. Education is not simply a process of having a warm emotional "experience" of an amorphous sort (for this the student need not come to the university but can spend his days at the beach or coffee house) but a process of intellectual development whereby a student is led or guided by someone supposedly more mature than himself. It is part of the teacher's leadership role (and not the student's alone!) to decide what and how much a student should learn.

Now I've remarked that professors have tended to abandon this leadership role in the last few years. As I've said, this is due to no bad will, nor is it due to some systematic lack of vision. What has happened to the curriculum has largely happened by a process of slow erosion rather than of massive change, but the change has been so gradual that professors have not really had the chance to protest it.

In short, the students have had no systematic program for revising the curriculum. They do not usually come forth with a massive plan to eliminate all required courses, but rather go at the curriculum item by item. One year will see the introduction of the pass/fail option, the next the elimination of the language requirement and so on. Once the pass/fail system is implemented it can be broadened, so that eventually the idea of no grading standards can be hinted at, and so on—and on.

Professors, however, should have a systematic program for the curriculum, and should not allow themselves to be put in a position of taking up one fragmented proposal after another. In the last few years it has become increasingly difficult to formulate such a program, chiefly because of the ways administrative decisions on the curriculum are presently made. There has been a tendency on the part of the colleges and universities to so far democratize faculty bodies, senates, committees and the like (and to hold sessions in which students do a great deal of the talking and most of the shouting), that dispassionate discourse on the key issues is well-nigh impossible. A great many universities today lack a forum where weighty educational matters can be discussed in an atmosphere of calm and objectivity.

The key to extricating ourselves from this difficulty lies in adopting on our campuses new types of forums composed of educators only (students, janitors and electricians are not, I am assuming, educators), where educational policy can be discussed in quiet and in freedom. Perhaps these could be weekend retreats, special faculty conferences, or whatever, the only requirement being that the word go out that these are not policy or decision-making bodies . . . if this is made perfectly clear, students will consider them purely moot, academic and unimportant and seek no part in them.

Still, much can be accomplished through them. Away from the din of campus politics it may be possible to put things on the table that must be held back in official faculty and committee meetings. Let me give an example of what I mean. In the past few years there has been a significant rise in the number of colleges that have adopted the pass/fail option for one or more courses per semester. Students and faculty alike claim to do this for the most noble of reasons: it is said that students can explore intellectual interests in areas outside their specialty with no fear of being penalized by poor grades in an unfamiliar subject matter.

The fact is, however, that this is not how students actually use the pass/fail option. They employ it very simply to lighten their work-load by one-fifth or more. It seems likely that only a small percent of American professors are so naive in the ways of student tactics that they fail to realize this. But under our present system of administration in the universities we have no place where these simple truths can be openly expressed. Individual people may have opinions, but by and large must hold their peace unless they want to find themselves shouted down or put on a student blacklist.

Now perhaps we ought to lighten the burden of college work. Perhaps we should insist that students take only four instead of five courses per semester. The matter is well worth discussing. But it shouldn't be presented in terms of ideals so foolish and unrealistic that they could hardly deceive a five-year-old child.

Educational decisions like this need to be taken on firm and rational grounds as the result of creative thinking by educators, not the result of a desire to keep students quiet and happy.

I should like to suggest, then, that professors take a little time away from their duties as specialty thinkers to devote themselves once again to their duties as educational thinkers. At present it does not seem that conditions are favorable for doing this within the context of the ordinary decision-making work of the individual college campus. We need, I think, more nationwide conferences of educators (and by this I mean not just college presidents, U.S. Senators, and the like) in which the present problems of higher education may be openly and rigorously discussed. Certainly the various professional societies have not adequately performed this function in recent years. Some progress can be made on individual college campuses if professors do a better job of discussing the long-range goals of education in an atmosphere of calm and restraint.

Organizations like UPAO can help in several ways, chiefly of course through individual involvement of members in the academic process on their respective campuses. But I would also recommend, in addition to this, that the association schedule, at its next annual meeting, a special session on the decline in academic standards in the American university. The session could be doubly effective if UPAO members from individual chapters came armed with proposals or reports of progress from their own institutions. In any case, such a session could make a serious analysis of the major factors in the deterioration now in evidence, that is, it could tackle such phenomena as pass/fail courses; reduction of graduation hours; the move toward a completely elective system of education with its popular student bonanza, the elimination of difficult courses such as foreign languages; grade inflation ("All have won and all must have prizes"); the new student philosophy that education is simply a spineless emotional "experience" where discipline is no longer required, where everybody simply "does one's thing;" the new belief that students should govern the university and establish its educational policies—and all the rest.

Sessions of this kind will have the advantage of exposing to the light of day some of the strange perversities and shibboleths that have entered educational thinking in the last few years, and hopefully result in a program for a healthy revision—and restoration, where necessary—of the curriculum.

April 1972

Some Observations on Declining Standards

by

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DURING THE PAST DECADE far-reaching developments have taken place in higher education, many of which, I am convinced, are contributing to a rapid decline of academic standards, if not to the ultimate demise of American higher education itself. Rather than deal at length with one or two of these developments, I would like to identify a number of the major ones and to comment on them briefly.

First of all it should be noted that most of these developments can be traced through various ideological channels back to a group of notions that evidently have become the unassailable verities of our "enlightened" age. Fundamental among these are the ideas that everyone is endowed with equal potential, that man is infinitely malleable, and that government—through wise counsel and social engineering—can repair all the deficiencies of the human condition. Individual will and natural proclivity, it would seem, are no longer determining factors, even in a free society such as ours.

In the academy, these notions have manifested themselves in a variety of developments issuing from faculty and administration, from Affirmative Action and the Equal Opportunity Program, and—indirectly—from public indignation at extravagance and radicalism on campus. This is not, of course, to ignore such other manifestations as student activism and the growing aversion to intellectual pursuits on the part of students who seek the unstructured classroom—to find there, in effect, the easy rewards of the group confessional, Utopian fantasy, and social "buck passing."

Initially the role of faculty and administration became clear in the fateful capitulation to the misnamed Free Speech Movement of the early 1960's. Anyone whose knowledge of the academy goes back further than that period and who is not hopelessly ideologized knows that freedom of speech on the campus has been a traditional right of student and professor alike and was not the invention of Mario Savio. He and his sympathizers did, however, win the freedom to conduct political activities on campus, despite the fact that this "freedom" had hitherto been denied at most institutions and that in many cases it is expressly prohibited by state law to use public schools for political purposes. As Governor Reagan of California once argued later, if political activism is permitted on our campuses, then there will be political activism on our campuses.

Campus activism has brought in its wake such ill-omened privileges as the militant student voice in faculty hiring, in curricular programming, and in EOP recruitment. Concomitant with this, of course, is the making available to militants of campus facilities for what, in essence, are blatantly radical and New-racist ends. A death and severe injuries at an off-campus "moratorium" in Los Angeles two years ago exemplify only a few of the many frightening consequences of such policies. The moratorium had been planned at my institution the preceding week with the aid of faculty consultation and of campus offices, telephones, and other state equipment, all of which were—and often still are—placed at the disposal of militant students. These unprecedented "privileges" are being afforded the militants, we are told, to enhance the sense of racial dignity of minorities and to prepare students for participation in the democratic processes of the larger society.

Another manifestation of campus activism is that the EOP recruits at many colleges have become almost exclusively Blacks and Chicanos—despite the professed egalitarianism of EOP itself. Also, activist dominance of EOP has brought with it an increasing number among the recruits of radicals and high-school dropouts, in addition, it should be mentioned, to purportedly rehabilitatable parolees, week-end convicts, and former drug addicts. This is not to question the admirable ambitions of remedial education and of genuine rehabilitation.

But there is a serious question as to whether institutions of higher learning are compatible with remedial involvements and an even greater question as to whether they are qualified for the difficult, often hazardous task of rehabilitating felons.

In any case, one must wonder, in general, about the use of EOP funds to subsidize anyone, regardless of his background, who has not proven, by test or preparatory work, his ability and desire to benefit from an academic environment. As it is, however, not only have admissions standards been dropped for EOP students, but they are also allowed to circumvent required standards once they have been admitted. This is done, among other ways, by permitting them to withdraw from courses up to and including the last day of classes without academic penalty.

Such EOP policies alone have been enough to cause a general decline in scholastic standards. On the one hand, professors are hesitant to give EOP students preferential treatment in the classroom, where, obviously, other students will resent the unethical double standard. On the other hand, professors are fearful that an embarrassingly large number of EOP students may fail if established standards are universally applied. Such failures would not only run counter to the sympathies of many professors but might also entail reprisals from the ideologized administration or from the less restrained among the militants themselves. In consequence, professors are tempted to lower over-all grading standards and the quality of course material in order to avoid these unsettling prospects. New, no-fail, "individualized" teaching methods, it should be added, are also being used to this end.

Before continuing, I should emphasize that the above remarks are in no way a covert attempt to blame by association minority students for decreasing standards, for there are many among them who are a credit to their respective institutions and who quite often are intimidated, rather than inspired, by militancy on their behalf. It would be misleading not to emphasize also that permissive relativism on the lower levels of education and, particularly, in the home itself has contributed to the decline of standards even more significantly than have militancy and the EOP.

Affirmative Action—EOP's counterpart in faculty, staff, and administration—has not yet been in force long enough to make its impact felt noticeably on academic standards. "Qualifiability," however, rather than qualification has become the underlying rationale of what is, in effect, a quota system in hiring. It seems inevitable that this rationale will further erode standards, since no one has yet discovered a means of measuring the undeveloped potential of unskilled, or underskilled, job applicants. Unavoidably, therefore, under this policy a number of people will be hired whose "qualifiability" we have misjudged, but whose appointments we dare not let expire for fear that we may fall below the required balance of race and sex, thereby losing our federal stipends.

This process will, of course, soon begin to feed on itself, and not just because of the necessity for sustaining the flow of federal funds. It is also inevitable that, in the course of time, the number of unqualified people employed under Affirmative Action will increase. Along with this will come increased influence and a greater need to offset "elitist" standards which may threaten their interests. This is not to mention the fact that Affirmative Action has shown itself indifferent to the reestablishment of a proportional balance in cases where employment happens to be weighted in favor of minorities or women. The double standard makes it possible for the militant or nationalistic among them to use Affirmative Action for their own brand of ethnic or political partisanship. It would seem, then, that Affirmative Action will prove not to be antidiscriminatory at all, but rather highly selective in its application, creating disequilibrium rather than balance. In any event, if we are to achieve true quality in education and fairness in hiring and student recruitment, merit—not sex, race or national origin—must be our sole criterion.

Furthermore, such developments as the dropping of course requirements and the offering of experimental programs in open curriculum, in accelerated degrees, and in coöperative education seem to be playing a fateful rôle in the academy, despite the legitimate motives of many who support these new policies and programs. A major problem with them is that these programs are usually so unstructured that students are not given the guidance they need to acquire necessary intellectual and professional skills. In addition, they enable students to circumvent challenging or unpopular subjects that should be part of a well-rounded higher education.

Another major problem is that these programs are often utilized by ideologized academics for ends for which they were not intended. Cooperative education, for example, is designed to give students credit for on-the-job training in the community and appears, in itself, to be a laudable undertaking that is long overdue. I am sure those who originally conceived of this program envisioned it as a means for students to obtain hard skills in their fields through part-time work in private or public agencies. The cooperative programs that have come to my attention, however, seem to be exercises in social activism more than anything else. For instance, students are given credit for gathering of evidence on alleged discrimination and pollution in local businesses. They are granted credit also for projects with marked ethnocentric overtones in the ghettos and "barrios," and for a host of other so-called community involvements, most of which are activistic in nature and few of which impart concrete professional or intellectual skills. One must wonder, therefore, if certain aspects of this program will not be used by the New Left for in effect deploying student "Red Guards" into the community to engage in activities which disparage American society and promote political and racial alienation, activities which hardly fall within the province of higher education.

As mentioned earlier, public indignation over extravagance and radicalism on campus has also played a role, if an indirect one, in the lowering of academic standards. Along with the advancement of the "baby-boom" generation beyond college age and the abolition of student draft deferments, public indignation has contributed to a slackening of enrollments. Parents are becoming justifiably wary of subsidizing the moral decay of their children by sending them to college, where quite often they receive educations of little practical value. At the same time, public indignation has led to cutbacks in educational funding. Since body count has become the major criterion for apportioning the resultant limited funds, this has led to competition between institutions (and between departments within institutions) for the dwindling number of students. In order not to lose enrollments and thereby jeopardize their continued existence, numerous schools and faculties lower degree requirements and introduce "innovative" and "exciting" programs and teaching methods under which the program or the teacher, rather than the student, becomes responsible for the student's success or failure.

The inescapable result of this will be, of course, that students will seek out those schools and those majors that are easiest and that promise the most economic rewards in government support for later jobs. In California this problem is of great urgency. When class enrollments fall beneath a number arbitrarily set within the bureaucratic structure somewhere, classes are cancelled, teachers are laid off, and the displaced students are left only with course offerings in fields already overenrolled. This causes a serious curricular imbalance. If steps are not taken to counteract this, general education, on the one hand, and the production of scholars and professionals in more difficult or less remunerative fields, on the other hand, may soon become relics of the past.

In order to reverse these disturbing trends, I must urge a return to reason and balance and the removal of federal controls–however indirect they may be–and of partisan activism from our campuses as the only means to lead the academy back onto the path of health and sanity. Things have, however, progressed so far that this no longer may be possible, at least in the public sphere of education. Perhaps Samuel Blumenfeld in his *How To Start Your Own Private School* is correct in his thesis that public education, by virtue of its bureaucratic, doctrinaire nature, is–at best–doomed ultimately to defeat at the hands of private education or–at worst–to evolve into a monolithic instrument of centralist control.

March 1973

The Equality Principle

by

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SOME PEOPLE SEEM TO THINK that the attempted imposition of quotas for the academic employment of candidates who believe they belong to minorities runs counter to the principle of equality as understood in this country. However, it is quite possible to make the case that this attempted interference by the federal authorities only represents an extreme development precisely of equality as misunderstood by many people, especially in the academic community.

In my own field it has long struck me that it is fashionable among many linguists to consider all languages spoken on this earth as literally equal. I am the last person to deprecate the study of even the most remote aboriginal idiom spoken by a community of perhaps a few hundred people somewhere in New Guinea, and indeed I think that very valuable insights into the workings of the human mind as it expresses itself in grammar or vocabulary may be gained from such research. But it will not do to treat languages with a tremendous cultural heritage as if they were on a level with them, mere objects of an almost zoological, at best taxonomic, approach. It alienates any but the purely linguistically oriented students, who will always be in a minority: the others will not see why they should be made to study, say, Old Church Slavonic if it is presented to them as just that kind of object, on a level with Papuan. A very outstanding scholar in the field who left the University of California not so long ago to return to Europe told me that he was the first from whom the students ever heard *why* they should learn that language in particular, *i.e.* because of its outstanding cultural importance in the history of some Slavic peoples. The reason why they had never before been told this was, of course, the belief that all languages are, after all, equal. They are not: often they are untranslatable without lengthy paraphrases, and the cultural treasures enshrined in them are also an important consideration in their study. Equality between them can only mean that each of them should be examined in its own terms, without unfair comparison with others, and as an object deserving of study *even though* it may have no cultural heritage at all. But this "even though" is important—it is pointless to close one's eyes to differences in historical, cultural, artistic, and even political significance. All languages are not literally equal.

Neither are all men literally equal: equality is a fiction. When I use the word 'fiction' I certainly do not mean it in a derogatory sense, for without fictions we could not live. Every word, unless it is a proper name, refers to a fiction, *e.g.* of a table, and only via this fiction to the real table at hand; what is more, given the overall importance of the principle of economy in language, the situation cannot be otherwise. We are supposed to be seeking *the truth* and nothing but the truth in our universities; yet I venture to suggest that *e.g.* the entire discipline of mathematics is founded on fictions to which no possible reality can correspond, such as the zero, negative numbers, points without any dimension, lines with one and areas with two dimensions only, not to speak of such obvious untruths as the square root of minus one. *Even though*, once again, we realize that these concepts are fictions, we must pursue them, because they are essential to our lives in this modern world. *Even though* people are not equal, they must be treated *as if* they were—in politics, because although democracy is not ideal, we have yet to devise a better system for creating a political order. Life on this imperfect earth, as many of our students and even some of their professors have yet to discover, does not so much demand choices between the good and the bad, as between the bad and the worse, and democracy seems the least bad system because it makes political power subject to scrutiny and periodic replacement. Since it is in principle the weal of everyone which is at stake, it is only right that everybody should have an equal chance of deciding political matters. After that, he or she should also have an equal chance in education to bring out what talents he has—but alas, these talents have been very unequally distributed by nature. It is precisely this which will prevail in an education accessible to all and equal for all as long as they can take it; nature's voice must not be disregarded. Some of it may in fact not be due to "natural," or "biological," causes, but to the environment, say family tradition, but this again is a factor that should be allowed to follow an organic development and not be treated with a surgeon's knife.

Many Americans, when they come to Europe, fail to appreciate fully the strength and importance of cultural differences because they take the "equality of man" quite literally rather than as the political guideline which it rightfully is. When they see young people, they will tell you: "Oh, young people are the same everywhere." They are not, because they have imbibed different cultural backgrounds. I saw telling examples of this misunderstanding while serving with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the U.S. State Department. Contenting myself with harmless examples, I recall that when in my translation say of a speech by Tito I rendered faithfully the speaker's reference to "myself, Kardelj, and Rankovic," my American editor would take good care to reverse the order, because no well-bred gentleman would mention himself first. The translation thus gave a misleading idea of the personality of an important leader, who apparently is very much more equal than the others. Or, in an item dealing with Chinese agriculture, my faithful version referring to "peasants carrying dung to their field" would be transmitted to the head office in Washington in the guise of "farmers transporting fertilizer," apparently because Chinese peasants must be equalized with American gentlemen farmers. Consequently, when the disaster of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba occurred, I had my own opinion of the share of the U.S. information services in this. Ideology based on misunderstood principles, that is principles understood literally, interposes itself between us and a view of the world as it really is.

The inequality of individuals must be recognized, and *even though* it is a fact, it must be disregarded in politics. We must all understand that there is a profound difference between facts and values, and not confuse the two. Human equality is not at all a fact, otherwise there would obviously be no need to raise such a fuss about it: inequality stares us in the face at every step. Yet when some biologist comes forward with statistical evidence corroborating this fact, the academic community cannot endure facing the figures and deprives his courses of academic credit. We must be strong enough to maintain our values, although they are, of course, not facts! But that only means—one man or woman or even chairperson, one vote, and equal opportunity in education. But once education generates inequality, it is no good ignoring it by means of government-imposed quotas. I cannot imagine any self-respecting American university where people would not be given an equal chance irrespective of sex or color, and to discriminate wilfully on such grounds is contrary to the only criterion which should be applicable in academia—excellence. Universities are not institutions concerned with promoting equality, because this is a political business, even less with hopelessly trying to bring it about artificially. Mankind will have to live with human inequality for the remainder of its existence on this imperfect globe.

I have had students (in Western Civilization) tell me that good causes must consist of individual good acts, just as a good house must consist of good bricks. Alas, the analogy is not to the point. It is much easier to determine what a good brick is than what a good deed is, because the latter hinges on consequences which are not in the same way accessible to immediate inspection. There can be no doubt that war is a very bad thing indeed, probably the worst of all man-made evils. Yet who can deny that the last war had to be fought and that the violence practised by this country and its allies was beneficial in the long run? It has not solved all problems? What naivete to expect this! But it has solved quite a few, besides engendering new ones, and he who says "violence never achieves anything" shows thereby two things: first, by "anything" he means, of course, "anything good" because he somehow refuses to recognize the existence of evil; and secondly, that he confuses facts with values: that violence achieves many things, either good or bad, is an incontrovertible fact, but he *would like* to live in a world where violence achieves nothing. But this sort of statement is made in tones of deepest conviction and by such honest, well-meaning people, and swallowed by thousands of innocent youths, so that one seems almost a brute for daring to contradict it on the strength of many thousands of years of human experience.

We should by all means strive for a world where violence achieves nothing, despite the facts; we must be prepared to resort to it, knowing full well that it is evil in itself, but that something else which it averts may be worse still; we must strive to promote true equality, despite all the evidence to the contrary, but recognize excellence and not stifle it, because that would be even worse; and we must pursue the truth, but not to the exclusion of other things, because the truth may be trivial and very much less valuable than the fascinating and palpable untruths of mathematics. People possessed by an exclusive passion for truth remind me of certain heroes in some plays by Henrik Ibsen, characters who have unearthed some truth about their environment and then proceed with great singleness of purpose to wreck everybody's life around them, in addition to their own, with that new-won truth. "Truth regardless of the consequences"—what we are supposed by some to be pursuing at our universities—is a false principle if the consequences should prove fatal to human life and happiness. Equality, truth, non-violence, etc., are all very good things in themselves, as are many other ideals, but none of them can be good if pursued to an extreme to the exclusion of the others, if only because they are bound to come into conflict with each other, and each of these ideals has some claim on our attention. The task is to balance them: non-violence, unless this directly helps what we consider the forces of evil (as G.B. Shaw's idealism and opposition to armament did before the last war); truth where it is relevant (and we shall see that it is much more relevant in some academic pursuits than in others, and must not forget the untold harm inflicted upon mankind through the ages by the purveyors of what they conceived to be the one and only truth), and equality where it is applicable, in the political arena. Our universities in fact stand or fall on the principle of a certain inequality which has entirely natural causes. We plead nature where it suits us, but I have never heard anybody say that the automobile should be abolished because it is unnatural.

May 1973

Capitalist Professors in a Socialist Environment

by

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BY THE NATURE OF THEIR OCCUPATION university professors should be capitalists. Yet given the nature of the environment in which they work, they should be socialists. To what does this lead? But, first, how may it be argued that professors *should* tend to be capitalists, and that campuses *do* incline to be socialistic?

A humorist once defined a professor as "someone who thinks otherwise." That was an obvious overstatement, albeit professors do like to make their own inquiries and reach their own conclusions on almost any subject in which they feel competent. For some the range is wide indeed. University professors knowledgeable in the theories and skills of their specialty belong to the so-called learned professions which also include doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers and accountants, to mention only some of the more evident ones. Professors tend to be rather independent minded; indeed many choose the academic life precisely because they feel they can be more independent in it than if they were tied to a business whether as employer or employee. In any case, to the extent that each professor reaches his own conclusions on any issue within his competence, there are likely to be several verdicts. That situation gives the "consumers" of their services, be it students, other scholars, or even the general public, a varied bill of fare from which to choose. Members of other learned professions, whether architects, doctors, or something else, also take pride in their individuality. Economically, the research or conclusions of these people may be quite rewarding, especially for the ones whose design, interpretation or diagnosis is judged the best. It ought not to be surprising if members of these learned professions leaned toward a capitalist philosophy of life. The emphasis in their occupations is on free enterprise, that is, considerable freedom to choose within their profession the subject of their specialization. For professors this may be the choice of a research topic, or the manner of organizing and presenting a course. A substantial reward of prestige or of money, and sometimes both, goes to the most effective performers. There is keen competition for those rewards. All of this is the warp and woof of capitalism: free enterprise, free market competition, and good profits to the winners. To the extent that professors do espouse these values and follow this pattern of behavior, one might expect them to be avowed capitalists.

Yet what is the nature of the world in which professors live, that "ivory tower" of popular legend? It is highly socialistic today. In theory at least, under state socialism, the state owns the chief means of production, that is, the factories, railroads and other forms of transportation and communication, the major farms and large mercantile establishments. So-called "communist" Russia in theory operates under state socialism. Under state socialism there is also substantial security against the economic uncertainties of life such as unemployment, injury, and helpless old age. Also, the difference in incomes (again in theory) between the lowest and highest paid individuals is a modest multiple. In the academic world these same conditions obtain, especially in a state university. The university owns the chief means of production, that is, the classrooms, laboratories, libraries and offices. (The University of Illinois has its own airport, hospital, police force, dining halls, food warehouses and of course heating plant.) Academic staff are protected from economic uncertainties by academic tenure granted after six years of service, if not sooner, by low-cost medical and hospital insurance, and by generous retirement programs. As for rates of pay, in most universities the well-established full professor receives a multiple of some two to four times what a starting instructor gets. Often the multiple is on the lower side. Yes, academic people live in quite a socialistic world.

Despite some chronic grumbling about being underremunerated (academic people rate with farmers and soldiers in their inclination to complain of their lot), most professors really like the academic life rather well, and basically know that they "have it pretty good." They believe that if the rest of the world lived as academic people do, it would be much improved. Accordingly, academics promote or encourage any proposals that push the world in general in that direction. But what many, if not most, academic people forget is that the persons who pay the bills to support this socialist world of theirs are either tax-payers, particularly businessmen in the outside capitalist world, or else they are well-wishing alumni, also largely businessmen, providing gifts and endowments. And this is a major oversight.

Today most faculties are quite "liberally" oriented, as was shown by the opinion poll of some 60,500 college faculty members taken in 1969 by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. This is particularly true in the liberal arts and social science areas. There is less "liberalism," however, in the agriculture, engineering and business administration colleges. Clearly, then, most members of the learned profession of university teaching in point of fact are influenced by their socialist environment more than they follow the capitalist logic of their occupation.

Is there any good reason for this anomaly other than the ones cited above? Some readers of this essay, themselves professors, will have their own explanations to offer. An additional explanation of my own is that all too many academic people do *not* do their own thinking on social and economic questions, but blindly follow the established "liberal" line thrown at them constantly by the various communications media. Far too many professors thus do not live up to the traditions of their learned profession and do not play the role one would expect of them.

December 1971

Curriculum and the Student Market

by

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AT LEAST IN CALIFORNIA, the academy is now caught in the squeeze of two forces which, though philosophically antagonistic, are becoming ominously allied in practice. On the one hand, we find the well-intentioned forces of Liberaldom, mostly inside the academy, that are pressing for a "nonelitist" system of education in which the "repressive" traditional required courses, established majors, and academic standards will be abandoned in order to accommodate certain groups that have hitherto been "denied" the benefits of higher learning, if we will still be able to call it that by then. On the other hand, we have the equally well-intentioned, budget-minded forces of conservatism—mostly external to the campus—that are pressing for economy through the discouragement of majors and course offerings in fields with low enrollments in order to allay the legitimate weariness of the tax-ridden public with growing extravagance in the academy. Conjoined with this is the stimulation of educational innovation to increase efficiency in providing a greater number of students with professional training in a shorter period of time. Also underlying the conservative viewpoint appears to be the credo that free market principles will have as salutary an effect on educational curriculum as they do on business. By this reasoning, those academic subjects which are not saleable in the student market place or which do not provide dollars-and-cents benefits in later careers (such as requirements in foreign languages) are costly luxuries and should therefore no longer be required—or should perhaps even be dropped altogether if they prove unable to attract large enrollments of their own.

For the present, thanks to the large degree of autonomy on our campuses, these external forces have little to say in determining which curricular wares will be regarded as suitable or unsuitable for marketing in the academic emporium. It remains, therefore, largely for the local faculty and administrative committees to decide, sometimes quite subjectively, what is "relevant," or required, curriculum and what is not. Such decisions play a major role in influencing what appears on the surface to be solely a matter of "student demand." For example, if a subject is required and has been granted several class sections, more students will enroll in that subject than in another subject which is not required and has been granted only one section, even though there may be equal interest in both. After all, the students reason, college is difficult enough without taking on extra work or jeopardizing one's grade average by enrolling in "nonessential" courses, as valuable as some may be. Another factor to be kept in mind is the effect on course preference of the growing Left-Liberal indoctrination of students in their college and precollege schooling. These considerations will have a decisive influence on which courses seem viable from a budgetary point of view and will largely determine which courses are to be phased out or neglected and which are to become the "popular" new disciplines of the day.

In effect, then, conservative and libertarian forces are playing into the hands of the progressivists by making it convenient for the latter to operate under the guise of economy and innovation in an attempt to eliminate or radicalize those offerings not in line with their ideal image of the Progressive University.

This is rather ironic at a time when even a liberal commentator like Eric Sevareid, during the recent presidential trip to China, was moved to remark on the dismal state of education in the "progressive, *nonelitist*" Chinese universities. They were described as places where scholarship is condemned as subversive bourgeois individualism and were placed on an academic level with the very lowest junior colleges in America. Everyone who wished could attend, no one ever failed, nothing of any real scientific value was ever taught, and the teachers were obliged to "learn" from the students.

This description assumes even greater significance through its striking resemblance to the statement of purpose adopted recently by one of the academic task forces for the California State Colleges. This task force is working on a state-sponsored experimental "small college" which is supposed to point the way to a more effective system to be adopted in California on a statewide basis later. The intent of the experiment is, in many respects, quite laudable; the initiative stems chiefly from conservative quarters in the state government and Chancellor's office, which are justifiably desirous of a more efficient, profession-oriented program of education. When one considers the *elitist* Left-Liberal make-up of the task force, however, with its militant student representatives, "nonelitist" statement of purpose and notions of "open" curriculum, it would seem the conservatives will be handed something they do not want at all, something much closer to Mr. Sevareid's description of Chinese universities.

To avoid contributing to this outcome, economy-minded individuals both on and off the campus must free themselves from the misconception that only those subjects with high enrollments, on the one hand, or measurable practical benefits, on the other hand, should receive priority in the allocation of tax dollars. In the first place, enrollments, insofar as they are a true reflection of popularity, can vacillate greatly within relatively short periods of time thanks to transitory intellectual or ideological fads or sudden changes on the national and world scene. This is aside from the obvious fact that popular subjects are not always those most essential to a student's intellectual and professional training, the acquisition of which entails much more than the satisfaction of a student's curricular whims. It would be highly dangerous to base curricular planning on such shaky foundations. Moreover, as we have seen, high enrollments may result from the setting of arbitrary priorities by ideologized or pyramid-building academics in strategic positions, and thus may not necessarily reflect genuine curricular demand.

In the second place, our institutions of higher learning—if they are to remain such—have an important obligation not only to student preferences and the professional job market but also to perpetuate and expand the traditional body of world knowledge. Otherwise colleges and universities would become nothing more than vocational training schools or centers of social indoctrination, while the other vital areas of human accomplishment would be irreparably neglected. Our civilization could not long endure without the preservation of its intellectual heritage, both humanistic and scientific. The goals of general education must not be sacrificed to the pressures of doctrinaire ideology or those of gaunt practicality. The trend toward the production of college graduates with no mastery of such "nonessentials" as foreign language or traditional humanities is becoming a national disgrace. The appearance of elitist humanitarians and ideologues with no appreciation of the hard sciences or industrial arts is also a very serious problem. Most alarming of all, though, is the present movement away from both the humanities and the sciences toward amorphous, virtually useless "studies," the sole content of which often consists of student-chosen dabblings in sundry subjects linked more by the New-Racist or the New-Leftist dogma of the program director than by the material's inherent worth.

Responsible experimentation and pruning are desirable and necessary, but we should resist all attempts, from whatever side they may come, to undermine the concept of *traditional* academic subject matter, which has evolved and proven itself in the course of the ages. It also is our obligation to deflect students from unrealistic career goals dictated more by artificial trends or excessive idealism than by the availability of future jobs. For example, the percentage of students majoring in the social and behavioral sciences is reaching calamitous proportions (the last figure to come to my attention showed that about 60% of all graduate students were in these fields). For all these students' zeal to help the poor and alienated, where will they obtain jobs? If the upward curve of enrollments continues, graduates in these fields may well find themselves *receiving* rather than administering social welfare. Whom will they blame? Agnew, the Establishment, the pyramid-building and leftist bias of social scientists? Yet these are the subjects receiving high budget priorities because of their great "demand" in the student market, if not the job market.

These considerations may cause us to wonder whether the market principle as reflected in popular enrollments may not prove as tenuous a basis for curricular budgeting as that of "social relevance" if knowledge and higher learning are to remain our primary goals. Our guiding principles must encompass simultaneously the greater market of economic productivity and the development of the human spirit and intellect. Either without the other will slip from our grasp.

April 1972

Architecture and the Academy

by

Louis C. Gasper
University of Arizona

NO SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, no campus architect, has ever made me privy to his thought processes when he was designing the buildings that we professors find ourselves in and around almost every day. This is a great shame, since I should like to know what they could possibly have been thinking of. Of course I can see that they believed lecture classes, seminars, and laboratories would be held, students would want to talk with professors, and that massive records would have to be kept. But the design of a building ordinarily reflects more than these obvious matters. As a rule, it reflects and embodies the ideas of those who use the building.

If you think for a moment of the church buildings in your community, you will grasp the point at once. Places of worship designed as such ordinarily reflect the theological ideas of those who build them. To some extent this occurs spontaneously, but it is in the case of churches a matter of conscious choice, since we recognize that surroundings are part of the synesthetic component of our thinking, helping us arrive at an understanding of the truth. It is no mere coincidence that Gothic architecture and scholastic thought flourished together. The respective theologies of the Roman and Protestant churches are reflected in their ecclesiastical architectures which are, in turn, designed to lead worshippers to different ideas of the relationship of God to man.

But churches are only the most obvious example of this function of architecture. The front of a bank, it has been said, is its most important asset: that is, a solid appearance inspires confidence in the customer's mind and thus attracts deposits as nothing else will. And, in turn, the design no doubt reinforces a sense of financial responsibility by inducing the bankers to follow policies in accord with the idea of solidity suggested to them every day by the marble columns and brass tellers' cages.

Now if a visitor from Mars were to visit our campuses, what ideas would he guess were taught there, if he judged by their architecture and design? Of course, there is enormous variation even within single campuses. Yet certain trends may be discerned, most alarmingly at our large state universities. Their architecture may be characterized most often by the words functionalism, anonymity, crowding. It is again no mere coincidence that these words also describe the kind of ideas taught by the schools. The regnant value system in the academy today is positivist, anti-spiritual, and aggressively collectivist. A few campuses that still reflect bygone days show in their design and architecture a leisurely kind of freedom that favored "useless" gargoyles and wood paneling and—mark it well—gowns. They reflect a sense of history, proposing an ordered universe within which the individual can establish his identity. They permit solitude and quiet and spatial freedom so that the life of the mind may flourish and grow strongly self-reliant.

Those of us who are interested in the restoration to the American academy of humane education, of spiritual as well as physical order, are therefore in the odd position of experiencing a certain sneaking sympathy upon seeing our large campuses set alight: physical structures are intimately related to the ideas communicated, and humane values will not be instilled effectively in inhumane surroundings. We are going to have to tear things down and start again on a different scheme.

I am by no means defending the violent events of the last few years, the result of efforts merely to destroy without any idea of what was to replace the rubble. The motive was purely an animal delight in wielding brute power, a frenetic, unthinking urge to smash. Granted that there has been a bad order of things intellectual in the academy, the radical response was nonetheless misguided in seeking to destroy the order instead of the badness. When civility is discarded, civilization is necessarily besieged. Our proper aim must be to preserve whatever elements of the campus are good, that is, conducive to true and valuable ideas, and replace those which are not, instituting order from the very beginning of the process, even in the first step of discarding things.

Recently there have been suggestions that the title of our corporation reflects too narrow a goal, a preoccupation with reacting to the campus disorders of the last few years. There is great merit to this point, yet I suggest that the remedy is, not to change the name of our organization, but instead to broaden our notion of "order," recognizing that it informs each part of the whole in academic life. Just as a fabric has order in the warp and woof, in color and design and kind of yarn, so the academy has order—or ought to have—not only in the conduct of business, but also in ideas, and interpersonal relations, and even physical surroundings. I argue, therefore, in favor of a goal of academic order, including not merely utter absence of violence, not only decent civility, but also gardens and walks and volutes and stone and wood and woods and space and, withal, a humane scale of things.

February 1972

The Politicized Academy

Statement to the President's Commission on Campus Unrest

by

Charles A. Moser
The George Washington University

THE FORMS

STUDENT UNREST HAS MANIFESTED itself in various forms within the last several years. Even during the "apathetic" campus years of the 1950's, universities harbored many extracurricular organizations which pursued political objectives (Young Democrats, Young Republicans, and others) and played a legitimate role in campus life. They did not represent the student body or student opinion in any way, being in a sense merely organizations formed by citizens who simultaneously happened to be students. The university bore only minimal responsibility for them, although they often used university facilities and the university's name. Almost nobody did or would object to this type of activity kept within proper bounds, but nevertheless our present difficulties have sprung from this very seed.

With the intensification of student activism in the late 1950's and early 1960's, new student organizations emerged that had an entirely different character. The most prominent was Students for a Democratic Society, which developed into one of the most radical revolutionary-activist groups in the United States, splitting into various factions as it went. Many of the disruptive activities on campuses during recent years were spearheaded by SDS members or sympathizers. They made no secret of the fact that they had concluded that the American system of government and the free enterprise economy were rotten and should be eliminated. The tactic of SDS and other radical student groups has been to utilize whatever issues of local, national or international import arose in order to subvert the university and capture it for use as a training ground and base for revolutionary activity against society at large. Thus such issues as the Vietnam war, student power, environmental pollution, the Black Panthers and Women's Liberation have been used in kaleidoscopic succession for the purpose of mobilizing the nonradical majorities on campuses for ultimate ends which they would not support were they clearly aware of them.

The process of politicizing the university (an alarming segment of the entire effort to politicize all our institutions and pave the way for a totalitarian society) continued some years back with teach-ins, for example, on Vietnam. Regular classes were suspended so that students might discuss questions of current and immediate interest. Similarly, campaigns were mounted to pressure professors to devote their regular class hours to consideration of such subjects as Vietnam. These were followed by rallies which were designed to propagandize students for certain causes. There was no pretense of discussing issues; agitators worked for one side only. Such rallies distracted students from their regular work and often disturbed classes in session nearby, but these activities were permitted in the name of "freedom of speech," at least as long as the cause was felt to be worthy.

A quantum jump in the escalation of protest occurred with the forcible attempts to prevent recruiters from the military and some industrial concerns from interviewing students and to secure the abolition of ROTC programs and research projects which were thought to bolster an anti-communist foreign policy or to augment the military strength of the United States. The next step was the more spectacular bombings, arson and general terrorism directed against institutes or individuals or even against the university as a whole.

A chief objective of these activities has been to close the university down. The success of this tactic in May 1970 resulted from a fortuitous concatenation of circumstances, but the fact remains that for some time the radical left had been unsuccessfully attempting to strike the university whenever it found what it considered a suitable issue. In each case its aim has always been not to do something about the particular issue, but to utilize it to deflect the university from its genuine objectives and to take over its resources for revolutionary purposes. In May the combination of student indignation over the continuing war in Vietnam, the sudden decision to eliminate the Cambodian sanctuaries, the deaths of students on two campuses and the general weariness students experience at the end of a semester all came together to shut down many universities, either for a few days or until the end of the semester. It is unlikely that such a combination of circumstances will occur again soon, but attempts at striking the university will undoubtedly be repeated. Striking the university did little to change the Cambodian situation, but it accomplished a great deal in subverting the university. This is clearly what was in the minds of the radical leaders during the demonstrations in May, and they did in fact damage the universities very substantially, in some cases perhaps irreparably, at that time.

THE CAUSES

Particular issues of local, national and international politics are vital contributing factors to the student unrest with which we are now faced, but they are not the root cause of it. With the tremendous expansion of public education in this country, especially public higher education, great numbers of students and even faculty now in our institutions of higher learning either do not understand or consciously reject the idea that the purpose of the university is to advance learning and to analyze everything around it as nearly disinterestedly as is possible in an imperfect world, and that it betrays its calling as soon as it takes an institutional stand on an issue or transforms itself into an instrument of political action. Ideally, institutions of higher learning subscribe to the principle of academic freedom, by which is understood freedom of learning, teaching and research as well as freedom of speech in communicating the results of investigation in one's particular field of specialization. This is an ideal which is rarely attained in reality. Scholars have at least as many intellectual vested interests as other people, and certain scholarly points of view may be suppressed for some time by the unwillingness of the scholarly community to entertain them. Political considerations have also played a role in the composition of university faculties. Scholars have generally considered themselves politically liberal and looked suspiciously upon those few who emerged from their academic training with a different political point of view. Indeed there is often greater pressure for intellectual conformity in the academic community than in society at large, perhaps because intellectual matters are more important in the universities than in society at large. Consequently, a selection process has occurred, leading to the entrenchment of the politically liberal professoriate. Professors with conservative political convictions have found obtaining appointments difficult, especially at the more prestigious universities (it is partly for this reason that some of them have been experiencing the greatest difficulties in recent years). Still, the professoriate at least paid lipservice to the ideals of academic freedom and political impartiality and in many instances upheld these ideals in practice.

The current student generation, frequently encouraged by younger faculty members, has decided that the time for discussion and reflection—those purposes for which the university traditionally exists, but which ordinarily lead to a recognition of the complexities of a problem and a realization of the difficulties of resolving it—has passed, and the time for action arrived. Many of these young people, having no commitment to this idea of the university, if indeed they know what it is, have set out deliberately to take it and its considerable resources over as an instrument for accomplishing political ends instead of *organizing new and specifically political* organizations to do the same thing. It is, after all, easier to subvert already existing organizations, such as the university, than to build new organizations from the bottom up.

One or two further factors contributing to a student unrest may be mentioned. One is that students, who ordinarily live in a more focused environment than society as a whole and who have a propensity to think alike on many subjects, have discovered the pleasures of political mob action. They have unearthed a fact buried only a little beneath the surface of any civilized society, namely, that a very small minority, provided it acts in concert, can greatly hinder the workings of society. Individual students, especially radical leaders, obtain a great feeling of power by thinking of the temporary dislocation of society they can cause if only they rid themselves of their inhibitions and do not hesitate to make spectacles of themselves. In addition, even when universities do take firm steps to counter mob action, it is very difficult under existing law to punish individual members of the mob, the more so if a misguided sense of justice among college administrators holds that if any are punished for a misdeed, all those guilty of the same misdeed must be punished as well. The upshot of this is that most student radicals are not made to pay any penalty for their activities, something which only encourages them. Furthermore, the nonradical majority on the campus is usually only mildly inconvenienced by disruptions and, therefore, is not motivated to do anything about them.

THE CURES

With violence spreading into society as a whole, on some campuses there may be enough determined terrorists around to endanger students' lives and safety. If the university administration finds this to be the case, it should close down the university entirely for whatever time is necessary rather than permit it to be only partially closed and then used for subversive purposes. If the university cannot function as intended, then it should not function at all, and this should be made clear to everyone.

Short of this drastic eventuality, the university administration should assert its commitment to the concept of the university as a place for teaching, learning, research and the free exchange of ideas and opinion. In order to make this assertion credible, the administration and the faculty should examine themselves searchingly to make sure that the university does in fact adhere as closely as possible to the ideals of scholarship—that research does not become the investigation of masses of trivia, that teaching does not become preaching, that students have the opportunity to formulate their own ideas and participate as fully as they properly should in furthering the legitimate purposes of the university. There are many things the university should do within the framework of its proper functions to improve itself, and if it does them as a result of the current unrest, that will be only so much the better.

Once this commitment has been affirmed, the university must then resolve that it can do without those who do not understand or refuse to accept this general view of the university's functions. They may be very good people who belong in any number of places, but they do not belong within the walls of the university. The university should make a policy decision to expel or otherwise get rid of even very substantial percentages of its student body and faculty if they seek to undermine it. This course is difficult to adopt and requires a strength of character not noticeably in evidence among college administrators recently; moreover, the civil courts have been inclined to interfere wrongly here in recent years. But the university should be under no legal or moral obligation to harbor those who do not accept its purposes. Along with this, or possibly instead of this, the university should adopt tactics which will ensure that the nonradical majority of students and faculty, who presumably do support the aims of the university, should be harmed by the activities of the radical minority, for then they will have an incentive to undertake or support measures designed to cope with them. For example, if a building is burned on the campus, the entire student body should be assessed to pay for it; the consequences of student strikes should be made to fall upon the entire university community, students and faculty, strikers and non-strikers. The nonradical majority did nothing to counter last May's strike because they were convinced they would be only slightly inconvenienced by it, and some of them were outraged (at the university, unfortunately) when in certain cases it turned out that they would have to suffer a penalty.

So long as the university is not closed down by the threat of outright violence, the responsibility for keeping the educational process going rests with the faculty as individuals. If pressured to close down classes across the board, university administrators should decline to exercise their power to do this, leaving it rather in the hands of individual professors. Some professors may then accede to radical demands and cancel their classes, but the damage they can do is limited. Many other professors will not comply with the demands or will comply only partially. In any case there will be no uniformity of results throughout the university, and no student can be sure that he will escape without penalty. The burden will thus be lifted from the shoulders of a few harried administrators and placed where it belongs, on those of the faculty. If they fail to uphold the purposes of the University, they will have only themselves to blame.

Finally, it should be noted that all these suggestions are predicated on the assumption that the campus situation is still under the control of the faculty and administration. If this should cease to be the case, we suggest that legislative or administrative standards to cope with massive student unrest should be developed by the civil authorities and promptly invoked.

October 1970

The University and Society*

by

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EVERYONE AGREES THAT, since the university exists in society and draws its sustenance therefrom, it owes a debt of some kind to that society. Disagreements arise when we attempt to define the nature and extent of that debt, and the manner in which it is to be discharged. But since this question is central to the problem of the direction in which the university should move in the future, it must be faced and explicitly dealt with.

In his excellent book of 1970, *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma*, Prof. Robert Nisbet of the University of California at Riverside develops a point which must be adhered to in our thinking about the university: namely, that however the university may discharge its responsibilities to society, it must of necessity do so *indirectly*. The reason for this is that if the university is to have any distinct and separate function, it is to encourage research, reflection and teaching about the world around it. Scholars and academics hope, of course, that the results of their study will be utilized for the improvement of that world, but such application must necessarily be made by those outside the academy who are directly concerned with business, political and social affairs. For the authority of the scholar's investigations and conclusions derives precisely from the fact that he is supposed to be a disinterested observer, one with no special policy to promote or to justify in retrospect. And it is for this reason that universities, and scholars within

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them, have been granted a large measure of autonomy (though not an—unattainable—absolute independence) *vis à vis* the societies which support them: those societies have thought the results of independent learning to be sufficiently valuable, either for the amelioration of social problems by persons outside the academy using these results, or for the bettering of individual lives through the education of the intellect and the training of the moral faculties, to justify large expenditures for their upkeep. Whether this point of view is correct is debatable, but the fact is that it has been accepted in recent years by the vast majority of American citizens.

Of late, however, more and more people have departed from this concept of the university, either because they have never understood it or because they have explicitly rejected it. Some have grown impatient with the university's approach to society's problems, and have demanded that it devote its considerable financial and other resources to immediate intervention for their relief, or, in other words, that it participate directly in assisting the society about it. However high-minded their motivations may be, the adoption of their prescriptions would lead to the dissolution of the university as a distinct social entity and its virtual amalgamation with such political organizations for the betterment of mankind's lot as VISTA, the Peace Corps, the Headstart program, and so forth. The reply to such demands as these is simple: if you feel that working in the ghettoes is so vitally important, by all means work in the ghettoes, but do not pretend that this is academic effort and ask to be given academic credit for it. To do so is to seek something under false pretenses. If we believe that the university's role in society is essential, we should be quite clear about granting academic rewards only for academic work. A trained doctor, lawyer, or engineer, after all, makes contributions to society which no one else can; but in order to reach the stage where he can do this, he must for a time retire from the world to prepare himself. For if a student lawyer's energies are entirely taken up with practical efforts, he will never attain the level of expertise necessary for him to make this unique contribution to society; if this approach be taken to its logical conclusion, we should end up with vast numbers of workers in the ghettoes, but no doctors, lawyers or engineers—and no need for universities either. In order for such specialists to serve society directly, they must serve it indirectly, or not at all.

The student mobs who used to demand that the university divert its resources directly to the solution of social and political problems are no longer nearly so prominent on the university scene as they once were, but the situation has not improved so much as one might have expected. The reason for this is that now many administrators in high positions, forgetting what the university should be, have quietly accepted the radical viewpoint and calmly go about implementing it, to complete the destruction of the university. To be sure, there are those who realize what the true state of affairs is, as is shown by the action of the faculty of The George Washington University Law Center, which last year separated from itself the Urban Law Institute on the entirely appropriate grounds that a law school should not engage in the practice of law, and thereby usurp the function of law firms and political organizations: in a word, it recognized that a university must serve society indirectly, not directly. But not everyone has such a clear understanding of the university's role as this. An indication of the appalling extent of our academic deterioration is to be found in an interview of last summer with Mr. Joseph Blatchford, President Nixon's nominee as head of ACTION, in which he declared that "he would ask colleges and universities to grant full academic credit to students for a year spent working in the inner city." With the resources and prestige of the federal government behind it, Mr. Blatchford's total lack of understanding of the university's function in society will contribute mightily to the further demolition of the American academy, entirely without bombs and threats of violence. Mr. Blatchford alone may do far more harm than all the mobs. Rather closer to home, the recent announcement that the "National Endowment for the Humanities has awarded a grant of $432,730 to The George Washington University for a four-year Humanities Development Program designed to make the university *directly* responsive to what faculty, students and the surrounding community need and value" (italics added), and the Experimental Humanities course 101-102, involving "work with a community agency and a field-study project," raise questions as to whether we are being sufficiently careful in observing the crucial distinction between direct and indirect service to society. If the program truly involves thorough study and evaluation of community projects, it belongs to the University; but if it is a step in the direction of Mr. Blatchford's policies, it does not.

It may well be that as time goes on fewer and fewer people will believe in the university's traditional mission. If a young person truly wishes to serve society directly, he should invest his time, energy and the money he would otherwise have wasted on tuition in political organizations, and not bother with higher education. Those, on the other hand, who believe that the university has a distinct, unique and valuable function in society should have the courage to say so, and should be prepared to suffer a drastic reduction in the university's reach, if necessary, rather than pervert its purposes and obliterate the distinction between it and a political organization. We live, however, in an age of dissolution of forms and morality, and very likely those who speak of excellence in education even as they revise grading systems to make it impossible to recognize it, lower standards wholesale and cheapen degrees, those who split up, compartmentalize and rigidify curricula in the name of reform, those who employ the word "discriminating" almost as a term of opprobrium—such are in all probability incapable of maintaining the idea of the university as a distinct social entity. And if we of the academic community do not believe in the value of education and the university's role in society, we may scarcely expect anyone else to.

March 1972

Why Not Politicize a College Class?

by

Allan Shields
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FEW PROFESSORS WOULD WISH to politicize entire institutions of higher learning, even if they could. But more and more professors and students are ready to believe that it is permissible to politicize a class—even a class in chemistry, biology, or logic, not to mention political science, economics, or history, where the problem of defining "politicization" becomes more difficult.

If we assume the key term to be sufficiently clear, what *is* wrong with a professor's politicizing his class? When a class in chemistry or logic is turned into a forum for debate, discussion, or propagation of viewpoints on national or international problems, social and religious questions, or partisan politics, it is wrong for several reasons.

Students form a captive audience. They have no choice or voice when their professor undertakes to pursue his chosen irrelevant topics, or at least they feel they don't. If students do find their voices and object, an adversary relationship is substituted for that of student-teacher, or learner-guide. A delicate mutuality gets fractured.

Politicizing a class transforms the group from a class of individual students into a social force, a collection of disputants and advocates, who may unwittingly create conditions of coercion ("social pressure") for their fellow classmates. This is anti-intellectual and destructive of each student's academic liberties. Such an atmosphere cannot be cleared by "changing the subject."

Again from the student perspective, academic freedom for students does not mean that classes are kept free *for* politicizing. It means that they must be kept free *from* politicizing and other forms of extraneous influence.

Politicizing a class in logic breaks an implied contract between student and teacher for a subject matter course. What is not so apparent is that the contract is not solely between teacher and student: there are other parties to it. Courses are approved and offered only after elaborate procedures involving the instructor's colleagues in the department, college committees, university committees, and administrators at various levels. Professorial autonomy, greatly puffed up as a principle, does not extend to the point of allowing a professor to break so intricate a contract arbitrarily. He never talks alone. Uncritical belief in "autonomy" leads directly to irresponsibility.

Politicizing a class subverts entirely the safeguards of academic liberties and tenure conditions which have been developed to protect the teacher and students alike from just such extraneous political, religious, and economic influences.

Such willful, headstrong, defiant flaunting of personal bias provokes counter-measures in kind from colleagues, students, and administrators, to say nothing of the citizen public, who on various grounds must *oppose* politicization of university and college classes. Counter-tactics unavoidably assume the coloration of the tactics to be stopped.

When a professor politicizes a class, he takes both unprofessional and unfair advantage of his position to engage in *citizen* acts which are not truly available to other citizens and groups. Nor are they available even to students in his class, or students from the hallways. Such acts reflect immediately and unfairly on his colleagues' reputations with students and members of the larger community who support him, through loss of confidence in the professoriate.

Such an act is academically unjustified, for it injects extended, irrelevant material into course content on the dishonest pretext that it is "indirectly relevant." Perhaps the professor believes that all things are related and thus any topic is relevant to his course, but the students don't. They see through such shoddy thinking and lack of hard discrimination.

Though some have recently tried to obliterate the distinction, academic freedoms are not synonymous or coextensive with civil liberties. The freedom to research, publish, and teach ideas is far narrower than liberties of speech, assembly, or worship. Faculty are fully protected in their individual rights as citizens. They are free to resign, or to take leaves of absence, when their religious or political consciences compel them to pursue such courses of action. They are not at liberty to project their civil liberties over the academic process. They surely are not in a privileged position to do on campus what other citizens may not also do on campus in the name of civil liberty.

In practical terms, politicizing a class invites counter-forces from outside the campus to adopt political, religious, and economic measures. The wonder is that this has happened so seldom during the past decade of campus disruption. When its great reservoir of prestige runs dry, the campus will be further invaded by outside interests.

Advocacy of irrelevant moral, religious, or political views, of one's personal convictions, "poisons the well" of the other teaching one does, of objective research and reporting. One's professionalism is decapitated in the service of topical concerns. There is a chasm of difference between a Professor of Radical Economics and a Radical Professor of Economics, or even a Radical Professor of Radical Economics. Some have yet to learn it.

If classes were fully politicized, the institution of higher learning would be virtually destroyed as a detached, objective agency supportive of the larger human good, and sustained by a long tradition of devotion to truth.

September 1972

The Risks in a 'Political' University*

by

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ONE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCE of the discovery that the campus is a convenient focus for political action is that the campus will self-destruct. Recent weeks have produced voluntary shut-downs and destructive periods at some of the most important institutions of higher learning.

Disrupting and shutting down institutions of higher learning are direct assaults on the principles of academic freedom for faculty and students alike. Such actions are the most direct attacks ever made in the history of U.S. institutions of higher learning, *and these attacks have been made by the administrators and faculties of the institutions themselves.*

Though politicizing is not the sole motive, there are enough cases of recent notice to state that most institutions have been disrupted because of political and moral actions by the institutions themselves.

Governors, acting in the name of alarmed citizens, are making stronger demands on administrators and boards of regents for direct control of institutional policies. Splinter citizen groups are threatening their own forms of disruption and action on the campus.

It is an important distinction whether a particular action on a campus involving a major portion of students and faculty is a case of politicizing, or whether it is an instance of simply a large-scale conference, teach-in, sit-in, or some other authorized activity for the campus.

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*Reprinted from the *Des Moines Sunday Register* for June 14, 1970.

A faculty and student body may not have the matter both ways: if it is imperative to maintain buffers between the political legislature and governor and the state institutions of higher learning, it is equally imperative that those institutions themselves must not as *institutions* be thought to stand for particular political viewpoints or actions. Faculties and institutions cannot insist upon political immunity for the protection of academic freedoms from the top while they insist on the prerogative of institutional political action from beneath. Over a period of months, some faculty, students and administrative officers have been intent on involving the institution in social and political actions. They have succeeded. Academagogues have been most vociferous in their desire to move the campus to political action. It yet remains to be seen if they will become alert soon enough to the extreme dangers to the institution that such success has brought. *Whether the consequences of subverting the academic purposes of the institution to political and social ends are worth the price must be assessed with great care.*

Institutions of higher learning must provide their facilities for the exercise of informed and uninformed free speech, for the advocacy of political action, in the same forms in which that advocacy is provided in any other public place in this country, so long as such advocacy of action does not interfere with, disrupt, or threaten the primary academic programs.

Each campus must work out policies for itself that will protect the exercise of free speech and political advocacy, that will ensure such expression while protecting the primary functions of the institution. Incorporated in such procedures must be protection for professors who pursue esoteric, nonpolitical actions as their primary functions.

Freedom *for* involvement in political affairs, must also provide freedom *from* involvement. The unorganized reticents in the academic world continue to be the pulsing heart of the academic institution. The quiet, unobtrusive, devoted teacher and scholar especially require the kinds of protection that the principles of academic freedom provide. And just as professors must be left free not to be involved in social emergencies or political actions, so too must members of the student body be given precisely this same kind of protection.

Faculties need to understand, while they still have time to act, that the choice between politicizing the campus and remaining an institution of higher learning is a hard and complete choice. It cannot be a decision to have both. If the campus is politicized, institutions of higher learning will die. If campuses are to remain institutions of higher learning, then they must reject the temptation to politicize the institution as a whole.

Faculties of institutions of higher learning, as the beneficiaries and legatees of the traditions and principles of freedom to inquire, report, and to teach, are obligated to protect these rights and benefits for the ultimate welfare and for the life of the intellect, not only of professionals and students, but also of the larger human community.

State institutions are particularly vulnerable to political control, influence, and direction. The long history of boards of regents having been cleansed of political powers is well known to students of the history of higher institutions. There are new and increasing efforts to subject boards of regents to political influence. Concerted efforts are b ing made through budget control and other means to control, intimidate, and otherwise influence the operation of universities under state support.

The important distinction that needs to be borne in mind is the difference between an *institutional* position of a political kind and the political activities that are permitted *within* the institution. These are not easily distinguished and kept distinct even in the faculty mind, let alone among students, parents, or citizens.

The public or private institution of higher learning ought never to strike a political stance, ought never to take an official position, as an institution. Institutions of higher learning, public and private, ought always to provide facilities, areas and occasions for political debate, discussion, and action. Such institutions must also provide safeguards against the abuses of freedoms of expression of a democratic kind.

Policies must be devised to ensure that freedom of expression and action politically can be granted without directly threatening to disrupt the academic process. The academic process is primary. Where political action subverts these functions, then such action must be disallowed.

January 1973

On Affirmative Action*

by

George C. Roche III
President
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COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES across the nation today find it commonplace in their departmental files and on their bulletin boards to discover announcements of a peculiar sort, announcements which a few short years ago would have been described as racist and discriminatory:

> The department of philosophy at the University of Washington is seeking qualified women and minority candidates for faculty positions on all levels beginning fall quarter 1973.
>
> All of the California State colleges have been requested to implement a program of active recruitment of qualified faculty of minority background, especially Negro and Mexican American.
>
> Since I am unable to determine this type of information from the resumes you have sent me, I should very much appreciate if you could indicate which of your 1972 candidates are either Negro or Mexican American.
>
> We desire to appoint a black or a Chicano, preferably female. . . .
>
> We are looking for a female economist and members of minority groups. As you know, Northwestern, along with a lot of other universities, is under some pressure from the Office of Economic Opportunity to hire women, Chicanos, etc. I would greatly appreciate it if you would let me know whether there are any fourth-year students at UCLA that we should look at.

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*Excerpts from a report to the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities, meeting in Scottsdale, Arizona, on December 4, 1972.

These announcements are soon followed by actions even more discriminatory. Let me share with you the plight of Mr. W. Cooper Pittman, a doctoral candidate at George Washington University, as reported by the University Centers for Rational Alternatives. He received a letter Aug. 16, 1972, stating:

> The recommendation for your appointment to the department of psychology at Prince George's Community College was disapproved by the board of trustees on Aug. 15, 1972. The basis for disapproval was primarily that the position presently vacant in that department requires certain qualifications regarding the over-all profile of the institution and department as well as educational qualifications of the individual involved.
>
> The disapproval in no way reflects upon your professional preparation or specific background in the area of clinical psychology. The decision was based primarily on the needs of the department in accord with its profile and qualifications.

This reversal came on the heels of a series of earlier promising developments. While specializing in clinical psychology, Mr. Pittman taught during the past academic year certain courses at the Prince George's Community College. Planning to make college teaching his lifetime profession, he applied, at the same institution, for the academic year 1972-73. Last winter, the chairman of the department described his chances as "very good." In the spring he became "the leading contender." During the past summer, he was introduced as the man who would be "with us this fall." This seemed natural, since he was selected by the departmental committee from among 30-plus applicants as the department's "No. 1 recommendation."

The rank of assistant professor and the corresponding salary were approved by the dean of social sciences and the vice president of academic affairs. The chairman of the department asked, in July, for preferences in the autumn teaching schedules. The agreed choice was a morning program. Mr. Pittman and his wife began a search for a house in the Maryland suburbs which would be able to accommodate their two children.

And so it went until August 3, when the department chairman broke the news orally that the president and the trustees of the college, at a meeting on July 31, disapproved the recommendation for appointment to the department of psychology.

Furthermore, the president or trustees ordered that the two open positions be filled by women, and especially, by blacks. A woman applicant was subsequently hired. The president and trustees then ordered the department of psychology to go out and find blacks qualified in clinical psychology for the remaining position and to invite them to apply. . . . In the opinion of the chairman, Mr. Pittman would have been hired without difficulty had he been a woman or a Negro.

Examples of such hiring policies could be multiplied almost indefinitely, reflecting a nationwide rush on the part of America's colleges and universities to conform to the new Affirmative Action guidelines of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Similar patterns exist in regard to students. Today, admissions procedures in many schools are governed by a quota system which sets its own special double standards, unwritten but exercising great force in the lives of individual students. Such admissions policies also have their effect on campus standards, compelling steadily lower requirements as the original applicants, often unqualified for admission, are retained on campus despite their poor performance. Such preferential treatment in admissions to undergraduate, graduate and professional schools has become increasingly common, penalizing both those qualified students who are thereby denied admission and the standards of the schools themselves, which are eroded to maintain in residence those unqualified students who have been accepted.

Dormitory and social regulations on many campuses are similarly under assault. For example, the State of Pennsylvania, both through the Human Relations Commission and the Office of Education, has launched a drive against "sexism in education." These State bureaucracies have moved to enforce changes in faculty hiring and promotion, curricular offerings, housing, hours and other aspects of campus business in both the public and private higher educational institutions of the State.

The principal line of assault on higher education, however, has come through the HEW Affirmative Action programs governing faculty-hiring policies. Many schools have been subjected to great legal and financial pressure—pressure generated largely behind the scenes.

Typically, one school at a time has been selected for pressure. Indeed, there would be little public knowledge of such programs if it were not for the fact that some of the high-handed measures involved have provoked a reaction from some of those schools most hard pressed by the Affirmative Action programing.

For example, the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities began an inquiry into Affirmative Action only after an appeal for information and help on the part of a sister school.

At a board meeting of the Association of Presidents held in the late spring of 1972, it was decided that some further exploration of what was actually happening would be in the interest of the member schools. The resultant exploration of the subject has revealed an iceberg of Government intervention in higher education, raising problems of far greater magnitude than the public, or indeed most of us in higher education, have fully appreciated.

The result of this investigation is the preliminary report which I now present. Certainly this preliminary report is not the exhaustive treatment which the subject demands. We are discovering that the problem and its implications are far greater than anticipated. There are philosophic and practical considerations involved of the greatest import for higher education. What began as a preparation of a paper for this meeting now has grown into a projected book, to be completed in the months immediately ahead.

Most of my remarks today will be limited to the question of hiring, because it is here that the HEW directives are most actively being applied, and here that a college or university is currently most likely to run into legal difficulties. What ultimately is at stake is the institutional integrity of higher education. If America's institutions of higher learning lose control of admissions, hiring, curriculum and campus policy—in effect losing control of who attends the schools, who teaches in the schools and what standards are enforced in the schools—private, independent higher education will no longer exist.

Let me summarize the situation as it has developed, together with the questions raised by Affirmative Action. While hiring specifications for Government contracts have existed since the early '40s, the story properly begins with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Act expressly forbids discrimination by employers on the grounds of race, color, sex, religion and national origin, either in the form of preferential hiring or in the form of differential compensation.

Until amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII did not apply to educational institutions. Between 1964 and 1972, however, Executive Orders 11246 and 11275 had already directed *all* federal contractors and those receiving federal assistance from HEW to take "affirmative action to insure that employes are treated during employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin." The Labor Department was charged with enforcement of these executive orders and designated HEW as the enforcer for educational institutions.

Thus began the rash of directives and orders which now engulf higher education. In Labor Department Revised Order No. 4, affirmative action was for the first time defined as "result-oriented procedures" measured by "good-faith efforts" emphasizing "goals and timetables" to be used in correcting "deficiencies in the utilization of minorities and women." Revised Order No. 4, the fulcrum for the Office of Civil Rights' present activities, must cause the original drafters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and President Johnson, whose executive order gave passing mention to "affirmative action," to pause and wonder if this is indeed their stepchild.

Affirmative action, under the auspices of HEW and OCR, has blossomed into a bureaucratic nightmare: Laudable goals have been badly distorted by overzealous HEW advocates. Backed by the full force of Revised Order No. 4, HEW and the Office of Civil Rights have, since 1971, developed enforcement procedures which reflect a political attempt to mold the hiring practices for America's colleges and universities. American higher education is particularly vulnerable to this attack, since the Federal Government now disburses contract funds among colleges and universities which run to virtually billions of dollars a year. The funding continues to grow. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has also recently suggested that federal funding to higher education be increased within the next six years to some 13 billion dollars per annum.

Some of America's most prestigious institutions are already deeply committed to the continued receipt of this federal funding. The University of California budget calls for federal-contract funds in the vicinity of 72 million dollars a year, the University of Michigan is involved in federal funding to the tune of 60 million dollars, and similar dependence is evidenced by other first-line schools of the rank of Princeton, Columbia and Harvard.

As J. Stanley Pottinger, director of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, readied for battle in the first stages of Affirmative Action, some of America's largest and most prestigious educational institutions found themselves under heavy attack. In a legal procedure most unlike traditional American practice, the schools in question have been assumed guilty until proven innocent. In Mr. Pottinger's own words:

> The premise of the Affirmative Action concept of the executive order is that systematic discrimination in employment has existed, and unless positive action is taken, a benign neutrality today will only preserve yesterday's conditions and project them into the future.

Nothing about Mr. Pottinger's action since that time has suggested that he would be guilty of benign neutrality.

Mr. Pottinger's assumption that American higher education is guilty until proven innocent is a rather highhanded approach, but this presents no real difficulty, since, as Mr. Pottinger himself phrased it in a recent West Coast press conference: "We have a whale of a lot of power, and we're prepared to use it if necessary."

The college or university faced with proving its innocence by showing "good faith" has discovered that satisfaction of the bureaucratic task force is a supremely difficult undertaking. Those schools attempting to comply with the Affirmative Action programming find themselves trapped in a mass of paper work, a labyrinth of bureaucratic guidelines, and an endlessly conflicting collection of definitions concerning "good faith," "equality," "minorities," "goals" and "quotas."

A central fact in the confusion has been the discussion of "goals" versus quotas. American academics are properly suspicious of the racist overtones involved in the quota system. We have tended to pride ourselves on the ability to judge people as individuals rather than as members of a group. The concern over quotas has been met by HEW with substitution of another word: "goal." Since then, endless amounts of ink have been expended on this semantic distinction. And the distinction remains exclusively semantic.

Professor Paul Seabury of the University of California has been highly outspoken concerning the artificial nature of the distinction. In the process, he has developed two hybrid labels which put the question in perspective: the *quoal,* a slow-moving quota-goal; and the *gota,* which is a supple, fast-moving quota-goal.

There is more validity in Professor Seabury's humor than HEW has been willing to admit. The "results-oriented goals and timetables" aspect of Affirmative Action simply results in a *de facto* quota system. As one highly placed OCR official recently commented: "The job won't get done unless the university is subjected to specific objectives that are results oriented."

HEW's insistence that it abhors quotas holds little weight when seen in the light of Mr. J. Stanley Pottinger's remark to the representatives of six Jewish groups. He said: "While HEW does not endorse quotas, I feel that HEW has no responsibility to object if quotas are used by universities on their own initiative." In practice, no matter what the semantic distinctions are, the central fact remains that both quotas and goals demand that our colleges and universities treat people as members of a group rather than as individuals.

The New York Times in an editorial earlier this year confronted the quota issue rather directly:

> The resort to quotas, which is the unmistakable suggestion in HEW's approach, will inevitably discriminate against qualified candidates. It can constitute a direct threat to institutional quality . . . . Preferential quotas are condescending, divisive, and detrimental to the integrity of a university.

HEW demands colleges and universities demonstrate "good faith" in complying with their guidelines. What indeed is good faith? The HEW version of good faith is almost impossible to decipher. Compliance procedures are outlined in five pages of very fine print in "The Federal Register." The amount of paper work and continual analysis update that is demanded of the university and department chairman is almost inexhaustible. Have you then demonstrated "good faith?" No one can know. As one OCR official phrased it, "Judging good faith is a very elusive thing." Elusive indeed!

This raises a number of fundamental questions for higher education. For example, the equality issue itself raises many questions. What is equality? What is a minority?

Such questions have led to bizarre definitions in the bureaucratic pursuit of Affirmative Action. Let two examples suffice:

1. A departmental chairman in a large Eastern state university circulated a letter to a number of other departmental chairmen across the country, asking that the *curricula vitae* of new Ph.D.'s contain identifications of race and sex since HEW hiring orders were impossible to follow in the absence of such information. To his credit, one of the departmental chairmen of a Western university replied:

> If there were objective or legally established definitions of race, together with a legal requirement of full disclosure of racial origins, we would be in the clear. I understand that a number of steps in this direction were achieved by the 'Nurnberg laws' of Nazi Germany. And in the Soviet Union, I am told, all individuals carry their racial identifications on their internal passports. Similarly for blacks in South Africa. So there are precedents.
>
> I would suggest that the American Economic Association call upon the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and other bureaucratic agencies now engaged in promoting racial discrimination for assistance. We should ask them to establish legal 'guidelines' as to: (1) Which races are to be preferred, and which discriminated against; (2) What criteria (how many grandparents?) determine racial qualifications for employment; (3) What administrative procedures must be set up for appeals against arbitrary classification.

> With guidelines like these, you and other department chairmen would suffer neither embarrassment nor inconvenience in employing some individuals, and refusing to hire others, on the grounds of their race and sex. And you will have the peace of mind of knowing that the authenticity of racial labelings have in effect been guaranteed by an agency of the Federal Government.

2. Another professor, fed to the teeth with quotas, minority definitions and politically enforced "equality," proposed the creation of a Sociological Caucus, so constructed as to provide proper representation to various groups. Such caucus would be composed of:

> Two blacks (one man, one woman); one Chicano (or Chicana on alternate elections); one person to be, in alphabetical rotation, Amerindian, Asian and Eskimo; and 16 White Anglos. Of the latter, eight will have to be men and eight women; 14 will have to be heterosexual and two homosexual (one of these to be a lesbian); one Jewish, 10 Protestant, four Roman Catholic; and one, in alphabetical rotation, Buddhist, Mormon and Muslim; 15 will have to be sighted and one blind; eight must be juvenile, four mature and four senile; and two must be intelligent, 10 mediocre and four stupid. . . .

The attempt to achieve a statistically adequate representation of women and ethnic groups on college faculties has tended to produce a rush to discover sufficient numbers of well-qualified professors with minority credentials. In actual practice, the numbers demanded of such minority types rather exceed the qualified people available. Thus a strange new word has entered the Affirmative Action dialogue. Today we talk about the appointment of persons who are not qualified, but who are "qualifiable." In point of fact, the guidelines state: "Neither minority nor female employes should be required to possess higher qualifications than those of the lowest qualified incumbent."

Has merit come to mean only equality on the lowest level of performance? Not only does this do an injustice to the institution and the students coming in contact with faculty members unqualified to hold their position, but also it excludes from consideration large numbers of an entire generation of young scholars, quite well-qualified to hold a position, yet often rendered ineligible by virtue of their nonmembership in an HEW-approved minority group. Unfair discrimination and the lowering of standards go far beyond reverse discrimination. Today many well-qualified blacks are passed over for consideration precisely because they are not from the ghetto. The search is not merely for blacks, but for "authentic ghetto types." . . .

Black professors and black students alike have been downgraded. The first-rank performers have suffered this downgrading because whatever accomplishment they attain is often assumed to be because of some special privilege. Meanwhile, unqualified professors and students from various ethnic groups have been cheated into assuming that they were taking their place in a true educational framework, when, in fact, all the standards which gave the framework any meaning had been undercut. As one Cornell professor bluntly put it: "I give them all A's and B's, and to hell with them." Surely this is not the "equality" which we desire for higher education. . . .

One of the most pressing threats arising from the Affirmation Action programing has been the assault upon the institutional self-determination and integrity of many schools. As one president phrased it:

> Many of us simply do not like the idea that the Feds can come in and demand the personnel files. Nor do we like the fact that the guidelines clearly place the burden of proof of nondiscrimination in our laps. The amount of time and money we have to spend to comply with the order is considerable. If they want to show we are guilty, let them dig up the proof.

The costs involved in compliance are large in material terms as well. Another college president, recently under the gun on this question, was quoted as saying: "To tell you the truth, my little college simply does not have the personnel to go through all our records and do the necessary homework." The Office of Civil Rights investigator replied: "Too bad. You'll just have to dig up somebody to do it."

The briefest examination of a completed Affirmative Action plan—only a handful have been accepted by HEW—should make it abundantly clear how high the costs are in preparation of the original material. It has been estimated by the Affirmative Action director of a large Midwestern university that 1 million dollars would be necessary to make the transition to the new set of records and procedures demanded by Affirmative Action on his campus. This figure does not include the continuing costs involved in the maintenance and monitoring of an Affirmative Action program.

One academic investigator deeply involved in studying the impact of Affirmative Action programs on a number of campuses conservatively estimates that an ongoing Affirmative Action program, operated within HEW guidelines, would consume 50 percent of the total administrative budget of a typical school. Not only is the Affirmative Action program a heavy financial and administrative burden for higher education, but the new drive for a spurious "equality" finally challenges the integrity of the institutions in question.

North Carolina's Davidson College, a school long committed to nondiscriminatory policies in all areas, received a letter from the chief of the education branch of the Atlanta office of Health, Education and Welfare, acknowledging that Davidson "generally eliminated barriers which would prohibit admission or participation of any person on the basis of race, color or national origin." However, the letter continued with several pages of "observations and suggestions," including pressures to (1) raise the number of blacks to 10 percent of the student body; (2) allow for more flexibility in admission requirements (thus lowering standards); and (3) restructure the "curriculum to include additional emphasis on black contributions in all areas of academic instruction."

The tone in which such material is usually couched leaves little doubt that compliance is not only expected but demanded.

The bureaucratic arrogance involved becomes even clearer in the recent experience of one Western college president. After making every effort to comply with the HEW demands, the president of New Mexico State University still apparently was not moving fast enough for the Affirmative Action team. While he had exceeded his goal in the professional category of hiring by more than 400 percent, he did not yet satisfy the HEW regional office in Dallas.

Mr. Miles Schulze, branch chief of contract compliance, chided the college for not meeting its goals in the office-manager, technicians and sales-workers categories (10 projected—nine hired). "Why was there no native American on the faculty?" asked the HEW report. President Gerald W. Thomas went to great lengths to explain that "Assistant Professor Richard J. Lease of the Police Science Department is three-fourths Cherokee, considers himself native American. This fact is shown in all . . . reports since he joined the faculty in 1965. The new director of the Agriculture Extension Service is also part Cherokee Indian."

Despite his great efforts to comply with HEW, how was Dr. Thomas and New Mexico State University treated? He received a letter with the following closing paragraphs:

> A detailed response to our findings and the revised Affirmative Action plan (inclusive of goals and timetables) must be submitted to our office within 30 days. The award of a substantial contract of over 2 million dollars is pending our approval. In view of this fact, we are sure you will want to act as expeditiously as possible by making adequate commitments.

The ultimatum in such a letter is unfortunately common. This is typical of the HEW bureaucratic assault upon the self-determination and integrity of an educational institution. Dr. Thomas replied:

> I am concerned when the Office of Contract Compliance of HEW feels that it is necessary to use threats and coercion to force quotas. . . . I am concerned about the lost time and effort and the tremendous expense associated with the investigation and review merely because we were not given advance information about the nature of the investigation or the time span of the study. We were told by the review team that the universities 'could not be trusted with advance notices' because they would 'change their records.' This statement is a reflection on all institutions of higher education in this nation and cannot foster the co-operation needed to correct our historic problems of discrimination.

The bureaucracy has appointed itself not only the judge, jury and executioner of higher education, but its conscience as well. The present situation can be summarized as an assault upon the standards and integrity of the institutions involved. A false view of equality is being pursued by dangerous political means, producing a variety of negative effects on higher education—negative effects pressing with special severity on the individual members of the minority groups in whose name the entire project is undertaken.

Virtually hundreds of examples have already accumulated in the first months of the Affirmative Action programing, which began with the formal issuance of the guidelines only as recently as this October. Already, numerous individual injustices, assaults upon the dignity and integrity of our educational institutions, and bureaucratic interferences with the educational process have accumulated so rapidly that it will take a book-length treatment to examine all the practical and philosophic issues raised by Affirmative Action.

One major question remains in this deliberately brief survey: What can higher education do in the face of this threat?

At present, there can be no doubt that most of our colleges and universities are severely handicapped in this contest with bureaucracy. Federal funding remains the key. Those schools most heavily involved in federal funding are naturally most exposed to bureaucratic assault. Independence retains a high priority—independence which can be purchased only through total divorce from political funding.

Even that independence cannot long be guaranteed. The basis of the Pennsylvania assault upon private higher education, touching all dormitory and social regulations as well as curriculum, is undertaken not through Health, Education and Welfare but through State-level "public accommodation" laws. Similar legislation is already being considered in several other States and, given the present state of the body politic, seems likely to spread still further.

Finally, we are all exposed in an even more basic way. The matter of tax exemption forms an unavoidable portion of this discussion. A member school of AAPICU has already been faced with the experience of an IRS inquiry concerning the number of blacks in the student body. When it was suggested to the IRS official that the number of blacks in the student body of a private institution was not a concern for the Federal Government, the response from the agent in question was a thinly veiled threat, warning that compliance with general federal guidelines *in all fields* was a necessary prerequisite for retention in good standing of a tax-exempt status.

It may well be that the IRS agent in question was running well ahead of his fellow bureaucrats. Yet the fact remains that tax exemption is a privilege which, given the present state of tax legislation, is an absolute prerequisite for our continued existence, a privilege which exists at the pleasure of the Internal Revenue Service.

Tax exemption, though a privilege, is nevertheless governed by separate statutory language which Congress has not tied to compliance with other federal laws, such as antitrust, labor relations or patents. Certainly noncompliance of a business enterprise with a federal antitrust statute should not result in an adverse tax ruling re that corporation. Neither should opposition to federal Affirmative Action requirements result in a university's tax exemption being threatened. Legal strategies do exist for contesting these Affirmative Action directives. Yet, new strategies need to be developed.

The most pressing danger in the present higher educational situation is that colleges and universities will stand aside, being unwilling to be involved in a difficult fight. In the process, we will tend to be picked off one at a time. It is this divide-and-conquer strategy which has already been pursued in the early forms of Affirmative Action. Rest assured that the time is coming for all schools to face the same problem. . . .

Those educational institutions who choose to resist will have the preliminary tools at hand to form an impressive legal case in their defense.

Consider the fact that middle-echelon bureaucrats have been responsible for the implementation of administrative law far beyond the original confines of any action taken by an elected official, in either the legislative or executive branch of Government.

Consider also the vagaries and confusions involved, especially in the area of reverse discrimination. Many of the programs now pressed so ardently by the Office of Civil Rights are almost diametrically opposed in intent to the original idea of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Are we indeed banning discrimination by race and sex, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 suggests? Or are we encouraging a reverse discrimination, as the Affirmative Action programs seem to insist?

In the period immediately ahead it is up to the private, truly independent colleges and universities to speak out on this issue. A great deal is at stake.

Another Threat to Our Universities*

by

Justus M. van der Kroef
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AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, still trying to recover from the mindless assaults of student militants and their faculty Svengalis in the past four years, today faces what is perhaps an even more serious threat.

Campus after campus is succumbing to the federal government's so-called "Affirmative Action" policy, which, as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in its Oct. 4, 1972 "guidelines" to colleges and universities puts it, requires college administrations "to make additional efforts to recruit, employ and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded, *even if that exclusion cannot be traced to particular discriminatory actions on the part of the employer*" (emphasis added).

This Kafka-esque ruling (what HEW, in effect, is saying to the college administrator-employer is that even if he isn't guilty of past discrimination in hiring he will be considered as if he is) is based on the consideration, according to the same "guidelines," that "benign neutrality in employment practices will tend to perpetuate the status quo ante indefinitely."

HEW's Office for Civil Rights director, J. Stanley Pottinger, said when the October 4 "guidelines" were issued, that these did not herald anything new but merely clarified and systematized directives already on the books and applicable especially to the nation's colleges.

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Just so, because for nearly two years, at least, university administrations, mindful of the federal funds and loans that have been, in many cases, indispensable to their institutions' past development, have been busily interpreting and applying earlier "Affirmative Action" directives.

The interpretations are simple: hire more blacks, Spanish-surnamed persons and women, even if you wind up practicing discrimination in reverse. And while HEW's guidelines mandate the hiring of *qualified* "members of groups formerly excluded," the pressure to (1) stay on the right side of HEW, (2) appease minority group clamor in the community, and (3) satisfy black and Chicano militants and Women's Libbers on the campuses themselves, more often than not becomes decisive.

The supply of the truly qualified in university teaching has always been limited. Now quality is further attenuated by politically enforced racism and "sexism," designed presumably to right the employment wrongs of the past.

The consequences have been inevitable. Already, on Aug. 8, 1972, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Jewish Labor Committee and a number of other Jewish organizations submitted a memorandum to HEW, detailing instances of preferential treatment and discriminatory employment policies in a number of colleges and universities resulting from efforts to comply with the federal government's "Affirmative Action" directives. The following instances are taken from this memorandum:

Item: In a report to HEW at the close of 1971 the administration of Northwestern University declared that it would permit replacement appointments to the faculty only to the extent that university units hire at a rate of 25 percent women and racial minorities.

"In other words," the report said, "no replacement will be authorized until a woman or racial minority faculty member is found." Northwestern said further that it would "reserve a pool of positions" for women and minority group members in its Arts and Science College faculty. The pool would include 20 percent of new positions and 10 percent of the vacancies in existing positions: clearly, as the Aug. 8, 1972, memorandum of B'nai B'rith and others point out, this is a quota system. One department chairman at Northwestern admitted that his institution, like "a lot of other universities" today, was "under some pressure" from the federal government "to hire women, Chicanos, etc."

Item: At the State University of New York at Albany the vice president for management and planning reportedly announced "a policy for one-to-one hiring of minorities affecting all of the administrative staff. This means that for every white (non-minority) hired, a minority member must be hired." Hiring officers at the university were also instructed that "the university will defer the filling of some positions until qualified minority members and women are added to the staff of the university." A related university "Affirmative Action" directive urged that no less than one of every three new vacant administrative positions concerned with student affairs be filled with members of minority groups.

Item: Last January an applicant for a faculty position at Connecticut College in New London was rejected, even though he was advised that his qualifications were "impressive." However, the department concerned wished to hire a woman "so we are concentrating on interviews of that kind."

As the Aug. 8, 1972, memorandum of B'nai B'rith and others points out, in this particular case women were not being considered *along with* other qualified applicants "in accord with legitimate affirmative action"; rather "on the basis of preferential treatment, the position was being restricted to men."

Item: One department chairman at Chico State College in California declared that since his was an "Affirmative Action institution" he would waive not only doctoral requirements for "Affirmative Action" candidates who were willing to pursue part-time graduate work, but would also give them "greater latitude in teaching" areas.

Pima College, Phoenix, Ariz., reportedly offered an even more blatantly discriminatory inducement in order to attract minority group faculty. Pima introduced what it called a "fudge factor," that is as much as $700 in salary more for minority teachers. As the earlier mentioned Aug. 8, 1972, memorandum notes, Pima's "fudging" is clearly contrary to the principle of equal pay for equal work, a concept which HEW itself, as well as other federal agencies, are trying to enforce in order to end discrimination against minority workers!

The data accumulated by the American Jewish Committee, B'nai B'rith and others have been enough to shake Pottinger's "guidelines." On Nov. 22, 1972, Pottinger's assistant, Samuel Solomon, announced that HEW's Office for Civil Rights would investigate complaints made by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith that white males were being barred from employment and job advancement because of the "Affirmative Action" policies of colleges and universities.

Meanwhile, some college administrators themselves had already become alarmed. On May 6, 1972, the San Francisco *Chronicle* quoted Dr. Mansell Keene, vice-chancellor for faculty and staff affairs of the California state universities and colleges, as having asked the presidents of the California state institutions of higher education "to be a little more tactful when turning down white male job applicants because of their race and sex" at their schools.

Keene quoted a letter from the personnel officer at one of the California campuses to a rejected applicant. The personnel officer had written that while the department to which the applicant had applied for a vacancy "saw you as our top candidate" it would not be able to make a job offer. The reason, as the personnel officer put it, was that "although the department initially viewed your ancestry as satisfying the requirements of Affirmative Action [the applicant was from the Middle East] consultation with our institutional advisers indicated to us that your ancestry does not qualify you as an oppressed minority." As Keene reportedly acknowledged, this rejected applicant, upon receipt of such a letter, might well feel like a member of an "oppressed minority."

The incident cited by Keene would be ludicrous if it were not so alarmingly indicative of the confusion in faculty hiring policies resulting from the Nixon Administration's "Affirmative Action" program.

Citing the above San Francisco *Chronicle* report, Dr. Aaron Wildavsky, dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, has noted that if one were to add up all the currently fashionable "oppressed minorities" in America today, ranging from consumers, women, youth, blacks and Chicanos, to commuters, welfare recipients and various "deviants," one winds up with a nation composed of "374 percent of minorities."

Perhaps satire is the best way to highlight the problem, as in the employment request made by one Eastern seaboard university department chairman of the author's acquaintance who, mindful of current "Affirmative Action" criteria and being in a position to hire only one person in his small department, claimed to be looking for a woman Egyptologist, black, with a Spanish surname, and born on a Southwestern Indian reservation.

However, meanwhile one is confronted with HEW's "guidelines" which, despite B'nai B'rith's protest, are, for obvious political reasons, likely to change as slowly as an ultimate judicial decision in an inevitable test case in the courts is reached. University administrations which refuse to authorize faculty replacements "until a woman or racial minority member is found" obviously are as ready to impair their academic program as those which are prepared to waive doctoral requirements and provide "greater latitude" in teaching for the "Affirmative Action" faculty they desire, or which reject their admittedly "top candidate" for a faculty position on the grounds that his "ancestry does not qualify" him.

One suspects that some university administrations, having caved in earlier to demands of their minority students that only a faculty member of that particular minority can teach certain courses in the academic curriculum, would no longer contest any racial assumptions that may govern university teaching in the future.

The presumed rationale of the "Affirmative Action" program is that women and certain minority group members have suffered from discrimination in employment and/or promotion in the academic community. This may well be the case, although the present writer is not aware of the existence of any comprehensive study, valid statistically and otherwise, that has addressed itself to the problem over any significant span of time.

Not just the absence of valid evidence alleging discriminatory treatment is disturbing. Even more so is "Affirmative Action's" apparent policy lodestar that somehow two wrongs will make a right—that alleged discrimination against one minority can be undone by discrimination against others.

The actual employment effects of such reverse discrimination in which "Affirmative Action" plays a significant role, are already becoming evident. The New York *Daily News* on Dec. 30, 1972, reported the results of a survey of the salaries being earned by male graduates in the class of 1970 at the City College of New York. The survey, made by Prof. Herbert Katzenstein, shows that blacks averaged $9,670 during their first year, while whites only averaged $8,050.

According to Katzenstein, blacks in the 1970 class not only benefited from higher initial salaries, but also from better career upgrading opportunities than whites.

From 1962 to 1970 annual mean income of black graduates in the first employment year rose by 71 percent (from $5,660 to $9,670) as compared to 32 percent (from $6,110 to $8,050) in the same period for whites. According to the *Daily News* report, Katzenstein attributed the increase for blacks to the relative shortage of black male graduates in terms of available openings (at a time when employment of blacks "became a virtual imperative" for a firm's "public image") and to such government policies as "Affirmative Action."

In the previously cited Aug. 8, 1972, memorandum to HEW submitted by various Jewish organizations concerned over the "Affirmative Action" policy there is a reference to one university vice president who, in response to an inquiry by an alumnus over the university's "Affirmative Action" hiring procedures, responded with: "I think that your quarrel is not with [this] university but with the federal government."

The answer is not unrepresentative of other administrative reactions in the face of complaints over "Affirmative Action." But it does seem curious that U.S. universities and their faculties, that is precisely those institutions and individuals that have made it fashionable to oppose vehemently such government policies as presumably outraged them morally or otherwise (*vide* the campus anti-war movement), have been so content to pass the buck to Washington when confronted with the data mentioned in this article.

Could it be that the much-discussed masochistic guilt feelings of the liberal intelligentsia, especially in the American academy, are somehow assuaged by the new racism in reverse on the campus?

A
Strategy
Of Freedom
In Order

Education
for What?

by
Congressman
Philip M. Crane

IF WE EXAMINE THE NATIONAL PROBLEMS that prevail today, one that cuts perhaps most closely and deeply is the possibility of losing a generation of the young. In a *Newsweek* article Stewart Alsop observed that our campuses are suffering from the deadly danger of intellectual orthodoxy, and that a generation of some of the brightest youngsters of our society are "practitioners of the politics of despair," young men who are totally out of joint with the thinking of the vast majority of Americans. This is a small minority of our young people, but a minority that has been growing steadily and has already shut down some of the finest institutions of learning in the United States, profoundly affecting us all.

Anti-intellectualism has become a hallmark of the campus radicals. They have callously burned and bombed libraries, classrooms and computers. They have destroyed the research of professors and students. Their intellectual guru is Professor

Herbert Marcuse, who in his essay *Repressive Tolerance* reveals that if we do not walk to the beat of his ideological drums, we must be denied our basic rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

When young people engage in "sloganeering" as a substitute for thinking, they have short-circuited all thought processes. Argot becomes the vehicle for communicating. When language becomes unintelligible, the resulting frustration leads to violence. It is more than a little ironic that in the post World War era we have spent more money on education than the world spent on education up to that point, and yet after this investment we are offering remedial reading courses on the university level. Businessmen are complaining that they are getting illiterates from our colleges and universities. It is not because the youngsters are not bright, but because they all read "Dick and Jane" pabulum in their formative years. Some educationist theoretician concluded that 350 words are the proper vocabulary for a first grader, and consequently stories were structured around the chosen 350 words. But if you go back historically you will find the McGuffey Readers of the same level had the youngsters well beyond 1,500 words. This limited approach to reading skills has indeed contributed mightily to the development of a generation of functional illiterates.

Secondly, we failed satisfactorily to communicate to the youngsters an appreciation of the American system. Recently when I discussed this point with some students, they concluded that our system is too responsive to the will of the American people. Therein lies the tragedy, they feel, because their particular point of view does not prevail against that of the majority of the American people. Historically, we have experimented with systems of government that would have enabled them to make their view prevail. We have called them monarchies or oligarchies, or government by aristocracy; and yet we finally settled down to a system with certain constitutional safeguards that basically lets the will of the majority prevail. If your point of view does not prevail, the logical alternative is to get out and work in the system to persuade and educate the majority to an understanding of the issues as you perceive them. If you fail in that, at least you will not be put up against the wall and shot for your failure.

Surprisingly, if we examine those four states where the voting age has been reduced below the age of 21, that group of young people has the poorest voting record of all groups of citizens in our society—approximately 39 percent. All of us should be moving in the direction of exercising greater responsibility, and our educational institutions should be directing young people into, and not out of, the system.

Young people who presume they have some monopoly on the truth should demonstrate by their actions that they can do a better job than the older generation. But we cannot stimulate them to do a better job than we have done if we failed to provide them with the necessary skills. We have not properly advertised our history to this oncoming generation. We have fallen short in providing them with a proper understanding of comparative systems, of how society functions, of the democratic process, and of free market economy. Young people instead absorbed the message that our existing institutions are rotten; and with their limited experience and without the ability to make significant comparisons, they condemn all society's creations.

DESPAIRING STUDENTS IN A WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T CREATE

In a question and answer period on a university campus where I spoke recently, despairing students complained hopelessly about being born in a world they didn't create and a society whose institutions were so perverted that their only recourse was to blow up or burn down these institutions. At this point a full-bearded gentleman raised his hand. "I don't really have a question," he said. "I am a fellow student of these young people here, albeit old enough to be their father. I too was born into a world that I didn't create. That world included the depression, World War II and the Korean War, all of which they know only from a history book. I would like to remind them that a lot of my friends gave the last full measure of devotion and are lying in nameless graves on islands of the South Pacific, in order to give these students the opportunity to sit here tonight and tell me about what a rotten world they were born into, and how they are going to blow it up or burn it down. But I finally want to remind them of one thing: nobody has the right to destroy what he has not first created, and until they have lived enough to put something into the world, they will destroy it over my dead body only."

A survey at Harvard University some years back revealed that approximately 25 percent of the students would not give up their lives for anything: not God, not country, not family, nothing. Well, if there is nothing worth dying for, there is precious little worth living for.

This study is illustrative of a breakdown in our educational system. It has failed to develop an appreciation on the part of the younger generation for what is so infinitely wonderful about America—that this was a truly unique experiment, an "experiment in liberty" as Alexander Hamilton described it, and a fragile experiment that may not survive. Liberty has always been a very tender reed which has never existed for long periods. The great lesson to be learned from history is that people, through apathy and ignorance, are disposed to run away from freedom to various totalitarian systems. We have today many young people who, without believing in a totalitarian system, nevertheless would impose that system out of their sheer ignorance of how to preserve a free society.

Another basis for the "politics of despair" of many of our young people is nihilism, the total rejection of the values and ideals of Western civilization, "those time-tested truths that undergird the length and breadth of human history," e.g., the Ten Commandments which still constitute the foundation of any civilized society. They are the benchmarks of civilization all over the world, not just in our own tradition. It is on such basic, fundamental principles as these that again our school system has let the youngsters down. They have not been taught to appreciate and cherish the values of our society, Western civilization, or civilized society in any time or age.

Now the question is why and how this has come about in education. Until John Dewey's time the first and basic objective of any educational system was to pass on that body of truth distilled over 5000 years of recorded history. After making sure that the students had the foundation, then the second objective was to build on that in the perpetual quest for truth which will never be totally completed. However, if man's nature is in the process of change, then the first objective of education is obsolete. How can a generation justify imparting truths that can only be relative to itself to an oncoming generation with a wholly different nature? The logical conclusion of such thinking is that the adult world must learn to relate to the children, instead of the children learning to relate to adult responsibilities, obligations and truths that go along with maintaining a free society. The objective is no longer to teach the youngster what is true, because we can't generalize about objective truth anymore. Man is the measure of all things, and truth is subjective. This reasoning leads into situation ethics and the pathetic youngsters "up" on LSD and pot, trying to discern truth. In educational practice, it involves the avoidance of generalizations about what is true. Children are instead taught to adventure and experiment to find out what is "true" for themselves.

Well, if 5000 years of recorded history have not taught us some basic generalizations about what is truth regarding men and human relationships, then we had better destroy education before it destroys us. Every generation, it has been observed, stands on the shoulders of giants of the past. We dare not turn our backs on these great intellects that have contributed so mightily to our understanding of the human situation and our conquest of nature which has enabled us to reap the great blessings of liberty. Our objective should be to incorporate the young people in the perpetuation of putting together this collective wisdom of the past in order to continue the great unfinished task of constructive building towards a better world.

SCHOOLS SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO SOCIAL LABORATORIES

I will not leave you on such a pessimistic note, especially as UPAO is serving as an organization to bring about reforms that would go far toward righting many existing wrongs. One of these involves putting a greater stress on reading, writing and arithmetic. Not only did sight reading cripple the reading ability of the younger generation, but grammar went out of the curriculum too, accompanied by the elimination of penmanship and spelling. We must stop experimenting with our children and stop making social laboratories out of our schools. We must also reemphasize the necessity of vocational-technical training. A majority of our young people are totally incapable of handling college work: in fact, only 15 percent of any age bracket traditionally have been viewed as having the mental horsepower to handle the abstract concepts necessary for a bachelor of arts degree. We should stop the intellectual snobbery and recognize that there are some young people who would prefer to work with their hands. Then, provide them the opportunity at the high school level for vocational-technical training which can often provide them with higher earnings than they would receive in some of the professions. In so doing, we would go far towards eliminating the frustration and disillusionment for many who are increasingly discovering that there is no necessary correlation between a university diploma and white collar job with higher income.

We must also recognize that there is no substitute for parental involvement and parental control of the schools. It is the parents' responsibility to teach their children religious values and ideals; and it is the parents' responsibility to educate their children. In a specialized world, parents create such essential institutions as the church or the school to reinforce what is first and foremost a parental obligation. We must be prepared to assume responsibilities if we are going to have a free society—a free and irresponsible society is a contradiction in terms.

A breakthrough reform would be the voucher system, in which a parent would be given vouchers redeemable in the school of his choice, thus insuring a truly competitive school system. It would put all schools on their mettle to attract students.

Another reform involves breaking through the intellectual orthodoxy prevailing in most liberal arts colleges which exposes the student almost exclusively to a single point of view. Academic freedom is the guarantee that there shall be indeed the preservation of conflicting points of view. Academic freedom guarantees dissent in the academic community, but the conservative-libertarian alternative to statism and collectivism is rarely heard.

Another point of great importance is centralization. Instead of the notion of a university of 50,000 students, fifty colleges of 1,000 would restore a lost sense of community which in the past has been one of the university's strengths. Certain facilities, such as laboratories and libraries, could be pooled for the sake of economy.

Finally, we obviously are doing an insufficient job in implanting an appreciation of those American ideals which represent some of the most refined thought that has come out of Western civilization.

If we do not begin an initiation of these reforms very soon, and I trust that UPAO will be able to contribute mightily to this end, we shall witness the further fostering of community strife, social disintegration and the ultimate resort to totalitarian solutions. And we run the risk of losing the most precious thing to us all—our children.

February 1971

Confronting the Radicalized Campus: A Tactical Suggestion

by

Justus M. van der Kroef
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A COLLEAGUE OF MINE at a nearby university recently had difficulty getting certain needed changes in his departmental curriculum approved. As departmental chairman he had tried to steer the changes through various committees and administrative offices for nearly two years, but was encountering unusual and inexplicable delays and obstacles. The real bottleneck appeared to be at the administrative top. When he went to see his Dean, this worthy informed him bluntly that the best way to expedite matters now was to have students majoring in the department concerned form a "special interest" group and bring direct pressure to bear on the highest officers of the Administration. My colleague replied that student concurrence in the course changes had already been obtained months before by the department itself. In the end, however, my colleague, with reluctance, followed his Dean's advice. A deputation of willing students was formed, spoke in moderate but determined tones directly to the cognizant Vice-President and his committee and lo! within days the curricular alterations which had earlier seemed destined indefinitely to remain but a dream had been formally approved.

It may well be that my colleague's qualifications as a departmental leader on that particular campus are slipping and this necessitated reliance on a student pressure group. But who will deny that in the past three years many (by no means all) college and university administrations, having long since confused cowardice with prudence in confrontations with campus rebels, have thus found it expedient to allow the student community an ever larger voice in the decision making process at all levels of academic and extra-curricular life? Indeed, administrations are counting on such enlarged student involvement in their own academic powerplays. Student membership of and/or participation on boards of trustees, academic senates, college and departmental faculty meetings, faculty selection and promotion committees and other bodies, has grown rapidly, and while by no means uniform, is viewed by many, particularly students, as a desirable and enduring new element on the American higher educational scene.

I am by no means wholly averse to such increased student participation in the academic decision-making process. My own department in my own particular university has greatly benefited from a student advisory committee, whose members, chosen by the departmental majors at different class levels, have generally rendered useful and on some occasions even indispensable service. The same may be said of student participation—at least in my particular institution—in some all-university committees, especially those that touch on student extra-curricular activity. But unfortunately there is no uniformity, or continuity over time, in the quality of such student involvement, nor can one reasonably expect them. The obverse side of the coin of student participation is, therefore, only too familiar to most of us. Student demagoguery, articulated in various university councils, fed by the dubious ideology of the university's supposedly new political role in the community, acquiesced in by weak-kneed administrators and aided by radicalized faculty, has already wrought extensive havoc with once accepted standards of academic quality and undermined the university's pre-eminent intellectual responsibilities.

The trend is not irreversible. But in the meantime those who long for the return of the university community dedicated to the reasoned and orderly development of the mind cannot remain aloof any longer from the student political process that surrounds them and from whose worst excesses they expect the administration, or supposedly settled academic practices and tradition, to shield them. I am well aware that what I am about to suggest may be repugnant to some readers, and, indeed, may be in contradiction to the very concept of a "depoliticized" university. I emphasize that I fully recognize the varieties of the

American academic scene and that my proposals may be applicable to some campus situations and not to others. I know too that there remain college administrations and faculties with sufficient fortitude to resist the demands of student corsairs and their witting and unwitting allies—although I wish I might hear or read more of such administrations and faculties. I also believe, however, that on many less fortunate campuses a determined involvement in, and yes, covert control over student politics by faculty unwilling to let the campus be swayed by a handful of radicals, are long overdue. If, in principle, students are now entitled to involve themselves in what was once considered to be administrative and faculty affairs then, it seems to me, the reverse must apply also.

The essential feature of my suggestion is the willingness of some faculty to form and assume covert, if direct, leadership over a student organization on campus which can act as an indispensable ally to the UPAO chapter or kindred group in the university decision-making process. Such students are not difficult to find among the decent, if often apathetic, "silent majority" on any campus. Sometimes existing organizations, like the Young Americans for Freedom, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Students for Responsible Action, the Majority Coalition, or campus chapters of the major political parties, can provide a recruiting ground. Most any university teacher has something of a student following or with a little effort can cultivate one. Under conditions of stress—student strikes, "teach-in" and "sit-in" campaigns, demonstrations—many moderate students are particularly ready to seek responsible faculty leadership.

The purpose of the student organization to be formed is to insure that its members and candidates for campus office become "the student voice" to which administrations and faculties defer. Even by becoming a small "power broker" on campus, the organization can see to it that radicals do not obtain seats on various university deliberative and decision-making bodies. Participation in student council elections is therefore crucial, particularly elections for the presidency of the study body or of the student government. Such presidencies on many campuses bring considerable appointive powers with them: a pop-Maoist marauder in the student presidency's office can ensure that student "representation" on various other university bodies consists exclusively of his ideological kindred. No post in student government must be considered too small, and fielding a full slate of candidates in any student election is essential, not least because of its psychological effect on the rest of the student community.

UPAO members in any given college setting might well take turns in guiding their student allies. Frequent changes in faculty leadership of the student organization discussed aid in confusing the student opposition further and are only fair to faculty members who do not relish having the peculiar puerilities of so much student politics threaten to transform them into becoming the oldest teen-agers on campus. A wise department chairman, moreover, who realizes what is at stake, may well give proper consideration in his annual staff evaluations to those faculty engaged in service "above and beyond" the call of normal duty on the front lines of student politics. It is no use bewailing the fact that matters have come to this on the American campus. The question, at least for those in UPAO, I believe, is the proper method of counterattack. And the new scope of "student involvement" in academic affairs affords opportunities that must not be overlooked.

September 1971

The Professor and His Identity Crisis

by

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AS EVEN THE CASUAL OBSERVER of today's campus scene is aware, the American college and university are undergoing a crisis of identity. An understanding of the role and authority of the professor is the vital first step in attempting to solve the problem, for it is generally acknowledged that the faculty is the foundation of the whole college structure.

Before attempting to define the role of the professor, we must first examine some basic notions of the function of the college or university. Traditionally their purpose has been twofold: effective and creative teaching, and the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge through scholarship. Teaching and scholarship have been considered equal in importance, and it has been the task of the professor to perform with competence in *both* areas.

In recent decades the harmony of teaching and scholarship has been disrupted by the downgrading of the teaching responsibility and the concurrent exaltation of the "research" role at the expense of scholarship. This "flight from teaching," as Jacques Barzun calls it in *The American University*, has been carried to such lengths that, as he notes, "college and university teaching is thus the only profession . . . for which no training is given or required." Traditionally, creative teaching has been considered indispensable to quality higher education. This atrophy of emphasis on effective teaching has contributed to student apathy and restlessness on the contemporary campus, and most importantly, intensifies the crisis of identity confronting the professor today, for too often he does not know what, if anything, is expected of him in this crucial area.

Even scholarship, which might have been expected to fill the vacuum left by the downgrading of teaching, has been eclipsed by "research." In terms of what they connote on the modern campus, there are subtle but fundamental distinctions between scholarship and research. Research can be a tool of scholarship, but it is not coextensive with it. Scholarship suggests depth and comprehensiveness of study, coupled with productivity in a particular academic discipline, while research can imply the collecting of data on particular problems, and the seeking of solutions to these problems. In brief, "research" is a by-product of the emphasis upon "relevance" so dominant in many areas of American culture, including the campus. Where research is oriented to problem solving of the moment, and is often better carried on in off-campus institutes and centers, scholarship is nourished by the vision of the accumulation of knowledge for its own sake over the long pull. Scholarship is entitled to top-priority claim on college resources, for it, unlike research, can thrive best only on the campus.

Today scholarship often finds itself on the defensive with its emphasis upon knowledge for its own sake and the long-term view. It is better to be occupied with research in solving specific urban problems, the indictment goes, than to be immersed in Shakespearean scholarship. Scholarship implies aloofness, elitism, the ornamental. To its critics, scholarship at best suggests quaint elegance, and at its worst, to use the "unkindest cut of all," it is "irrelevant." In brief, modern leveling and egalitarianism with their vision of Truth found and the Past decreed irrelevant, prefer "research" to "scholarship."

II

It is an index of the temper of our time that it is even necessary to defend scholarship *per se*. More particularly, why should intellectual excellence be an end in itself? For those with a religious bent, John Henry Newman provided a succinct answer in his unexcelled classic, *The Idea of a University*, where he wrote: "Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each other." That is, to engage in scholarship is to learn more about the Divine Order of things—no mean accomplishment and certainly nothing to be defensive about. To justify scholarship in secular terms, we may ask whether, for example, excellence in health and athletic achievement are considered legitimate ends in themselves (which generally they are), and if so, then why not intellectual excellence? Certainly the critic of scholarship *per se* places himself in an awkward position when he contends that the pursuit of excellence is natural and desirable in man, *except* in the domain of scholarship. Hopefully the cult of mediocrity has not yet brought us to the point of promoting such a perverse doctrine.

Nevertheless, in this age of utilitarianism and frequent anti-intellectualism, it will be necessary to defend intellectual excellence as something of immediate utility. This is a burden not forced upon athletes or entertainers, but it is a challenge that defenders of the traditional college or university education must meet. What then is the utility of a developed intellect? Is this not what colleges and universities are supposed to be about? Is this not the end product of the principal functions of teaching and scholarship?

To define the cultivation of intellectual excellence is to demonstrate its utility. Newman has written: "I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony." He goes on to say that development of the intellect "teaches [one] to see things as they are, to get right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant." Concerning the general utility of all this, Newman concludes:

> The general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and informed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a physician, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer . . . but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the callings I have referred to . . . with an ease, a grace, a versatility, a success, to which

> another is a stranger. In this sense then . . . mental culture is emphatically *useful*.

There is little reason to attempt an improvement on Newman's clarity and eloquence. In our age of short memories and vertiginous change, he reminds us that old truths frequently must be restated.

III

Today, in our preoccupation with utility, the practical and the "relevant" in education, we may unwittingly have seriously undercut the great tradition of college or university education. The tides of the moment are in favor of the technical school where practical training is provided for immediate employment in a given trade or craft. Beyond question there is a vital public need for this kind of education. Indeed, it is a necessary corrective to the post-World War II tendency to think of a college education as befitting everyone. However, there is reason to fear we may have gone too far in this direction, for it is not uncommon today to find bright and talented young people, clearly possessing the intellectual capacity to undertake college education, who are eschewing it for immediate technical and vocational training. Why? One of the primary reasons is that the colleges and universities have defaulted on their time-honored mission, which is to provide for the cultivation of intellectual excellence through creative teaching and scholarship.

We have degraded teaching as a vital function of the university professor, and we have too often allowed research to be substituted for the riches, joys, and enduring rewards of genuine scholarship. For the moment, some young people sense that what we are doing on the campus is not particularly important. Until we return to our principal historical functions, they are probably correct.

If the faculty reclaims its traditional functions of teaching and scholarship, its proper authority, role, and relationship *vis-à-vis* students, college administrators, and the public will be clarified, and we will take a significant step toward solving the identity crisis of the contemporary campus.

IV

In the academic community today there is growing misunderstanding of the professor-student relationship. Recent trends and pressures have moved us in the direction of academic equality between student and professor. This perspective, rooted in political theories of leveling and egalitarianism, sometimes travels under the label of "participatory democracy." It is an insidious concept, wholly wrong, and it should be unequivocally repudiated.

The academic community cannot function as a democratic institution, if by democratic is meant academic equality between student and teacher. Traditionally, in order to preserve its integrity and basic mission, the university has been unashamedly aristocratic in the relationship between students and faculty. Not aristocratic in the sense of inherited privilege or the fripperies of nobility, but aristocratic in the sense of a natural aristocracy, in the belief that the professor should have superior knowledge of the subject he is teaching, and in that regard is *superior* to the student. As Richard Weaver concisely stated it in *Language Is Sermonic:* "By what act of arrogance do we set ourselves up as teachers? There are two postulates basic to our profession: the first is that one man can know more than another, and the second is that such knowledge can be imparted. Whoever cannot accept both should retire from the profession and renounce the intention of teaching anyone anything." Or, as Jacques Barzun has forthrightly put it, "a good teacher will tolerate a certain overconfidence in undergraduates—that is part of pedagogy—but to make believe that their knowledge and his are equal is an abdication and a lie."

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not calling for the restoration of an autocratic or dictatorial relationship between professor and student, if that ever existed. Indeed, I would consider that dysfunctional to an effective teaching role, which is enhanced by mutual rapport and relaxed discourse. I am contending that, where knowledge, the classroom, and related academic matters are concerned, the professor is the superior of the student. If we must put it in political terms, the professor-student relationship should be based upon Platonic justice, and not upon leftist egalitarianism. By Platonic justice I mean the harmony that emerges when each performs his natural function, and each receives his natural rewards. Within this framework the student is entitled to a professor who knows his material, who presents it evenhandedly, effectively, and interestingly, and who, in displaying genuine interest in his students, treats them with balance and fairness. Justice demands these things, but it does not demand equality with students in decisions as to course offering and content, curriculum design, grading, credit, granting of degrees, faculty hiring and retention, or any other matter reasonably related to the functions of teaching and scholarship.

Moreover, a firm understanding of our roles and authority as teachers and scholars will make it plain to us that the campus is not a sitting service or a therapy center for the unsettled children of the affluent. It may well be that in some cases these children need sitting and therapy services, but the campus, as historically conceived, is not the appropriate setting for the meeting of these needs. In John Henry Newman's inimitable words: "Do not say, the people must be educated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept from excesses . . . . We must carefully distinguish, Gentlemen, between the mere diversion of the mind and its real education."

If my teaching experience is a valid index, I am confident that the overwhelming majority of our college and university students will accept and respond to this concept of the professor's role. They accept it because intuitively they understand it is rooted in reality and the natural order of things. It is the professors, confused about their roles and lacking in confidence, who have created the imbalances on the contemporary campus. When the faculty abandons its role of the superior in matters academic, it invites student intrusion into these vital and delicate areas. If the faculty will reassert its legitimate authority, there is reason to believe the students will respond favorably. To that small minority which will demand academic equality with their professors, we apply that firm standard offered by Samuel Johnson in 1772 on the dismissal of six students from Oxford: "What have they to do at an university who are not willing to be taught, but will presume to teach? . . . . I believe they might be good beings;

but they were not fit to be at the University of Oxford."

V

Similarly, if the faculty reclaims its teaching and scholarship functions, its relationship with college administrators will be clarified, and the end result will be positive and healthful. With the denigration of teaching and the eclipse of scholarship by research, the professoriate became disoriented, and began to covet campus administrative posts as prestige positions. This lusting after administrative power was not particularly alarming in itself (such proclivities are as old as the human condition), but it was a symptom of the campus malaise resulting from the downgrading of teaching and scholarship.

Administration is a vital function, but it is not the legitimate domain of the professor. Often by interest, talent, and temperament, the professor is ill-equipped to be an administrator. Initially he came to his profession through his love of knowledge in a particular discipline, and because of his commitment to teaching and scholarship. Often the professor looks unseemly and out of his element when he forsakes the original reasons for entering his chosen profession and hankers after bits and pieces of administrative power. He manifestly is confused and disoriented as to his legitimate function, and his surge for administrative power results in a disruption of his proper relationship with *bona fide* administrators.

The cultivation of excellence in instruction and in scholarly pursuits requires seclusion and quiet. It requires freedom from excessive administrative duties. In our culture oriented toward action and administrative power as the ultimate values, this setting will not be to the liking of most people. To those professors who cannot accept the vows of seclusion and quiet which are attendant upon quality teaching and scholarship, I would suggest, as did Samuel Johnson with his students at Oxford, that they seek satisfaction elsewhere—perhaps in the administrative and bureaucratized world of government and business. Russell Kirk summed it up well when he said that "the lover of wisdom must not drink deep from the cup of power."

VI

Finally, if the faculty recovers its teaching and scholarship functions, its badly deteriorated relationship with the public will be improved. Robert Nisbet in *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma* refers to that vital "social contract" which exists between the public and the academic community. Under this contract the professor is granted academic freedom, which is the right to free intellectual inquiry in the pursuits of teaching and scholarship; in return the faculty is expected to engage in the cultivation of excellence.

The public implicitly understood that academic freedom was just that—freedom, not license. In this regard, for example, the public is sound in its visceral rejection of the faculty contention that the use of obscenities by students in campus publications is protected by academic freedom. Even assuming that academic freedom may be extended to cover students as well as faculty (a questionable proposition, considering the student's role is not one of equality with the professor in matters academic), such practices are obstacles to the pursuit of the university's prime mission because they destroy civility, an indispensable ingredient of genuine teaching and scholarship.

Moreover, the public never considered academic freedom a privileged sanctuary or launching pad for unrelenting and doctrinaire assaults upon society's established mores and institutions. Balanced, reasoned, and proportioned criticism, essential to teaching and scholarship, the public was more than prepared to accept, but it never understood its arrangement with the professoriate to be an installment contract whereby society was expected to finance its own dissolution, and thereby ironically dissolve the very setting which had afforded genuine academic freedom.

Undeniably, in some quarters the academic community has violated its part of this contract with the public. Some faculty made the strategic error of following those purist colleagues who contended that academic freedom was an unlimited invitation to license, and to doctrinaire and mindless attacks upon American society. The public correctly realizes that these matters are not what the social contract involving academic freedom is about. Furthermore—and this is most embarrassing to professors, who ought to be the experts in academic matters—the public perceives that license and doctrinal fanaticism are antithetical to balance in teaching and excellence in scholarship.

This breach of contract on the part of some faculty is a matter of grave concern, for it erodes public confidence and support, indispensable elements for the survival of higher education. The professor can afford some estrangement from students or administrators, but deliberately to alienate the public is mischievous and tragic, and ultimately could be fatal. It has become accepted in American life for the public to regulate those institutions which have become abusive and disdainful of larger public interests. This has been true, for example, of government control and regulation of corporate and union excesses. Certainly there is nothing sacrosanct about the campus, and if abuses and perversions of academic freedom continue, those with a grip on commonsense and reality will not be surprised if the public intervenes and attempts to restore academic freedom to its proper dimensions. It is a familiar theme: those who will not keep their own house in order often will find the public via government or other avenues asserting what it feels are its legitimate interests. In a democratic society, premised upon the idea of popular involvement, it cannot be otherwise.

In most societies academic freedom is at best limited and fragile, and often it is nonexistent (for example, look at the current plight of intellectuals in the Soviet Union). In America, academic freedom has been a treasured reality, something to be revered and jealously guarded. It is truly lamentable to see the academic community, made up of the very people who benefit most from this earthly rarity, dissipating it through abuses and excesses.

VII

If the American college and university are to recover from their identity crisis, they will have to restore the faculty, the cornerstone of the academic community, to the basic tasks of teaching and scholarship. Teaching will have to be given back its deserved place of eminence, and scholarship, where it has succumbed, will have to be reclaimed from the provincialism and narrowness of "research." In sum, if the faculty recovers its proper role and authority, the campus identity crisis will resolve itself, for professors will turn to instruction and academic matters, administrators will address themselves to the pressing administrative problems of the modern campus, and hopefully the students will learn the ineffable and enduring rewards of developing their minds through the pursuit of intellectual excellence.

October 1972

The Teacher Evaluation Frenzy – Its Causes and Consequences

by

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THE IDEA THAT COLLEGE STUDENTS should play some role in the evaluation of their teachers is not a new one. True, until recently very few universities have had formal procedures for such evaluation, but for a long time there have been "guides," "advisors" or similar student-composed documents telling new or unwary fellow students which courses and professors to seek out and which to avoid. However, in the past few years the interest in evaluation of professors by students has stepped up to a frenetic pace, and a good many universities are now beginning to insist that such evaluations be included among the papers a professor submits for promotion and tenure.

There seem to be two main reasons for the increased interest in student evaluation of teachers. In the years since the Berkeley riots, the universities have been under fire for their performance in a number of areas. Recently, for example, we have seen the rise of a public conviction that university professors spend too much of their time on research or scholarship, and not enough on teaching. This kind of concern has led to the introduction in the legislatures of a number of states of bills providing for a prescribed number of contact hours, to prevent the "non-teaching" or "research" professor from receiving public funds for his private woolgathering. Embarrassed by this (partially wrongheaded) attack on the university, administrators have nervously attempted to show concern for the quality of teaching at their institutions by trumpeting the virtues of "evaluation" as perhaps a way of easing the pressures presently exerted on the university to effect palpable and tangible improvements in teaching quality.

There has been another source of pressure on college administrations to develop some kind of formal evaluation process, and that, of course, is student pressure. In recent years students have become increasingly vocal in their insistence upon gaining authority in matters of appointment, promotion and tenure of professors. The argument usually runs something like this: who better than the student knows how effective a job of teaching any particular professor is doing? So why should student comment not be taken strongly into consideration?

Well, why not? Since student pressure has probably been the stronger of these two pressures where teacher evaluation is concerned, and since the kind of argument made in the previous paragraph is, at first glance, so manifestly reasonable, we must ask ourselves, yes, why not? What's wrong with the idea of letting the students tell the administration who's doing a good job of teaching and who isn't? In theory there is nothing wrong with the idea; on paper it appears to be an excellent one. Careful examination, however, shows us that the idea fails in practice. If students looked on the chore purely objectively, with the altruistic motive of improving teaching quality at their institutions—and this is always the publicly proclaimed motivation—teacher evaluation would probably be a great boon to the university.

But we know that in fact students do not use the evaluation process for these ends. Instead, it has become almost exclusively a tool of political pressure. The insistence that students have a say in the selection, retention, or promotion of teachers is a product of present-day student politics, the end of which is only secondarily the improvement of educational values. Its primary purpose is usually the imposition upon the institution of student educational ideology. Students use evaluation largely to pressure professors into conformity in matters of grade distribution, work load, and the like. Ordinarily they display only faint regard for really important educational values.

I believe that the teacher evaluation syndrome is really a sub-category of one of the major fallacies of current educational thinking (the thinking, in any case, of nearly all students, and a large number of professors as well), to the effect that education is not so much a formal disciplinary process as a kind of amorphous "experience" that ought to be wholly self-determined. The average student believes that education should be an experience entirely of his own contriving—he ought to decide for himself how hard he should work, what he should study, what his living and working conditions should be like. The fallacy behind this is obvious, of course. Institutional education is by definition a process whereby the immature are guided and instructed by the more mature. It is not merely a warmly emotional and shapeless experience, it is not merely a matter of "doing one's thing." But in his own thinking, today's student already knows what he ought to be studying, how he should be spending his time, and believes that he need tolerate the professor only so long as the professor caters to his wants and needs, so long as he provides the proper amount of breathing room for the development of student culture and student life style.

We can only conclude, I think, that teacher evaluation as it presently exists is just as likely to lead to a deterioration of quality in higher education as to an improvement in it. Let me give a concrete example of what I have in mind. At the University of Illinois the young assistants and instructors who teach the course known as Freshman Rhetoric bend over backward to make it palatable: they assign only the smallest amount of reading and writing; they award As and Bs to nearly all comers. They are, after all, on the bottom rung of the academic ladder, and especially need to win the praise of their students as sporting fellows. The trouble is, Freshman Rhetoric or composition simply cannot be taught this way. If the course is not a baptism by fire, it is nothing at all, and probably ought to be dropped as a requirement. The students, of course, publicly acclaim their A and B giving instructors, but, I suspect, go away feeling uneasy over the worthlessness of the course, which in so many universities has now become a rather undemanding variant of high school English. (Perhaps it is an interesting paradox of our age that at a time when college students have been largely successful at getting their professors to ease up on work loads and all kinds of intellectual demands, more and more students have been finding college education increasingly sterile and disappointing. Students would probably do themselves a big favor if they thought this paradox though.)

There is, it seems to me, another detrimental consequence of student evaluation of teachers, and it is not an unimportant one for the future of our society. In their desire to turn the university campus into a kind of adolescent womb, to insist that their professors be mild and innocuous chaps who don't really cause much trouble and never interfere with student habits and life styles, students are forgetting one of the most important verities of life. Students going out in the world learn soon enough that any kind of achievement is going to involve struggle, that it is going to involve getting along with difficult people (far more difficult, no doubt, than their mild-mannered professors), and that they eventually are going to be in a position in their lives *when evaluation will be all one-sided*, when their work will have to stand some test of evaluation strictly on its own merits, without any softening or ameliorating circumstances. A young man who decides he wants to devote his life to making movies will soon discover that if he is to get anywhere in the field, he'll just have to make good movies. He has no chance to "evaluate" the public and find out whether its tastes are up to his standards. He either proves himself or he doesn't. Thus, if not in college, at least sometime in his life, a man must master some subject matter, some discipline. It would, of course, be in his best interest to start in college. And indeed, until the womb theory of college education insinuated itself in our midst, college was the very place where one started learning to cope with difficulties. The surrender of professors to the current rating fancy has as its most unfortunate side effect a reinforcement of the idea that college is little more than an adolescent holding pattern. Unfortunately this is a negation of the original purpose of the college, which was to be a provider of high-quality, rigorous, adult education.

December 1972

Teaching and Its Evaluation

by

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DESPITE ITS GENERAL DESTRUCTIVENESS, student unrest over the last decade has been beneficial in focusing attention on the problem of teaching, primarily classroom teaching, in the university. Those among us who approach the academy from a strictly 'free market' viewpoint argue that students, or the taxpayers, pay for an education presumed in large measure to be facilitated ('imparted' is an inappropriate word here, since ultimately each individual must educate himself) by good teaching. Students may legitimately ask, then, whether the teaching they receive is good; if it is not, how it can be improved; if it is, whether it should not be rewarded in more substantial degree than it is now.

To my mind it is indisputable that great teaching is an art, and that superlative teachers—or scholars, for that matter—occur as rarely as superlative doctors, architects, or plumbers. Great teachers are born, not made. Yet it should be possible for the good, or competent, teacher to raise his teaching effectiveness, and it would seem that an important channel for the achievement of this goal ought to be evaluation in some form, by someone. Classroom teaching is, after all, a semi-public activity; and although faculty have traditionally reacted strongly against the notion of direct teaching evaluation, especially by their peers, the fact that we have, however grudgingly, largely accepted the notion of student evaluation of teaching should now give us cause to reconsider the whole question of teaching evaluation and the improvement of classroom performance. A truly professional teacher should always be concerned with the raising of standards, both for his students and for himself.

The evaluation of teaching is far from easy. In the Fall 1969 issue of *The Public Interest* Yale historian J. H. Hexter published a stimulating defense of the "publish or perish" policy, at least as it is applied at the most prestigious universities. In the course of elaborating his chief argument in support of that policy (that publication is in fact a form of teaching by means of which one reaches, directly or indirectly, a much wider audience than one ever will in the classroom), Professor Hexter considers the question of teaching evaluation at some length. He very correctly emphasizes the difficulty of equating teaching excellence in a large lecture course with teaching excellence in a small seminar or discussion class, or teaching excellence in the direction of dissertations: one teacher may inspire large classes of undergraduates but be unable to handle a seminar, whereas another may be incapable of teaching large groups but train several individuals who later go on to make outstanding contributions in their field. How are the two to be compared? This is the perennial problem of quantity versus quality, one which, let us note, enters into the evaluation of nearly anything, including publication and teaching.

Professor Hexter then remarks upon the weaknesses of student evaluation of teaching, recalling one instance from his own experience in which as a student he would have ranked a particular professor very high, whereas now, forty years later and with the benefit of much hindsight, he would rank him very low. In general, Professor Hexter dismisses student evaluations quite lightly. He gives even shorter shrift to evaluations by fellow faculty, on two principal grounds: that he himself is so unsure of the evaluation of his own teaching performance that he cannot presume to judge others, and that "direct faculty evaluation in order to provide rewards for teaching would provide splendid opportunities for a reversion to the jungle in matters of academic politics." In even fewer words he dismisses the possibility of evaluation of teaching by administrators, and ends by concluding essentially that no objective assessment of teaching can be made and therefore, by implication, that it is impossible to improve it.

Professor Hexter continues, however, to argue that it is feasible to evaluate a scholar's published work more or less accurately, to give scholars rough rankings on the basis of what they have written. Here, it seems to me, his argument fails: for if publication is a form of teaching, and if it is impossible to evaluate teaching, then it is also impossible to evaluate publications, and we end up in a *cul-de-sac* of agnosticism. Everyone knows that scholarly books and articles may receive the most divergent appraisals: one man's trash is another man's revelation sometimes, and disagreements over the worth of a man's publications infest a major corner of the "academic jungle." It is precisely for this reason that those responsible for hiring and firing so often fall back on the expedient of counting pages, thus pushing onto the editors of scholarly journals and university presses the task of assessing scholarly merit. No, judgments as to quality cannot be avoided, either in the case of classroom teaching or of publication. Once this is granted, those making judgments should wish to have as much information as possible on which to decide: in the case of publications, they should have read them and the reviews of them, if any; in the case of classroom teaching, they should possess several different sources of evaluation.

How can evaluations of classroom teaching be obtained? In a number of ways. First, of course, course outlines, examinations and other written materials produced for the course by an instructor should be available to the evaluator. Such materials can reveal a great deal about the effort which an instructor has put into a course, and the success he has achieved in organizing his material.

Second, the evaluator may seek more or less systematic student evaluations, of the sort which already exist on many campuses. Student reactions to courses should never be taken as gospel, but students do have a right to express themselves on the way in which they are taught, and the serious ones often have cogent remarks to make about a course which an instructor is well advised to consider thoughtfully. An evaluator must use his judgment in separating the malicious from the well-intentioned, the ill-informed from the competent, in student course evaluations.

Third, an instructor's colleagues are in a good position to evaluate the faculty member's skills. They have been students in the past, they are teachers now and so are familiar with the profession's demands and rewards. Instructor-observers may themselves learn something of technique or substance from sitting in on a colleague's class, and they may very well make helpful suggestions to the one under observation, provided they do so tactfully. After all, it happens often enough that faculty attend courses in their own or other departments for their own instruction without offending those in whose classes they enrol. With a certain shift in psychology, professors could become accustomed to the idea of occasional visitations from their colleagues, and think very little of it. Certainly an evaluator who must make a decision as to hiring, firing or promotion should have the opportunity to observe a teacher directly, either in the classroom or when he gives a public lecture on a subject within his scholarly competence. The evaluator should not be wholly satisfied with hearsay reports, either from students or from other faculty, no matter how much skill he exercises in winnowing the wheat from the chaff therein. An evaluator who possesses the sources of evaluation just described–written course materials, evaluations of students and fellow faculty, and his own direct observation–will be able to make much more informed judgments than he could without them.

Moreover, the very fact that substantial time and effort are invested in the evaluation of teaching will raise teaching's prestige, and thus encourage teachers, both good and not so good, to put greater effort into their classroom teaching. Even the superlative teacher–not to mention lesser ones–can benefit from criticism and suggestions from students, faculty, or even administrators, provided they be offered and accepted in the proper spirit.

December 1972

The Evaluation of University Administrations

by

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EVALUATION HAS BEEN A MOST constructive influence for the better in Toastmasters and other groups. Many a professor has benefited from candid comments designed to help him do a more effective job of teaching. Recent trends toward using student evaluations as the major criterion in determining faculty pay, promotion, and tenure may induce a reaction which will alter the approach and content of these evaluations. Still, student evaluation must inevitably be proposed for yet other facets of university life: students themselves have expressed to me their desire to make their opinions known on things other than course work and faculty performance.

At the end of a course evaluation form I once asked students to rank in order of importance the evaluation of items in a list of 14 functions of campus life at Oregon State University. Weighting numbers were assigned the items by students in order of decreasing priority. Totalling the numbers for each item on the list then revealed student priority for evaluation. The first five items emerged as follows:

(1) Registration and scheduling of classes and exams.

(2) Administration (President, Deans, and Chairmen).

(3) Incidental Fees (honoraria, fees to support Nader's student public interest research body, and other compulsory fees for non-curricular functions).

(4) Student Body Association (government and funding).

(5) Student Advising.

The students gave much lower rating numbers to spectator sports, health service, campus student newspaper, housing, student union, food services, and the student Radio/TV station as subjects for evaluation. A more widely representative survey and redesigned list might alter these relative scores slightly but I believe these results gave a reliable indication of student priorities for expanded student evaluation of additional campus functions beyond his professors and his courses.

Since student evaluations of the faculty have provided an opportunity for some students to vent their feelings about life under the cloak of anonymity, the evaluation of other university functions such as those listed above might provide an alternative for students who did not feel unkindly enough toward the professors to indulge in blood-letting against them. Perhaps the president, dean, registrar, advisor, student body officers, or faculty-student committee spending the students' involuntary "incidental fees" would supply more inviting targets for these students. In that spirit, the same sort of questionnaire could be devised as many teaching evaluation forms which ask very vague questions, or request one-word characterizations, or provide a choice of answers such as "very good," "good," "neutral," "bad," "very bad," etc. Such evaluations merely measure the mood of the respondent, and give scant help to the professor or administrator seeking to improve his performance.

However, careful design can greatly strengthen evaluation forms. Thus, for instance, we can determine the kind and degree of student interest in a course, what percentage of students are merely occupying time between completing high school and adopting some form of adult life-style, what students aim to do after college, whether a course is too challenging or insufficiently demanding, the effect of other students upon the classroom environment, the suitability of the course methods for various interest groups in the class, the reaction of different student groups to the instructor's personality, and whether the expressed interests of the students are such as to justify their presence in the course or on the campus.

Likewise, students may reveal their expectations of the administration and their feelings as to the satisfaction of those expectations by the administrative arms. But what of the other body of university people with expectations and needs to be met by the administration? I refer to the faculty, who need leadership and both intellectual and material support from the administration if they are to perform effectively.

Faculty certainly have a solid basis for evaluating administrators, possibly even a better basis than students have! Does the president, for instance, truly act as "first professor of the university" in articulating purposes and an educational philosophy at his institution? Do faculty members truly feel themselves part of an intellectual community, or are they isolated experts collectively used as the chief scapegoat for adolescent student unhappiness through evaluations which pillory them unless they bribe students through extremely generous grading schemes so as not to suffer anonymous damage?

A well-designed evaluation of administrators by faculty could perform a signal service to higher education by focusing attention on the constructive role which administrators should perform, but so seldom do in actuality. The leadership vacuum evident at many colleges might be filled if the results of faculty evaluation of administrations were summarized and transmitted to their governing boards. I propose, therefore, that the UPAO make a priority effort toward the design of an evaluation questionnaire constructively oriented for faculty to use in rating their administrators (President, Deans, and Chairmen) and support services (library, physical plant, computer center, audio-visual and instructional materials center, instructional communications, recreational activities, supply centers, fiscal information services, etc.). Let such a form be printed and retailed for faculty to use, along with an offer to summarize for a fee the resulting surveys at UPAO national offices and to send the summaries to the chairman or to each member of the governing board of the institution from which a faculty group sends such forms to the UPAO.

Such a service to faculty colleagues would introduce UPAO to faculty in a truly constructive role and should heighten the desirability of individual membership in UPAO.

Moreover, the student evaluations of professors should incorporate some safeguards if they are to be constructive in the improvement of teaching and not merely result in a "blow-off" or the intellectual equivalent of anonymously throwing a rock through a window pane. UPAO should be able to provide responsible guidelines and specific questions for evaluation of faculty so as to protect the legitimate civil rights of professors and assure constructive results.

Thus, I would urge that the UPAO mount a major effort at once to formulate guidelines for evaluation of all aspects of the campus, and to produce evaluation materials which will foster genuine improvement and restoration of standards in higher education.

January 1973

The Range and Limits of Academic Freedom

by

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EFFORTS ON THE PART of faculty to *indoctrinate students* and even worse their efforts to *politicize the colleges and universities*, as evidenced by a number of universities giving students academic credit to work for candidates seeking office in last fall's election, have done much to alienate other students and the general public. The result has been a marked cooling of the enthusiasm the public had for higher education during the 1960's, a considerable decrease in the willingness of legislatures to appropriate money for higher education, and a great decline in the voluntary giving to higher education.

These efforts at indoctrination have also done much to cause questions to be raised about the desirability of academic freedom. The irony in this lies in the fact that it is often those who indoctrinate and those who would politicize our colleges and universities who also make the loudest demands for academic freedom. If they would retain that right, they would do well to address their attention to an objective treatment of their subjects.

I am strongly of the opinion that without faculty encouragement and leadership there would have been no student riots, no buildings burned, no people killed on campuses. Higher education would have continued to enjoy the support of the public and would have continued to fare well. Without that support, higher education is in for some hard times, and faculty members are part of higher education. This is a high price to pay for indoctrination, which is really the prostitution of academic freedom.

Academic freedom is given to a professor because it is believed that he will study, deliberate, and research, and, then, objectively report his findings WITHOUT ANY PRE-COMMITMENT ON HIS PART. . . .

Higher education is faced with political activists who use their positions as a sanctuary from which politically motivated attacks can be launched against the rest of society. "Sanctuary" is a well-advised term. Such political activists never question the justice of their attacks, yet are the first to raise the cry of "academic freedom" over the inevitable reaction to their activity.

Learned Hand once remarked, "You cannot wear a sword beneath a scholar's gown." He was quite right. No one can simultaneously be advocate and scholar. Refusal to face this fact makes the political activist on the campus a primary offender against the academic freedom he *constantly* invokes.

Much of the student unrest on campus is directly traceable to faculty agitation, in which a privileged academic position is used to subvert the entire process. Such professors are often so busy in such causes that they neglect the very teaching and research which are the reason for the academic community's existence. Unless the teacher fulfills his duties to the system and convinces society he is discharging those duties, he can expect to lose the privileged base he has been granted. Academic freedom is not some irrevocable grant. If it is lost, we all suffer, because the process of creative thinking suffers as does the development of truly free, inner-directed students. But any right is doomed unless its inevitably accompanying responsibilities are discharged.

While the professor has every right to take part in politics on his own, the current tendency to use the academy as an arsenal and staging ground for political combat is both unwarranted and dangerous. Considering the enormous overextension of government in our society, we may expect that when the academy is willing to lend itself to indoctrination and activism rather than education, the end result will be political regulation of that indoctrination. The state will prove to be a poor guardian of academic freedom.

The need is great for the academic community to put its own house in order. The image and the fact of an intellectual community devoted to pursuing the truth must be renewed. Meanwhile, the number of genuine teachers and scholars quietly pursuing their proper function is the cement which still holds the system together, despite all the destructive forces at work upon it.

This community of scholars needs protection on two fronts: from those outside the academy who would destroy freedom through excessive regulation, and from those inside the academy who would destroy the system through license. Unless faculties can regulate themselves from within, they may rest assured they will be regulated from without.

March 1971

Academic Freedom or Academic Nonsense

by

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ALTHOUGH ANY FOOL HAS A RIGHT to talk nonsense in any field, you must be academically qualified to talk nonsense in a university, though to be sure what strikes some people as nonsense may turn out to be higher education.

There are some people in the academic community who believe that academic freedom is the same freedom guaranteed all citizens by the First Amendment to the Constitution. They believe the right of free speech and free inquiry in any academic or non-academic area is a right of all faculty members. The First Amendment is a wonderful principle of freedom that is a right of all citizens, and I have no desire to inhibit its legitimate application. But we must ask: what is academic about the First Amendment? The First Amendment is a legal principle, and its relation to the non-academic activities of a professor, the philosophy of his institution and the authority of its administrators is a legal question to be determined by the courts. The belief in unconditional freedom for discussion of any topic in the classroom by professors is a threat to the existence of academic freedom and in the long run will result in the academy's destruction.

In order to avoid the confusion and irreparable harm to the university that this attitude toward academic freedom will bring, the academic community must objectively define academic freedom and police its own house. I offer the following definition of academic freedom as food for thought:

> Academic freedom is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, to investigate, to teach and to publish the

> truth as they see it, in the field of their competence, subject to no control, except the methods by which truths are established in their field.

What is academic about a professor's personal religious, political, economic or sociological views? If a professor has his highest degree in, say, anatomy, does this qualify him to speculate in the areas of nuclear physics, business administration, music or political science? If we answer yes to this question, we arrive at academic nonsense!

It is improper for any professor deliberately to intrude material designed to politicize his students in the classroom, particularly when that material has no direct relation to the subject he teaches. To campaign for one's personal political beliefs in class is just as wrong as to proselytize for one's religious beliefs there. In order to avoid violating the principle of academic freedom, the professor must present his course essentially as officially announced. If a professor encourages his classes to walk out and strike over political issues, he not only violates the academic freedom of those students who desire to learn, but raises the question of his own professional competence.

The gravest threats to academic freedom no longer stem from fundamentalist ministers, economic rogues, business charlatans or political demogogues. Today, the major threats to academic freedom come from the leaders in the academy who have forgotten the prime functions of the university and now want to replace them with their own personal and political goals.

Whatever claims radical professors and students have made, the methods by which the most extreme groups have sought to realize them—the violence, the strikes, the sit-ins, the vandalism, the obscenities, the callous disregard of property and the rights of others—are educationally far more evil than any existing educational practices. They destroy the entire notion of academic due process and rational consideration, which must be integral to the life of the university. The net result is that academic freedom is replaced by academic nonsense.

January 1972

Academic Freedom and Tenure

by

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"NOBODY HAS TIME THESE DAYS to improve himself, so busy is he with attempts to improve his neighbor."

Martin ten Hoor was dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Alabama when he wrote the above words in 1953 in an article stating the case for a return to the primary goal of education.

As a student activist in the middle 1940's, seeking to influence the direction taken by the revived International Union of Students after World War II, I stubbed my toe, metaphorically speaking, on the same hard fact of life when I outlined my thoughts and tentative plans to the president of our University College. He reminded me firmly and bluntly that the primary reason I was in college and the motive for my parents' financial sacrifices in sending me there was not the betterment of the student organizations, local, national or international, laudable activities though these might be, but my own academic advancement.

The University, he reminded me, is a community of scholars; the standards of such a community are necessarily scholastic, not those of the marketplace or the political arena, standards that reflect in a real way, a long scholarly tradition.

The twin pillars supporting the keystone of the arch of scholarly tradition are academic freedom and tenure.

From time to time in history, blind Samsons have attempted to pull down one or both of those key pillars. When they succeeded, as did the Biblical Samson in the Temple of the Philistines, the scholarly tradition did not long survive. The

Dark Ages following the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the nightmare of the thousand-year Reich, the present plight of scholars in the U.S.S.R., all should tell us how fragile a thing is human freedom.

Now as in past ages, we are told that all that is wrong in our universities can be blamed directly or indirectly on academic freedom and tenure of faculty. Get rid of these twin anachronisms and the university will be fully responsible to human need, personal, social, political.

Let one thing be clearly understood: a faculty deprived of their right to academic freedom and tenure will soon cease to carry out the duties corresponding to that right, the duties of the scholar, namely research and teaching. They will vote with their feet; if they remain they will not be worth listening to. For a scholar who is not 'his own man', to paraphrase St. Thomas More, is neither a scholar nor a man.

April 1971

How Effective a Safeguard Is Tenure After All? The Case of Filimon D. Kowtoniuk

by

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A STRONG PRESUMPTION remains in academic circles that tenure is a reliable guardian of the elementary faculty right of the free expression of ideas and opinion. In a recent article for a journal of higher education, Florence Moog notes the faith which persists in "the tale of the dragon Tenure and the golden treasure Academic Freedom." In explaining why tenure guarantees did not really help academic representatives of minority groups much in the past and do not give much meaningful protection to women at the present, she arrives at a magnificent diagnosis: "Academic freedom as ordinarily exercised displays a curious presbyopic quality: it readily discerns problems at a distance from the campus but has great difficulty seeing those right around home." In this article I would like to offer evidence from a current case to show that such a diagnosis has general validity well beyond underscoring the special problems of minority groups and women in academia.

There are two regular lines of defense which tenure protection provides. The first is academic-institutional: in current practice it is the guarantee of a hearing before a committee of fellow faculty members who will recommend a finding of guilt or innocence when a tenured faculty member is accused of an offense severe enough to warrant dismissal. The second is legal: since the awarding of tenure is essentially the awarding of a special type of long-term contract, recourse may be had to the courts if the academic-institutional line of defense gives way and allows stated terms to be violated. The protection offered by tenure rests, however, to a large and possibly not very well appreciated degree on how seriously the processes are taken whereby a tenured faculty member can be dismissed "for cause." If tenure is indeed to offer the protection which it is believed to offer, punitive dismissal "for cause" must be an extreme measure, used only for the most serious offenses against public or academic order. And yet, under the existing rules, when we get to the question of *how* grave an offense it takes to justify dismissal "for cause," whether this is judged by a faculty committee or by the courts, we find that we are dealing with anything but an objectively comprehended issue.

The case of Dr. Filimon D. Kowtoniuk, which has been festering in Virginia for more than the past two years, provides a startling example of how ineffective a safeguard tenure may be, if the formal guidelines for insuring due process in cases of removal "for cause" are only nominally adhered to.

Although the press nationwide, including the *New York Times*, has given some coverage to the case over the last year and a half, there are still probably enough readers who are unfamiliar with it to make the recent history of the man and his struggle worth reviewing. For five years, from academic 1961-1962 through 1965-1966, Kowtoniuk taught Russian part-time at Virginia State College (VSC), a predominantly Black college in Petersburg, some thirty miles south of Richmond. In annual reports his department chairman commended him for competence, enthusiasm, and "unusual progress . . . in developing the area of Russian studies." In 1966 he was appointed full-time Associate Professor. He then taught both Russian and German, and over the next several years he received not only good ratings for his teaching but also other commendations and awards both for academic work and for promoting good relations with students.

In the late 1960's, however, Dr. Kowtoniuk began to run into unexpected conflicts with part of the leadership on campus. A Ukrainian refugee as well as a survivor of a Nazi labor camp, he spoke out on campus and in the local press against what he believed to be institutional encouragement of the militant antiwar movement in general and demonstrations at VSC in particular. Defending traditional American values with a refugee's fervor, he also criticized some of the more extreme expressions of Black militancy by colleagues at VSC. In October

1969, he acted as spokesman for a group of VSC professors who opposed the Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations. Through early 1970, too, he continued to make full use of what he believed to be his right of free expression on public issues.

The following spring and summer, VSC attempted to terminate Dr. Kowtoniuk's appointment. According to Dr. Kowtoniuk, this attempt was in reprisal for his recent public criticism of colleagues and administrators. VSC administrators did not concede that there was any causal relationship here; instead, they charged Dr. Kowtoniuk with having faulty credentials and with having been uncooperative in supplying his credentials to the Administration. Since Dr. Kowtoniuk was protected by tenure, he was able to protect himself against immediate and summary dismissal by appealing to the Chesterfield County Circuit Court. On September 10, 1970, Judge Ernest P. Gates issued a temporary injunction against the College's dismissal action, which was followed by a permanent injunction on September 21.

Since tenured professors can be fired only "for cause," formal proceedings were subsequently instigated against Dr. Kowtoniuk. It was predictable that they, too, had no reference to Dr. Kowtoniuk's exercise of political criticism, but it was at least mildly surprising that the statement of charges attached relatively little weight to the matter of his credentials. Eventually, after some revision of the formal charges, Dr. Kowtoniuk was informed in a letter from the Dean of the College that he was to be given an opportunity to defend himself against eight counts of "unprofessional conduct," with matters pertaining to his credentials subsumed under the first two of these.

Nominally everything went according to AAUP standards; yet from this point on it becomes clear how important the spirit of a proceeding is when it is assessed as part of due process. Concerning the procedure for selecting the Hearing Committee, it is of interest that Dr. Kowtoniuk had asked the immediate past President of the VSC Chapter of the AAUP to consult with Mr. Calvin Miller, President of the VSC Faculty Senate, about what was going to be done in his case. That gentleman later reported the result of his brief interview with Mr. Miller in a letter to Dr. Kowtoniuk as follows: "Upon inquiry, Mr. Miller said 'F____ Kowtoniuk,' referred to you as a 'paleface troublemaker,' and said that all caucasian faculty members should be fired. . . . After this initial outburst, I realized that rational communication with Mr. Miller was impossible at that time and concluded the conversation."

Mr. Miller subsequently appointed the members of the "Faculty Committee in the Matter of Filimon D. Kowtoniuk," who conducted the Hearing and answered with their report to the Faculty Senate, of which Mr. Miller at the time was still Chairman. (The fact of Mr. Miller's having appointed the Committee has subsequently been denied; however, it was substantiated during the first hearing and, in fact, is mentioned in the Hearing Committee's report, which states: "A hearing of the charges against Professor Filimon D. Kowtoniuk was held in Virginia Hall, Virginia State College, on April 27, 1971, before a faculty committee appointed for this purpose by the Chairman of the Faculty Senate.")

Then there was the matter of instructions to the Committee. Instead of being asked to look for evidence on both sides of the case, committee members were instructed in a letter to Committee Chairman Isaac Ridley by Dean of the College Elwood B. Boone, March 23, 1971: "In view of certain recent developments, the Administration of the College is requesting that your committee concentrate upon the establishment of supporting evidence of the charge of unprofessional conduct against Mr. Filimon D. Kowtoniuk." In the preparation of the case, the functions of investigation and prosecution were entangled from another standpoint as well: the same representative of the Virginia Attorney General's Office rendered advisory service for the Hearing Committee and functioned as counsel for the prosecution during the hearing. When Dr. Kowtoniuk's counsel attempted to complain about the broad and unspecific nature of charges against Kowtoniuk, the Assistant Attorney General wrote him to "refrain from directly contacting our client." There are probably many legal sub-questions in this connection, but with regard to the matter of tenure's being protected by due process of law, the most significant question is probably: can the same office, in fact the same attorney, impartially advise an investigating committee as a "client" and then conduct the prosecution of the same case which the committee is investigating?

In the matter of allowing observers to attend the hearing, the Administration was quite gracious. The AAUP was allowed to send its designated observer, UPAO sent two, and the Faculty Senate sent three. All were most courteously received by VSC officials, allowed a full view of the entire hearing and even provided with a table for taking notes.

The hearing itself was a marathon affair, lasting from 1:00 P.M. April 27 to well after 2:00 A.M. the following morning with a break for supper. During the hearing, Dr. Kowtoniuk, assisted by his attorney, was given an opportunity to respond to all allegations of unprofessional conduct. It seemed to me as an observer at that hearing that the Committee member who posed the most questions sometimes did so in a distinctly hostile tone when addressing them to Dr. Kowtoniuk or his counsel and in a much friendlier tone when these were directed to those presenting evidence against him. The real fault to be found with the Committee's part in all this, however, lies in the way the Committee Report stated conclusions that were not supportable by the findings noted in that self-same report. This report noted, concerning the eight charges of alleged unprofessional conduct:

Charge No. 1: "The general and consistent acceptance by Dr. Kowtoniuk of the Title of 'Doctor' when he knew he had not earned this right through academic achievement." Kowtoniuk testified that he had completed his dissertation and all requirements for the degree in 1966 and had not used the Ph.D. title before that. A piece of supposed documentary evidence showing that "doctor" had been written in front of Kowtoniuk in 1965 was hastily withdrawn, after it was shown that the handwriting was actually not that of Kowtoniuk. The Committee acquitted him of that charge.

Charge No. 2: "His failure to provide the College academic credentials in the form required by the College and within the deadlines established by the College." In this connection, the Committee noted that "the only deadline which appears to have been established by the Administration for delivery of these documents by Professor Kowtoniuk was thirty-five days after

March 14, 1969." The problem was that while Kowtoniuk had completed his work in 1966 at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, that school would not give him his diploma until he attended graduation exercises in person, which he was able to do only in August 1970. A clause in his 1969-1970 contract had specified that he would have to produce proof of having obtained his diploma before receiving the higher salary which the contract indicated. Since he did not go to Munich in time, he was not given the higher salary. For unstated reasons, the Committee rejected the inconvenience of having to go to Munich to receive a diploma as an excuse for delay, but instead of faulting Kowtoniuk for a delay of sixteen months (April 1969 to August 1970), which would have been the result of his failure to meet what the Committee described as the only deadline set by the College, the Committee proceeded to note that he had been delinquent in delivering his credentials for a full four years. His failure to meet the contract stipulation for the higher salary in 1969-1970 was weighed in the balance, as was the Administration's claim that the Ukrainian Free University had failed to answer letters of inquiry, and the conclusion was the confirmation of this particular charge of unprofessional conduct. (Since it *did* seem strange that the Ukrainian Free University would not answer letters, to confirm or deny the time when Kowtoniuk claimed to have finished his degree requirements, I wrote that school and promptly received a confirmation: "In 1966 Kowtoniuk has completed his dissertation and all requirements toward PhD, but due to personal reasons was unable to come to Munich for the Doctoral Promotion. He came in 1970, participated in the Annual Commencement Exercises, which are prerequisite for promotion, and received his diploma certified by the Ministry of Education of Bavaria." The *New York Times* confirmed the same thing by an on-the-spot check.)

Charge No. 3: "The efforts of the defendant in 1970 to force the Dean of the College to include courses in the summer schedule to be taught by him by the use of intimidation, threats, and other forms of coercion." The incident in question arose when enough students (by standards previously used at VSC to offer a summer school course) petitioned the Administration to allow Dr. Kowtoniuk to teach several summer school courses, and it emerged that while the Administration was willing to allow the courses to be taught three administrators had agreed among themselves that Dr. Kowtoniuk would not be allowed to teach the courses but that they would be taught by another instructor. Dr. Kowtoniuk was not informed of this decision until the last minute. The Committee noted that indeed "the Administration's treatment of Professor Kowtoniuk in the matter of the 1970 summer session was lacking in sincerity and candor." As for the alleged threat against the Dean by Dr. Kowtoniuk, who certainly has no reputation for physical violence, the Committee repeated the Dean's own words: " 'By word inflection, eye expression, gesture and general body movement, Mr. Kowtoniuk conveyed in clearly unmistakeable terms that he was threatening reprisals for the Dean's reluctance to meet his demands. The conference closed as he got up from his chair and walked toward the Dean, who was seated in his seat, all the while expressing hostility and mouthing words of intimidation.' Professor Kowtoniuk categorically denied the accusation." The Committee noted that "the evidence was sparse" concerning the allegation of intimidation; in point of fact, no evidence was offered except the Dean's own testimony, contradicted by Dr. Kowtoniuk. After again rebuking the Administration for some provocation, the Committee went on to find: "Nonetheless, Professor Kowtoniuk's actions constituted unprofessional conduct." Why the word of one of the very administrators who had been cited for lack of sincerity and candor by the Committee in its discussion of that particular charge should have his word taken against that of Dr. Kowtoniuk was, of course, not specified.

Charge No. 4 concerned allegations that Kowtoniuk had attempted to teach the summer school courses referred to above without proper authorization. The fault of the Administration for this state of affairs was so obvious that the Committee acquitted Kowtoniuk of the charge.

Charge No. 5 concerned Kowtoniuk's "attempts to take over" certain German classes and the eviction of a colleague assigned to teach them. What had happened was this: the preliminary injunction from Judge Gates of the Circuit Court in its enumeration of rights to be restored to Dr. Kowtoniuk included the provision that he was to be allowed to "attend" classes. Incredibly enough, the Administration insisted on a casuistic interpretation of the word "attend"–i.e., that he could go to classes but not teach them. Kowtoniuk then went every day to the classes which he believed to be his, asked the instructor sent by the Administration to leave (which he did), and taught the classes. As soon as Judge Gates was available, the wording of the injunction was clarified in a permanent injunction which spelled out the obvious: that in taking back Dr. Kowtoniuk, the College was obliged to let him teach his classes. In considering all this, the Committee noted that even the Administration was subsequently forced to concede that Kowtoniuk's interpretation of the preliminary injunction was correct and that the other instructor had testified "that the classes were not seriously disrupted, hence the inconvenience is considered minimal," but went on to dwell on the embarrassment caused to the other instructor. Summing up the matter, the Committee concluded that the eviction of this colleague from Kowtoniuk's classes constituted "unprofessional conduct since Professor Kowtoniuk could, presumably, have achieved the same result with the aid of the Circuit Court and without embarrassment to a professional peer or inconvenience to students." This conclusion boggles the mind. What Dr. Kowtoniuk did at the earliest possible moment was precisely what the Committee said he should have done, namely, get an official clarification of the court order. Kowtoniuk was not even non-violently opposing a court order; he was non-violently enforcing it under most trying circumstances.

Charge No. 6: "The inability of Mr. Kowtoniuk to get along well with the members of his academic department and administrative officials of the College which caused friction in the Department and lessened the ability of the Department to function effectively and efficiently." It was here that the Administration offered the only shadow of justifiable criticism of Dr. Kowtoniuk as a professor made during the entire hearing: statements remained uncontested that he missed departmental and committee meetings. Dr. Kowtoniuk rested his defense primarily on his contribution to the Foreign Language Department in other ways. An obvious aspect of the matter which the Committee chose to ignore was the fact that most of the missed meetings occurred during the period after the

College had originally attempted to fire Dr. Kowtoniuk summarily. Since his Department Head had been on the side of the administrators in question in their disagreements with Kowtoniuk–both his Department Head since the fall of 1971 and the previous interim Department Head testified for the Administration at the hearing–Dr. Kowtoniuk was being indicted for not being a team player on a team whose captain was attempting to throw him off of it. "Accordingly, the Committee evaluated Kowtoniuk's failure to cooperate with departmental members as a serious example of unprofessional conduct."

Charge No. 7: "Mr. Kowtoniuk's conduct in relationship to the public press for which he was censored (sic) formally by the Faculty Senate." The evidence was a single newspaper article in the Petersburg *Progress-Index*, dealing with affairs at VSC and giving Kowtoniuk as the source of information. The Committee based two partial findings of unprofessional conduct on this: "While meetings of the Faculty Senate are not secret, they are not open to the general public and it was an abuse of discretion for Professor Kowtoniuk to publicize their proceedings." Also, "Professor Kowtoniuk failed to indicate that he was not a spokesman for the Faculty Senate." The information was concerned with the possible resignation of several administrators, a College deficit of $360,000 resulting partly from low student-teacher ratios, and the absence of salary increases for the coming year. Dr. Kowtoniuk indicated, no doubt naively, that he did not know that his discussion with the reporter in question would end up as a news article and that he had subsequently apologized to the Faculty Senate for the fact that the information appeared as it did. Obviously if he did not know that the article was to be written on the basis of his information, he could not have asked to have it made clear that he was not a spokesman for the Faculty Senate. Be that as it may, by contemporary standards it normally takes a great deal more indiscretion in speech than that shown by Dr. Kowtoniuk for such speech reasonably to be equated with unprofessional conduct. The Committee was no doubt influenced by the apparent weight which the Faculty Senate attached to the matter, according to the Administration's charge. Among the criticisms of the hearing, however, noted by the observers from the Faculty Senate in their report is this item: "We were concerned about the non-critical acceptance of certain statements presented by the administrators. For example, the acceptance of the administrators' statement that Dr. Kowtoniuk has been censured by the Faculty Senate. We as Senators knew this to be in error but in our roles as observers could say nothing."

Charge No. 8: "The making of slanderous and malicious statements and the assignment of motives to the actions of certain administrative officials of the College in connection with this case without any valid basis for them." There is no question that Kowtoniuk was vehement in certain letters to Administrators, who he felt were attempting to have his employment terminated. In one, he accused an Administrator of using "a smoke screen to cover your dirty tricks." In another he likened the Administration's method of proceeding against him to that used by Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany. For some reason, however, the Committee noted but chose to attach no importance to the fact that these were letters which were not made public until the administrators who received them chose to make them public. Here, too, the context of our times is significant. In a day when the U.S. President can be publicly likened to Hitler in stories carried across the country, it is difficult to see why College administrators should be protected from the same indignity in a letter destined for their eyes alone. The Committee did note that the malice of the letters was generated by actions of the administrators concerned but concluded somewhat vaguely: "To the extent that the letters are malicious, they represent unprofessional conduct."

It is very questionable whether the individual findings of the Committee would have added up to a charge of "unprofessional conduct" in the minds of most persons familiar with the academic scene of the last ten years or so. Even if they were to have done so—and, no doubt, each educational institution should be permitted *some* latitude in determining its own view of unprofessional conduct—does not a spirit of elementary fairness in quasi-judicial proceedings demand that a distinction be made between acts which were directly provoked and those which were not? And yet, there is no mention of the Administration's provocations, which had been noted in the consideration of individual charges, when we get to the Committee's account of its final conclusion: "[I]t is the opinion of the Committee that the evidence warrants the dismissal of Professor Kowtoniuk for unprofessional conduct. This opinion is based on the cumulative effect of the evidence under each of six charges (#2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Charges 1 and 4 were not sustained."

None of the observers or observer groups was satisfied with the hearing, and all made complaints concerning matters of formal due process, the discrepancy between what was implied to have been and what really was proven in the Committee's hearing, or both. But here we come to another curious aspect of the seemingly built-in protections in the tenure system. What must happen when the written protests of observers at what amounts to the trial of a tenured professor on matters of due process or the discrepancy between asserted and proven guilt are ignored? The Kowtoniuk case reveals an alarmingly simple fact: nothing *must* happen. Worse than that, the case shows that not only can the protests of observers from professional groups be safely ignored, but that at the same time the *presence* of the observers whose protests were ignored can be cited to show that due process was given the accused teacher. What we have throughout the Kowtoniuk case is a mockery of due process; however, it is a mockery because of the spirit in which the proceedings were conducted and the conclusions were reached, not because of the lack of such formal safeguards as observers.

The UPAO's General Counsel in Virginia, John A. Paul, who had been one of the observers at the hearing, drew up a memorandum noting the most objectionable features of the case, as outlined thus far in this article. It was submitted by registered mail to the President of VSC in one copy and the Rector of the Board of Visitors (Board of Trustees) in another. Subsequent testimony from Board members, however, failed to indicate that serious—if any—consideration was given to the UPAO's written objections or to those raised by observers from the VSC faculty. Kowtoniuk was allowed to appear before the Board of Visitors to testify in his own behalf when the Board met to consider the Committee's report and their own action to be taken, along with other business, on July 21, 1971. Kowtoniuk's plea, however, was directed more towards establishing a basis for reconciliation on a partly common-sense, partly emotional, level than towards presenting a tightly reasoned legal defense. Kowtoniuk, incidentally, had been able to hire counsel for the Faculty Committee hearing, but had exhausted his funds and had no legal assistance except what Mr. Paul and the UPAO could provide him with occasionally between the summers of 1971 and 1972. It emerged from subsequent testimony that the Board of Visitors had considered only "the three principal evidences of Professor Kowtoniuk's unprofessional conduct" noted by the Faculty Committee, namely: "(1) his failure and refusal to serve on important departmental committees; (2) his failure to work cooperatively with members of his department; and (3) his eviction of a colleague from a class which the colleague had been assigned to teach." (The attentive reader will notice that numbers (1) and (2) come from a splitting of *Charge No. 6* into two counts.) At any rate, members of the Board of Visitors considered his case along with other business at a meeting on July 21, 1971, and decided that Dr. Kowtoniuk was guilty of unprofessional conduct to the point of forfeiting tenure rights. He was informed of their decision by the VSC President, Wendell P. Russell, in a letter dated August 7, 1971.

The UPAO advised Dr. Kowtoniuk to take his case to court right away. Since Kowtoniuk had virtually no money and it was another year before a law firm volunteered its services for only the reimbursement of expenses, Dr. Kowtoniuk spent much of that year learning that there were no lines of defense between the institutional-academic safeguards, which had failed him so gloriously, and the courts. Both the Governor and the Attorney General had some ability to influence the outcome of the case, or to help in reaching a settlement without a court case; both of them, however, declined to do anything. The Governor's Office recommended that Dr. Kowtoniuk be assisted by "one of the national professional organizations or possibly the American Civil Liberties Union." Actually, the UPAO, as one national professional organization, was supporting his cause already; the ACLU was approached for support a long time ago but has evidently had a long and soul-rending time of it deciding whether it wanted to become involved. More interest was shown, perhaps surprisingly, by the legislative branch of the state. On March 8, 1972, Virginia House of Delegates Appropriations Committee Chairman W. Roy Smith called a joint open hearing of the Appropriations Committee, the Education Committee, and the Chairman of the Courts of Justice Committee, for both sides in the Kowtoniuk controversy to present their case. They did, and some significant testimony, particularly from the VSC Board of Visitors, was obtained. It was at that point, for example, that testimony from a member of the Board of Visitors revealed that the Board had considered only findings related to *Charge No. 5* and *Charge No. 6* (split in two) before recommending dismissal. But testimony in and of itself does not accomplish anything, and the hearing seems to have served largely the ends of enlightenment—laudable ends, but not immediately usable in protecting tenure rights.

During the summer of 1972, the Richmond law firm of Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore took on the case without requiring a fee of Dr. Kowtoniuk. Then, in September, the second line of defense for the protection of tenure rights was put to a test: Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard Dr. Kowtoniuk's plea for injunctive relief, i.e. reinstatement by court order pending a full trial of his case on its merits. Judge Merhige listened to both sides present their case almost the whole day of September 12. It had struck me that *here* would be the place where testimony from an observer at the Faculty Committee's hearing of this teacher should be effective, particularly since there was agreement among the observers or the groups they represented that the hearing had not been as fair as it should have been. It turned out, however—and this may come as a surprise to other academicians who are laymen in the science of the law—that such testimony was not at all welcome in Judge Merhige's court. When I attempted to testify concerning why Dr. Kowtoniuk would be considered to have been denied a fair hearing in normal academic circles on the basis of what I had observed first-hand at his hearing, most of the testimony was stricken from the record at the request of the Assistant Attorneys General who represented Virginia State College. The reason is an interesting one: "This man is attempting to testify in expert vein" were the words which introduced most of the successful attempts to keep my testimony out of the record. The point is that an observer from a professional organization is not considered an expert on matters of due process or even of standards of academic fairness unless he can show expertise in having dealt with the specific type of case being argued, assumedly in many varied instances. I wanted to explain that tenure cases which go to trial are so extremely rare that no teacher can be expected to be an *expert* in them, but that observers at academic hearings are intended to assure that proceedings are conducted in a fair and impartial manner by normal academic standards and that it was on aspects of fairness and impartiality that I was attempting to testify. I was not permitted to do very much explaining, however, and what I did get out failed to impress Judge Merhige in the least. The matter does, however, raise something of a question for professional organizations in their choice of observers at faculty-committee hearings: if they are going to testify in courts of law on matters of fairness and impartiality, while to testify effectively presupposes the technical background and experience to testify "in expert vein," then the observers should be selected with this in mind. Nothing could be further from the purpose than attempting to have a "typical" college professor—for the typical college professor has minimal or no experience with legal aspects of contested tenure cases—fill this role.

The Court's decision was given on September 29: it went against Dr. Kowtoniuk. The underlying rationale for the decision was that since the forms of due process had been observed, due process had been given Dr. Kowtoniuk. In fairness to Judge Merhige, it should be noted that since the hearing before his court was for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was more heavily on Kowtoniuk as the seeker for this special measure than it would have been if he were simply a party in a regular civil suit.

Judge Merhige did, to be sure, take up some of the evidence that due process had not been given; however, he succeeded in putting it down again without letting it influence his decision. As I later read his decision and perceived the second line of defense for tenure protection breaking down, as far as Dr. Kowtoniuk was concerned, all sorts of questions sprang to mind.

How about the fact that the Faculty Committee was directed by a letter from the Dean of the College to concentrate on establishing Dr. Kowtoniuk's guilt? Judge Merhige took notice of this: "I suggest that the lack of a good choice of language in that letter may well have given rise to some of the problems that we are faced with. I refer to that portion of the letter of March 23rd [1971] which suggests that the administration committee [Note: *It was not supposed to have been an administration committee, but a faculty committee; unwittingly, perhaps, Judge Merhige used the proper term for that committee*] concentrate upon the establishment of supporting evidence. [Note: *This paraphrase changes "is requesting" to a mild "suggests" and shortens "evidence of the charge of unprofessional conduct" to "evidence" if we look at the actual wording in the letter from the Dean of the College*]. That is enough to get anybody flipped." *But the question, Your Honor, is not whether anybody was flipped, but whether the committee was instructed to concentrate on evidence supporting guilt rather than evidence related to both sides of the case.* As for the fairness of the Faculty Committee, the very fact that it "tempered" an administration charge was taken by Judge Merhige as "evidence certainly for our purposes, of its fairness, for by its criticism of the administration it belies any reason for this Court to say that this Committee was hand picked." *Isn't the problem rather, Your Honor, that the Committee let an unproven charge slide by as proven—even while forced to chide the administration for its enormities?*

How about Dr. Kowtoniuk's obedience to the intent of the Circuit Court order and the casuistry of the College Administration in interpreting "to attend classes" as not including the right "to teach" classes? Instead of facing that particular issue, Judge Merhige chose to confine his comments to the embarrassment and inconvenience caused to the evicted colleague and to the students by Dr. Kowtoniuk's insistence on the right to teach his classes on the basis of the Circuit Court's preliminary injunction: "Frankly, had the Court been the finder of fact on that alone, and from the evidence before me, I would have had no hesitation finding exactly the same way." *Just try to think now: what possible reason could Judge Gates of the Circuit Court have had in ordering that a teacher be allowed to attend* *classes without teaching them when the very purpose of issuing the order had been to reverse the summary action of the institution in dismissing him from his position as a teacher?*

In probing further into the question of whether or not Dr. Kowtoniuk had had due process, Judge Merhige noted that Dr. Kowtoniuk's "alleged inability to get along well with the members of his academic department, was found by the committee to have been sustained, and was fairly obvious from the Court's observations. There is at the minimum a personality conflict between Dr. Kowtoniuk and certain members of the administration." *Indeed there was and is such a personality conflict. But isn't this precisely the sort of thing which tenure guarantees are supposed to guard against—the possibility of construing personality conflicts as evidence of misconduct?* Further, Dr. Kowtoniuk was convicted by the Committee of making "slanderous and malicious statements in reference to the action of certain administration officials of the college in connection with this case without any valid basis for them," which Judge Merhige found a reasonable thing for the Committee to have done. *Dr. Kowtoniuk's written epithets were no doubt vehement on occasion, as noted above, although, really now, by today's standard of political rhetoric how extreme were they? Again, doesn't the fact count for anything that they were made privately in correspondence and publicized only by the Administration? Is it possible that tenure does not protect even non-public written statements?*

Remonstrating with court decisions is, of course, an "academic" pursuit in one of the less favorable connotations of that word, unless there is some intention of taking further legal steps. There is no doubt but that someday, somehow, Kowtoniuk will be vindicated through the courts or outside of them, although the steps to be taken remain uncertain at the moment. In the meantime the lesson of his case is worth reviewing for the light which it throws on the effectiveness of tenure safeguards as such.

Part of the lesson is the inefficacy of observer groups at trial-like tenure proceedings. Observer groups are allowed to come to hearings, obviously enough, to observe. But then what? We recall that in this case all three observers or observer groups criticized the hearing on main points. But it would seem that the presence of these observer groups was merely decorative. Certainly the Administration remained unmoved by their findings, and, although these were submitted to the court as evidence, there is no indication that Judge Merhige took account of them in judging whether or not the hearing had been fair and impartial.

In short, the two lines of defense, academic-institutional and legal, can easily fail to give meaningful protection. Where a faculty hearing committee can be allowed merely to go through the motions of due process in recommending dismissal of a tenured professor "for cause" without being held accountable for its fairness and impartiality and where a court can certify that due process has been given to that tenured professor simply because that faculty committee has gone through these motions, tenure does not provide much of a guarantee for academic freedom.

The Crisis of Today's University:

Reviews

Robert Nisbet, *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma: The University in America 1945-1970*, New York: Basic Books, 1970

James M. Buchanan and Nicos E. Devletoglou, *Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis*, New York: Basic Books, 1970

Sidney Hook, *Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy*, New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1970

Gottfried Dietze, *Youth, University and Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970

Nathan Glazer, *Remembering the Answers: Essays on the American Student Revolt*, New York: Basic Books, 1970

Charles Frankel, *Education and the Barricades*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1968

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MANY OF US ARE INSUFFICIENTLY aware of the fact that the defenders of the idea of the traditional university have published several books in recent years. We should read them carefully, both for our own benefit and for that of our cause as a whole.

Robert Nisbet, professor of sociology at the University of California at Riverside, has spoken with a consistently sane voice within the academic community. He continues to display this sanity in his *Degradation of the Academic Dogma*, one of the most important books on the nature of the current university crisis to have appeared of late. Prof. Nisbet argues that the university is the last of the great medieval institutions to have come under the assault of the modern mind. This attack gained momentum immediately after the Second World War, to reach a point of especially intense crisis at the end of the 1960's. The university's stability over so many centuries was due, Prof. Nisbet believes, partly to its hierarchical structure, partly to its dedication to the ideal of fruitful interplay between teaching and research. But then after the Second World War the infusion of large amounts of money from outside sources, primarily but not solely governmental, distorted the university's structure through the instrumentality of faculty members who founded institutes on campuses which largely bypassed, and thus greatly weakened, the old lines of authority through deans and department chairmen, institutes in which research was divorced from teaching. In the course of some two decades the university was so weakened from within by these processes that it proved extraordinarily vulnerable to the attack begun by radical extremists around 1964. If the university is to be salvaged at all—and there is no guarantee that it will be, Nisbet writes: new forms for the transmission and extension of learning may have to be devised—it will be through a stripping away of the foreign growths which have attached themselves to the university and a return to the notion of the university as a place where teaching and research work together in tandem. Prof. Nisbet is sometimes a trifle wordy in his argumentation, but his major lines of thought emerge clearly and supply a fruitful framework for theoretical discussion. But the hour is late, and he is not altogether optimistic. "I could be more respectful of most of the current repudiation of the university conceived as center for the dispassionate study of nature, society and man," he says, "if it were not for the fact that in these there is more than repudiation of the university: there is also repudiation of the very ideal of dispassionate reason. I do not see how civilization can very long survive that."

Prof. Buchanan, of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and Prof. Devletoglou of the London School of Economics, have also contributed a fascinating theoretical treatment of the university crisis, this time by the simple expedient of applying an elementary economic analysis to the educational process and demonstrating how irrationally it is organized from a purely economic point of view. They start from the premise that education is, after all, not a free economic good: though supplied without cost to certain consumers, it is in fact extremely expensive. Under the current dispensation, the authors point out (their discussion applies primarily to tuition-free or low-tuition state institutions, but has relevance for private universities as well), education is a "unique industry" because "(1) those who consume its product do not purchase it; (2) those who produce it do not sell it; and (3) those who finance it do not control it." The authors demonstrate each of these propositions reasonably successfully, and then urge that the universities be reorganized along more economically rational lines, with the consumers (students) paying the cost of what they consume, but with a free market supplying them with greater flexibility in selection. Introduce free-market principles into the academic world and many of our problems will vanish, the authors maintain. Not everyone may accept the full argument made in *Academia in Anarchy*, but at least its authors outline a valid theoretical approach to the question of the university today. Quite possibly a combination of their viewpoint with that of Prof. Nisbet would yield some valuable suggestions as to the university's proper course for the future.

Prof. Hook's *Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy* is less concerned with the university as an institution than the first two books under review. Hook is well known as a forthright proponent of true liberalism, toleration of genuine freedom of discussion, in the American academy. He has spoken and written extensively on this subject over the years, and lately he has been a major motive force behind University Centers for Rational Alternatives, which seeks to defend the spirit of free inquiry against totalitarian and illiberal pressures, which lately have emanated principally from the left. Prof. Hook's book is a detailed treatment of the permissible limits of freedom of discussion within the university; it also summons the guardians of free discussion to resort to the police power of the state without apology in order to safeguard the "democratic process" of discussion and persuasion when it comes under undemocratic attack. Prof. Hook's work is rich in illustrations drawn from the university setting of recent years, but his treatment of the issues is almost as applicable to the problems of an open society generally as it is to the university as a unique institution.

In his *Youth, University and Democracy* Prof. Gottfried Dietze of Johns Hopkins analyzes the historical ideal of the university in the West. He tends to be overcautious in his statements and to operate at a rather high level of philosophical abstraction. He also thinks that in the long view of history the current troubles of the university are not very serious. One can only hope that he is correct in this, but the chances are quite good that he is not. Prof. Dietze has read and thought a great deal about the history of the university, and he is thoroughly committed to the idea of the university as a place of research and learning.

Nathan Glazer, professor of education and social structure at Harvard University, has collected a number of his articles published from 1961 to 1969 in *Remembering the Answers*, a volume in which he hopes to demonstrate how a "mild radical" of the 1950's could develop into a "mild conservative" in the 1970's. Prof. Glazer was in the thick of things at Berkeley and Harvard; being a man of some balance and judgment, at least when speaking of things he has observed at first hand, he has many enlightening comments to make on teaching as an art, civil disobedience on the campus, student power, grading practices, campus rules, and similar topics. Prof. Glazer adopts a pragmatic approach to these questions, and he sincerely seeks solutions which will benefit serious students and preserve the idea of the university, though his policies might be characterized as a trifle "mild." The book takes its title from a quotation from Norman Podhoretz which illuminates the situation of the defenders of the traditional concept of the university: "William Phillips once told the New-Left minded English critic Kenneth Tynan that he could not argue with him about politics because Tynan's arguments were so old that he, Phillips, could no longer remember the answers." It is now our task to recover those answers, and Prof. Glazer has assisted us in this.

Education and the Barricades is a short discussion of the more excruciating aspects of the university crisis by Charles Frankel, professor of philosophy and international affairs at Columbia University and formerly a State Department official. He raises a number of philosophical questions about radical student activism: whether the actions which protestors undertake are appropriate to the situation against which they are protesting, whether student radicals have the moral right to impose upon those who disagree with them, and so forth. Prof. Frankel might well agree with the stands of the radicals on some specific issues, but he values the principle of the university and free discussion sufficiently to defend them in a very reasonable way. It is less clear, however, what he would do were he to find himself in a situation in which the resources of reason had been exhausted. Sidney Hook leaves us in no doubt as to what he would do, by contrast.

Certainly any member of the academic community who is seriously concerned about the future of the American university should read these books, especially the first three reviewed, for without a definite theory of what the university should be, we shall continue to stagger under the pressure of those who do espouse a clear, and also pernicious, notion of the direction in which the universities should be pushed.

—Charles A. Moser
The George Washington University

Adam Ulam, *The Fall of the American University*, London: Alcove Press, 1972.

Adam Ulam, Professor of Government at Harvard University, has supplied a welcome contribution to that growing literature on the plight of the contemporary American university which attempts to analyze our present situation dispassionately and objectively. *The Fall of the American university* follows the tradition of such books as Robert Nisbet's *Decline of the Academic Dogma* in affirming that the American university can be salvaged only if it returns to its primary, and consciously limited, function of learning, teaching and the advancement of knowledge through research. The core of Ulam's message, then, is not startling, but it is one which seemingly must be made over and over again until finally it penetrates the consciousness of those responsible for the conduct of the academy's affairs.

Professor Ulam is not a sociologist, and his book lacks the factual and historical underpinnings of Nisbet's work or Sidney Hook's *Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy*. By way of compensation, it is a graceful and impressionistic essay written on the basis of personal experience at Harvard over the past several years by a man who can keep his intellectual bearings when many of his colleagues have virtually ceased to function rationally. Professor Ulam traces the rise of the university after the conclusion of the Second World War and its increasing involvement in affairs of state when academic specialists ceased to be "on tap but not on top" and thus made the university crucially vulnerable to the attack mounted upon it by faculty and student radicals in the 1960's. As a student of communist affairs, Professor Ulam is more sensitive than many to the totalitarian implications of contemporary radical demands upon the university; he is disturbed by the continuing despotism of "platitudes" in our national political discourse and, more especially, in the academy. He is not wholly sanguine about the future of the university as an institution, but he does think he perceives the beginnings of a "counter-revolution of common-sense" which may in the end repair much of the damage done by the recent hysteria. It is common sense which Professor Ulam exhibits in his analysis of the university crisis, and it is common sense to which we should repair in our defense of the university. The situation of the United States in the 1960's in many ways reminds me of that of Russia in the 1860's, the most radical decade of nineteenth century Russian history. The moderates in Russia of that day also argued in the name of common sense, but they were condemned out of hand by the radicals, who maintained that he who was not with them was against them. No doubt something of the same treatment will be meted out to Professor Ulam in certain quarters. His analysis seems to me basically correct, however, and his book deserves to be read by all those concerned over the future of the university.

—Charles A. Moser
The George Washington University

Jacques Barzun, *The American University*, New York: Harpe and Row Publishers, Inc., 1970.

A few years ago, when Neo-Barbarism in the form of student and faculty activists crashed the gates of Academia, the publishing industry reacted to this disaster in its usual way: it unleashed a spate of instant books on the topic, most of them with a leftist slant. In *The American University* Jacques Barzun is as critical of the university as are the leftist authors, but for quite different reasons.

Barzun is a well known figure in higher education. At Columbia University he has been a successful teacher, essayist, scholar, and administrator—certainly an unusual combination of careers. As the crest of the revolution rolled over the campuses he wrote this book; in it he describes the nature of the crisis, how it came about, and—hopefully—how it can be solved.

A conservative in the intellectual sense, Barzun wishes to preserve the historic university and its values, which are derived from the Judaeo-Christian, Classical, and Enlightenment traditions that have moulded the ideals of Western man. The aim of higher education, as he sees it, is to seek "the cultivation and tempering of the mind so that it becomes flexible and strong." The reader who sympathizes with such an outlook will appreciate the temper of Barzun's mind, with its patrician flair, its emphasis on style and form, and its dedication to reasoned analysis.

He believes that our troubles started a generation ago when, because of accidental drift and wrong-headed presumption, the university began to accept responsibilities that had nothing to do with its main task of educating the young in the liberal arts and sciences: "In a democratic welfare state, resistance to demands of any kind is extremely difficult." The government offered money lavishly—if the university would help with certain national problems; the big foundations sought to lure it with a siren song of grants—if it would participate in social engineering and radical experimentation. Alas, Alma Mater was seized by gigantomania. But as late as the early 1950's this process had not yet done serious damage and was still reversible. Barzun shows, by using the then-and-now technique, how huge has been the frenzied expansion of the university in the last generation. Some analysts would stop at this point, saying that the suddenness of the expansion caused natural dislocations similar to adolescent growing pains; however, they would add, intelligent administration and the passing of time will solve all the problems that have arisen. But Barzun turns his humanist's eye on the crisis and sees that the boom era has produced a malaise of the spirit and serious dislocations in the realm of values. When the awareness of crisis dawned, the university, stricken by affluence, no longer sure of its mission, and driven in all directions at once by a cacophony of demanding voices, began to thrash about frenetically, trying to find a way out of trouble. Then the stage was set for a classical tragedy. The university continued to blunder into more mistakes. It pursued the same things that had caused its original woes: sweeping change, fast growth, and big money. These remedies intensified at an exponential rate the virulence of the very disease they were supposed to cure. In the final act the university, having lost its bearings, began to drop standards, to play with student power, to ape life, and to seek the twin goals of relevance and innovation.

In the course of his presentation Barzun attacks many sacred cows and clichés. For instance, he points out that all learning cannot be exciting and provocative; that the visiting foreign professor may lend prestige to a school, but his employment usually is a waste of money; that the person the students think of as a great teacher is often known to his colleagues as a liability; that in education there is much fakery and gimmickry: "Use mathematical symbols to discuss French irregular verbs and your future may be made." Some other select quotations: "The open dorm is akin to the open town"; "What passes for education today would not deceive a child." Barzun sees the so-called knowledge explosion in many fields as only a proliferation of useless publications. He cautions us to "be sober" about innovative methods of teaching, and asks how many really new ideas appear in a century. In fact, he rejects dialogues, panel discussions, and "rap sessions" as humbug, and champions the formal lecture because of its "didactic energy." Finally, he is frank about the realities of the profession: academic competition is "vicious," and the life of the non-tenured teacher is "hellish."

The book has weaknesses. Barzun certainly cannot be accused of espousing any devil theory of the past; he does not really accuse anyone in particular of causing the crisis. According to him, the villain is, in a sense, all of us who have permitted certain things to happen by small accretions. However, it might have been good if he had examined the ideas of certain spokesmen of change such as Clark Kerr (mentioned only once and then obliquely). He might have then found that many did not sleepwalk into crisis but were led. One other dimension of the problem escapes scrutiny. The ailing body of American higher education has been permeated–like American society in general–by the creeping ideologies of leftism, which, as a result, is now the reigning view on most campuses. We know that the overwhelming majority of professors in the fields that teach values have opinions ranging from liberal to radical-revolutionary. Changing the imbalance of opinion so that students may be exposed to other views will be a difficult task, but it will be a precondition to restoring the traditional role of the university–the goal that Barzun says must be reached before we can find any solution to the current crisis.

Barzun is a responsible critic, not a system monger. He does not propose to replace at once the present imperfect academy with Utopia University. With his historical perspective he sees things *sub specie aeternitatis* and notes that despairing situations have come and gone in Academia. Even Cambridge University once fell so low as to grant degrees to barbers.

What chance do his moderate views have of getting a hearing? Probably not much. On the campuses the clamorings of the radicals are maintained at a high volume. Arguments such as Barzun's are meant to be heard in an atmosphere where the mind is alert, where it is tuned to pick up the clear harmonies of intelligent discourse and where reason is free to operate unhindered by the roar of unreason.

–Martin Kilcoyne
East Carolina University